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ABSTRACT
Though urban transportation planning decisions often have to be made
with considerable uncertainty surrounding knowledge of their impacts, ex-
plicit consideration of this factor is usually not present in the supporting
evaluation methodology. Furthermore, characteristics of the complex deci-
sion environment generally preclude the use of existing formal decision
methodologies. This thesis develops a decision aid for a class of trans-
portation decision problems in which an analyst is assisting a decision
maker in selecting from a large finite set of options whose impact is not
known with certainty. The features of this decision aid are specified in
a set of basic considerations, reflecting characteristics of the problem
environment as well as behavioral aspects of individual decision making.
Building upon those considerations, an overall decision aiding framework is
developed, consisting of three sequential activities: elimination, pair-
wise comparisons and global comparison.
The main thrust of the methodological development in this thesis con-
sists of the pairwise comparisons procedure (within the above decision
aiding framework) including its structure as well as its specific elements.
The methodology revolves around the construction of a binary preference-
indifference relation,over the set of options, that is consistent with the
properties of partial semi-orders (postulated as a model for such a rela-
tion, based on the above basic considerations). The first component of
the methodology consists of a mechanism for building an initial unrestric-
tive preference-indifference relation, featuring regret-based risk measures
summarizing the implications of a binary choicesituation; it is presented
for an important problem subclass where the options' impact is expressed
along a single attribute and uncertainty represented via alternative scen-
arios. Violations of the starting postulates by this initial relation are
discussed, along with rules for identifying such inconsistenciestin a given
problem situation, constituting the second component of the methodology. Its
third component then consists of approaches for correcting such inconsis-
tencies; three such approaches are presented and their implications dis-
cussed. The remaining component consists of obtaining a reduced subset of
superior options using the "corrected" relation.
Variations on some of the elements of the core methodology are presented,
defining a family of decision rules for use within the above basic structure,
thus increasing the flexibility of the methodology by allowing its details
to be fine-tuned to specific decision situations. In addition to analyzing
mathematical properties of the above variations, problem situations where
each would be appropriate are identified and illustrated via numerical
examples.
The methodology is subsequently generalized to the case where uncertain-
ty (in the alternative options' impact) is represented through probability
density (ormass) functions. In addition, extension to a problem subclass
where options are explicitly evaluated with respect to their uncertain im-
pact along multiple criteria is discussed.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of issues facing (an analyst
in) the application of the decision aid, and offers several guidelines and
suggestions to that effect.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Yosef Sheffi
Title: Associate Professor of Civil Engineering
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Decisions in transportation planning often have to be made with consid-
erable uncertainty surrounding knowledge of their impacts. Indeed, uncer-
tainty in future conditions, both for the long run and increasingly in the
short run, has emerged as one of the major factors that transportation
systems analysts and planners have to contend with (Manheim, 1981; Visser,
1977; Westerman, 1981). Despite its (widely acknowledged) significance,
explicit consideration of this factor is often not present in the evaluation
and design of transportation options; when not altogether ignored, its
treatment has been through ad hoc approaches usually involving sensitivity
analyses and/or alternative scenarios. A critical gap thus exists in the
field in terms of appropriate methodological support for decision-making in
the face of uncertainty.
Further complexity is introduced by the need to take a multiplicity
of criteria into consideration; indeed, it is widely recognized that many
social, economic and environmental impacts in both the short run and the
long run result from or are otherwise affected by the implementation of
transportation options. Furthermore, the decision to be ultimately im-
plemented depends on a multiplicity of actors/decision-makers, with dif-
fering and often conflicting opinions and preferences. This results in
another important feature of decision-making in the urban transportation
context, namely the ambiguity and impreciseness of the preference or value
structure on which decisions should be based.
tSee section 1.2 for a more elaborate survey of previous and existing
approaches.
In contrast with the considerable sophistication reached in our pre-
diction methodology, there is a notable absence of explicit treatment
of the above complexities in models of evaluation and choice. This situ-
ation is largely due to the high input requirements and/or restrictive
assumptions of formal decision methodologies, whereby the latter seem
irrelevant or unresponsive to the realities of the decision problem and
its complex environment (Michaud, 1976).
In the absence of appropriate decision aiding methodology, decisions
reached by unstructured, ad hoc, or overly simplified strategies are likely
to result in "missing" better options (than the one selected from among
the set of possible options). Similarly, but at the other extreme, use
of sophisticated butrestrictive approaches has the danger of misrepresen-
ting the true preferences of the decision unit(s), and thus also discarding
better options. This thesis is, however, motivated by the belief
that the use of decision aids for option selection and decision making, if
properly designed, can help analysts and decision makers focus their limited
attention/integration capabilities, and resources, on essential elements
of the evaluation, and as such improve the efficiency of decision making,
as well as its effectiveness (in the sense of not missing better options).
In the face of such complexity, Simon (1979) has noted that only one
of two approaches are possible: either to build optimal models at the cost
tFor example, see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1982) or Daganzo (1980) for the
state-of-the-art and recent advances in travel demand analysis; on the
performance or "supply" side, see Larson and Odoni (1981) or Trans.
Res. B., Vol. 14, #1/2 (1980).
§These methodologies have evolved in related disciplines and fields of
application such as operations research, decision theory, management
science, economics, water resources planning, mathematical psychology,
etc. See review in Mahmassani (1980b).
of simplifying environmental assumptions, or to develop heuristic models
that maintain greater environmental realism. Keeping in mind that the
definition of optimality in the context of choice among uncertain or
multi-attributed options is controversial at best (Keen, 1977; Simon, 1978;
Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981), we have opted for the second approach in this
research effort. While the overall aim guiding this research has been the
development of an integrated structured analytical apparatus for transpor-
tation evaluation and decision-making that would be cognizant of the com-
plexity of the decision problems, and operational in terms of being com-
patible with the realities of the decision environment, this thesis is
presented as a bounded contribution towards the achievement of that aim.
In more specific terms, the objectives pursued in this thesis consist
of the development of a decision aid, consisting of a family of decision
rules embedded within a coherent methodological structure, for a repre-
sentative (of the urban transport context) class of problems involving
selection among a large finite set of options whose impact is not known
with certainty; primary emphasis is on cases where the impact is expressed
in a single criterion, though special cases where it is expressed along
multiple criteria are considered. Furthermore, the methodology is to be
consistent with a set of basic considerations which are to be derived from
the decision environment as well as behavioral aspects of individual
decision-making and judgement.
While we recognize that different decision environments pose differ-
ent methodological requirements, and that it is rather unlikely that any
single unique "off-the-shelf" technique perfectly fits those requirements,
it is still possible to identify a common structure to the formulation of
the decision problems encountered. It is then possible to pursue the
development of the core of the decision aid within this formulation and
obtain a useful product provided sufficient flexibility is allowed to later
fine tune it to the specific problem at hand.
The next section provides a more detailed characterization of the
decision environment as it relates to the user of the methodology. Sec-
tion 1.2 subsequently presents a brief discussion of the types and sources
of uncertainty of interest to this study and its representation; approaches
for dealing with it in the transportation literature are also briefly re-
viewed. Section 1.3 discusses the treatment of the other dimensions
identified earlier in transportation evaluation and decision-making. Sec-
tion 1.4 then presents a mathematical formulation of the subclasses of prob-
lems addressed in this thesis. Section 1.5 summarizes this chapter, and
provides an overview of the thesis, highlighting its principal accomplish-
ments.
1.1 Decision Problem Environment
In this section, a characterization is given for the type of decision
environment in which the classes of problems addressed in this thesis arise,
and thus where the methodology developed herein can come to play a role.
a. It is first assumed that technical analysis and evaluation is the
responsibility of a single agency, for which it typically has some form
of public mandate. This agency is referred to hereafter as the "lead"
agency.
b. In this agency, there exists a single individual (or a group of
individuals who "speak with one voice") who is ultimately responsible for
that agency's position, and can be considered, for all practical purposes,
as the "decision-maker". It is therefore assumed that there exists a sin--
gle source of preferential information, hereafter referred to as the
"decision-maker".
c. However, the final outcome of the decision-making activity is not
necessarily solely determined by the above "decision maker", but is the
result of interaction of a larger set of actors (of which the lead agency
is a member) in the political arena, in the absence of formal, strict and
known rules.
The user of the methodology is thus an analyst (or team thereof) at
the lead agency whose role is to aid the decision-maker in the evaluation
process. The task addressed by this study involves selection from among
a finite large set of discrete options, or alternatives, 0 = {o,' "'"0 -n .
It is additionally recognized that the nature of the inter-agency
decision-making process is altogether different from the intra-agency
activity, and as such poses different methodological requirements. The
analyst in our problem environment is not engaged directly in the inter-
actor interaction process, as his role is confined to aiding a single actor
reach decisions consistent with his/her preferences. This, of course,
should not be construed to imply that the overall decision environment
does not enter as a constraint on implementability of the decisions of
the lead agency, but only that the analyst is not formally responsible for
bringing out group preferences, nor for directly maneuvering towards group
consensus, at least not within the framework of our systematic methodology.
An example of such an environment is the Ministry of Transport in
Egypt, in its conduct of urban transport project programming in Cairo
(Gakenheimer et al., 1979; Mahmassani, 1980a; Mahmassani and Gakenheimer,
1981a). Other examples are numerous in urban transportation planning, in
both the U.S. (and Europe) and developing nations; these include Metropoli-
tan Planning Organizations (MPO's) or Regional Planning Commissiens; for
example, the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission (SEWRPC),
for the Milwaukee region, comes to mind as a prime representative (Beimborn
et al., 1979; Schulz, 1979). Transit operators making decisions on service
cutbacks or other major service changes are another example. Other examples
can conceivably be found outside transportation, including water resources
planning commissions, education boards, etc.
This characterization of the decision problem environment is an im-
portant element in defining the classes of problems addressed by this
study, and it effectively determines the scope of this research. Chapter 2
examines in greater detail the methodological implications and require-
ments of the above environment, by translating them into the basic consid-
erations underlying the design of the methodology. However, we first
discuss the uncertainties of concern to this study and present a brief sur-
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vey of related transportation literature, followed by a specific mathema-
tical formulation of the subclasses of problems addressed in this thesis.
1.2. Uncertainty: Types and Treatment in Transportation Planning
In the introduction to this chapter, "uncertainty" was mentioned with-
out further qualification beyond stating that it concerned knowledge of the
impacts of the options under consideration. The first part of this section
offers further explanation as to what we mean by "uncertainty", how it
arises in transport planning situations (in general), and identifies dif-
ferent types of concern to this study. The second part then briefly sur-
veys a variety of approaches that have evolved in transportation planning
for dealing with uncertainty.
1.2.1 Sources and Types of Uncertainty
Uncertainty is viewed as a characteristic of the information available
about a particular system to an observer of that system. As such, it can
arise in conjunction with practically any parameter, variable, or event
considered relevant to the evaluation of alternative transport options.
Different researchers have thus had cause to be concerned with uncertain-
ties in different items. Neumann (1976) stresses the importance of taking
into account uncertainties in resource constraints, implementation timing,
expected impacts and political acceptability of alternative transportation
plans and programs. Friend and Jessop (1969) on the other hand are con-
cerned with uncertainties surrounding knoweldge of the external planning
environment, future intentions in related fields of choice and in appro-
priate value judgements. More broadly, Manheim (1981) refers to uncer-
tainties in "future growth and evolution of the economic, demographic and
social structure of society." Ina more problem-oriented analysis, Pecknold
(1i,70) restricted his concern to uncertainty in future demand using the
transport system.
Studies conducted in conjunction with the development of a programming
procedure for urban transport network investment in Cairo, Egypt, identi-
fied an extensive list of uncertainties of relevance to the programming
process (Gakenheimer et al., 1977; Keller, 1977). Those were grouped into
four categories (not unlike Neumann, 1976): project development related,
funding related, delays, and likelihood of implementation. Further work
in the same context focussed on uncertainty in one variable of critical
significance to programming, namely the availability of funds for capital
expenditures on urban transport projects implementation (Mahmassani and
Gakenheimer, 1981a).
The above examples merely reaffirm the pervasive nature of uncertainty
in transport evaluation and decision-making. While it is outside the
scope of this study to investigate the properties of any one specific
variable or source of uncertainty, we can classify these uncertainties
into broad types of relevance to the analytical formulation of transport
evaluation problems. We first note a distinction commonly made in the
literature between descriptive uncertainty and measurement uncertainty
(Rowe, 1977). Whereas the first affects the understanding and represen-
tation of a particular system, phenomenon, or event, the second is due
to inaccuracies in our measurement tools (physical or statistical).
Those two dimensions of uncertainty are however not mutually exclusive as
they can both be present in a given type of uncertainty.
We hereby categorize uncertainties affecting the evaluation of al-
Such studies can be quite insightful, especially for practice; the work
of Knudsen (1976) on uncertainties in cost estimates of airports should
be no-te~-Ifn i is context.
See Mahmassani (1980b) for an elaboration on this distinction and examples
in transportation planning.
ternative transportation options in our problem environment into five dif-
ferent types:
1. The unknown, consisting of new and unforeseen situations; these
include major unsuspected political upheavals or changes, unanticipated
technological breakthroughs, and the like. Representation of this type
of uncertainty is a non-issue since the analyst is not even aware of the
possibility of such occurrences. Beyond the effort of visionaries, or
some forms of technological forecasing (Ayres, 1972; de Neufville, 1976,
41-55), this category is by definition outside the scope of the analysis
of the transportation options.
2. Occurrence of exogenous events or states, i.e., independent of
the transportation decisions taken, but affecting the environment in which
the transportation system operates, including political events (e.g., new
administration) and economic or social set of circumstances. Such events
are of concern only in as much as they affect the performance of the alter-
native options on any of the evaluation criteria. For example, a new poli-
tical administration may have serious implications on budget availability
for project implementation; high GNP might imply high auto ownership levels;
future development of an outlying suburb would lead to high demand for tra-
vel on major connecting facilities, etc. This type of uncertainty can be
represented either through discrete "states of nature" or "scenarios"t
(with analysis of the option's impacts conditional upon their realization),
or directly through uncertainty in the variables entering the evaluation
(which is the third type, discussed hereafter).
tUse of this approach in transport planning is discussed later in this
section; a more specific formulation is presented in section 1.4 of this
chapter.
3. Uncertainty, or randomness, in the values of measured or predicted
impacts, usually the result of a modelling activity. The sources of this
type of uncertainty are numerous, including descriptive uncertainty in the
knowledge of the phenomena modelled, measurement uncertainty in model para-
meters as well as in the input data, inaccuracies introduced by approxima-
tions in model use, etc. Examples of such variables include estimates of
demands, flows on various portions of the transport network under consid-
eration, benefit measures, costs, and many others. Depending on the
analysis generating this information, this type of uncertainty can be spe-
cified in the form of interval estimates (ranges, confidence intervals),
or more completely in the form of (discrete or continuous) probablity den-
sity (or mass) functions, defined over the domain of variable(s) of
interest.
4. Imprecision or vagueness in the definition of one or more criteria
and the description of an option's performance along that criterion.
Examples include criteria such as "aesthetics", or "political desirability".
Vagueness, or "fuzzines", is a property that concerns the very concept of
a variable, and as such has been viewedby many researchers (Zadeh, 1965;
Menges and Skala, 1974) as completely distinct from "randomness" (which
characterizes the occurrence of well defined events). Because ill-defined,
a fuzzy quantity cannot be adequately represented using probabilistic logic;
thus the whole area of fuzzy set theory and multi-valued logic has recently
emerged in an attempt to provide such a representation (Zadeh, 1965;
Kaufmann, 1975). In this study, we view fuzziness as one type, albeit
tFurther advances along those lines include the concept of "stochastic
fuzziness" (Norwich ind Turksen, 1981) combining features of both random-
ness and fuzziness.
an extreme one, of uncertainty, which cannot however be adequately expressed
through the sole use of probabilistic notions. Several "engineering" adap-
tations are generally possible for dealing with such imprecise criteria,
such as the use of qualitative descriptions, categorical information, and
others which are highly problem specific. These might be needed since the
formalism of fuzzy set theory and associated algebra is still of dubious
operational value (Kickert, 1978; Nahmias, 1981; see also Mahmassani,
1980b, pp. 55-56, for further comments on its usefulness for transportation
decision-making).
5. Uncertainty as to the preferential or normative basis of the eval-
uation, which ultimately determines the outcome of the decision making pro-
cess. Examples include uncertainties as to whether or not a particular
system attribute ought to be included in the set of evaluation criteria,
or as to the appropriate trade-offs between the criteria (or, more gener-
ally, the underlying preference structure). In the problem environment
described in section 1.1, this type of uncertainty faces the analyst
interacting with the decision maker, who in turn might be uncertain about
his own preferences.t Uncertainties as to which actors have input in the
decision, their relative "importance", their underlying preferences and
choice rules belong to this category as well. While its representation
is a highly complex task, the existence of this type contributes heavily
to the specification of the set of basic considerations underlying the
tThis is especially true when the options under consideration are charac-
terized by type 3 uncertainty, i.e., randomness in the predicted impacts;
the preferential basis of decision making is discussed in greater detail
in Chapter 2.
See also Mahmassani (1980b) for further discussion of this aspect.
methodological development in this thesis, as described in Chapter 2. As
such, it provides considerable motivation for the use and development of the
decision aiding approach presented here.
In summary, the primary types that are explicitly addressed by the
methodology developed in this thesis are types 2 and 3, whereby uncertainty
in the predicted impacts is represented through discrete states of nature
and/or probability density (or mass) functions over the (multi-dimensional)
payoff space.t Type 4, or fuzziness in criteria definition, is not of pri-
mary concern to this study, as it is primarily an impact representation
issue; however, as we mentioned earlier, suggestions for the accomodation
of this aspect are made at a number of points in the presentation. Type 5
is naturally of concern, though its implications are addressed in a more
fundamental manneL than types 2 and 3. Of course, type 1, or the completely
unreachable, is ottside the scope of our methodological capabilities.
Most if not all of these uncertainties occur to various degrees in
urban transportation planning situations. The next section briefly dis-
cusses the implications of uncertainty for those situations and surveys
approaches recognized in the transportation area for dealing with it.
1.2.2 Implications and Solution Approaches
The fundamental implication of the presence of uncertainty is the fol-
lowing: since selection of an option o* at time t is conditional upon
its desirability at the time of selection (desirability resulting from the
[structured or unstructured] evaluation of the impacts of the options rela-
tive to the normative basis set at that time), the occurence of any changes
tSpecific mathematical formulation of the problems addressed in this thesis
is given in section 1.4.
in either knowledge about the impacts or in the normative basis at a future
time t + At might bring the realization that a non-selected option, differ-
ent from o*, would have been more desirable (relative to t + At) than o*
was. In other words, uncertainty can lead to regret at time t + At for
having chosen o* at time t.
Such situations are known to occur in transportation planning. For
instance, when the demand for a facility at time t + At fails to meet the
demand predicted at time t, or indicates a departure from the trend assumed
at time t for projections beyond t + At, options discarded at t might seem
more attractive (at t + At) than the one selected at t.
A well-known example of a change in the preferential basis of the eval-
uation that has had serious consequences is the "freeway revolt" (Colcord,
1971), whereby consideration of broader impacts (e.g., environment) resulted
in the unacceptability of prior decisions reached according to a different
set of criteria (namely user travel costs and facilities costs).
When the partial or complete resolution of the uncertainty present
at the time a decision is taken reveals changes in the relative desirability
of that decision, the extent of regret depends on the course of action sub-
sequently followed. One of two possibilities are present:
a. no action, in which case one would be paying the opportunity cost
of not having had the superior option; or
b. reversing previous decision, usually incurring more or less sub-
stantial costs. Such costs are not always monetary, as some impacts or
damages cannot be reversed (also known as the "irreversibility effect"
[Henry, 19741), and these are of major importance in transportation invest-
tThe notion of "regret" is central to this thesis and is explicitly incor-
porated in the methodology (see chapters 3 and 4).
ment decisions, especially those involving the construction of major phy-
sical facilities.
We next discuss approaches suggested in transportation to deal with
some or all of the above general types of uncertainty. These approaches
can be grouped into four categories:
1. Reducing it;
2. Structuring the decision process (over time);
3. Evaluation and design criteria and guidelines; and
4. Explicit evaluation techniques.
1. Reducing Uncertainty
Probably the most obvious way of dealing with uncertainty is to reduce
it by acquiring more information of the variable or event of interest.t
Different types of uncertainty of course require different reduction stra-
tegies, including:
- further measurement (physical or by statistical sampling), as a means
of reducing type 3 uncertainties as to the magnitude of different variables.
The standard statistical sampling literature is of relevance to the approach
(Cochran, 1963), as well as that of statistical decision theory (de Groot,
1970). Efforts to that effect in transportation planning are too numerous to
A general point of interest to this discussion is the dichotomy in philo-
sophical and scientific thought as to the possibility of eliminating all
uncertainty in propositional truths (White, 1969). One school of thought
(including Einstein as a proponent) claims that it is ultimately possible
to understand all phenomena in a deterministic, cause to effect, manner.
Another school of thought (with Barankin [1956] as a leading advocate)
essentially believes that nature is "one huge stochastic process" (White,
1969), which obviously limits our ability to completely eliminate uncer-
tainty in all matters (which is already limited anyway by our tools).
Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty, fundamental to quantum mechanics,
is a reflection of this second school of thought.
mention and outside the scope of this discussion (examples include Johnson,
1969; DiRenzo, 1977; and more recently Sheffi and Tarem, 1981).t
- conducting experiments, expecially when new technology is involved,
or new service concepts are contemplated; this is the rationale behind
UMTA's Service and Demonstration program. A point to note here is that
experimentation allows some type 1 uncertainties to surface.
Reducing uncertainty, as discussed here, is only a general approach,
of no direct concern to this study, as it is more of an impact modelling
and prediction issue.
2. Structuring the Process
By embedding the information acquisition activity in a sequential
decision process, one would take advantage of the possibility of learning
about the transportation system as it evolves (adaptive behavior), and
avoid overcommitting resources to options designed to meet requirements
which might not actualize. Theoretical studies along those lines have been
mostly concerned with uncertainty in demand (Pecknold, 1970). Pecknold's
time-staged strategic approach for investment decisions was further extended
and generalized by Neumann (1976) into an implementation strategy approach,
which was actually applied to a region in California (Neumann and Pecknold,
1973).
In general, any process whereby decisions are made sequentially,
conditional on prior decisions and the information acquired in the meantime,
can avoid the pitfalls and risks of conmmitting irreversible actions, and
tOf course, at a very general level, all efforts aimed at understanding
the phenomena of interest, and at developing "better" prediction models,
and the like, can be viewed as efforts to reduce uncertainty.
be more responsive to changes in community values and shifting priorities
(see also Manheim, 1979).
3. Design and Evaluation Criteria and Guidelines
As discussed earlier in this section, the occurrence and extent of
regret (after the resolution of uncertainties surrounding prior decisions)
depends on the ability to reverse or otherwise modify the option that is
the target of this regret. Thus flexibility is generally viewed as a
"desirable" criterion in evaluating options (and thus in designing them).
Flexibility naturally implies avoiding irreversibility, identified
earlier as a major concern in uncertain environments. Examples of irre-
versibility abound in transportation planning, and are particularly sig-
nificant in conjunction with community impacts (e.g. neighborhood disrup-
tion), landmark demolition, park land loss due to major constructed trans-
portation facilities (Henry, 1974; Pearman, 1977). We prefer the use of
the term "guideline", instead of "criterion". to denote such general
statements made in the planning literature about the desirable properties
of transportation projects and programs. We reserve the term "criterion"
for more specific and better defined measures which are unfoytunately not
present in the transportation literature as far as uncertainty is con-
cerned.
4. Explicit Evaluation Procedures
In contrast with the more general approaches described above, this
type of approach refers to actual analytical evaluation tools that expli-
citly account for the otherwise widely recognized presence of uncertainty.
As stated in the introduction, virtually no such explicit procedures have
been developed for or used in the transportation context. Rather than
structured, systematic procedures, which are almost totally absent,t some
unstructured ad hoc approaches have been reported, even though they cannot
be considered standard practice.
The rationale behind some of these ad hoc approaches is that since
the vector of outcomes (or impacts) of any option cannot be known with
certainty, these outcomes should be tested under a variety of assumptions
so as to assess the "robustness" of the decision, whereby robustness can
be defined as "insensitivity to assumptions" (O'Sullivan and Holtzclaw,
1980). One way of accomplishing this evaluation is by so-called scenario-
building (Manheim, 1981), whereby a more or less exhaustive number of
mutually exclusive descriptions of future situations are constructed
(e.g., "alternative futures" approach described by Bernard [1979]). Al-
ternative sccnarios allow for type 2 and 3 uncertainties, and are usually
constructed with the aid of assumptions on the values of selected variables
and/or the realization of specific discrete events.
Investigating robustness through scenario building can be viewed as
one form of conducting more general sensitivity analyses, whereby uncer-
tain parameters (or other elements such as model form) of the prediction
models are varied over a likely range and the corresponding figure of
merit computed. The usefulness of sensitivity analysis is however severely
constrained in major urban tansportation investment studies by the high'
computational requirements of the model systems which are typically used
in that context.
A possible exception being the modest methodological effort of Pearman
(1977).
§Such events could be other decisions affecting the system, as in Mahmas-
sani and Gakenheimer (1980), where one such scenario element was whether
or not a subway system would be built in a metropolitan area (Cairo, in
this particular case).
Scenario building is however an apprcach to formulating the decision
problem, and not of solving it. Thus the evaluation and selection process
following impact analysis of the options under alternative scenarios is
usually unstructured and left to proceed on an intuitive, ad hoc manner.
It is at this area that the methodology developed in this thesis is aimed.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the above ad hoc approaches,
notwithstanding their limitations, are more the exception than the rule,
as the prevailing way of addressing uncertainty in transportation plan-
ning decisions seems to be ignoring it altogether (Pearman, 1977).
In summary, while there is no need to re-emphasize the presence of
uncertainty in transportation decision-making, section 1.2.1 has presented
a "problem-oriented" typology of the uncertainties encountered, along
with examples, indicating the extent to and the mechanism by which they
are addressed in the decision aid developed in this thesis. Despite the
acknowledged need for explicitly accounting for uncertainty in evaluating
transport options, as evidenced by the general decision strategies and
guidelines proposed for that purpose in the literature reviewed in section
1.1.2, analytical efforts in that direction have been limited to conducting
sensitivity analyses. There are thus virtually no significant reported
efforts at developing or using explicit decision models for urban tans-
portation choices.
The next section briefly discusses the extent of explicit treatment
in the transportation literature of the other major sources of complexity
of concern to our problem environment, namely the existence of multiple
criteria and the dependence of the ultimate decision on a multiplicity
of actors.
1.3 Other Dimensions in Transportation Evaluation Methodology
The need to consider amultiplicity of criteria in the evaluation of
transportation options is widely acknowledged both in the literature and
in practice. A number of efforts in the late sixties and early seventies
were aimed at developing analytical representations of the relevant criteria
as well as methodologies for the evaluation and choice process (Manheim,
1965; Hall and Manheim, 1967; Follansbeeet al., 1968, Pardeeetal., 1969;
Godard, 1973). In particular, Pardee et al. (1969) compiled a comprehen-
sive list of system performance and impact measures for possible use as
evaluation criteria, and proposed a relatively sophisticated analytical
approach based on multi-attribute value theory for conducting the evaluation.
That approach however has substantial and rigid requirements of a priori
preferential information for the decision-making unit, and as such seemed
inappropriate for urban transportation decision environments.
Currently, many government agencies seem to have developed lists of
criteria and impacts (NCHRP, 1978; Bellomo et al., 1978; Beimborn et al.,
1979, Matthias and Wortman, 1980, Neumann and Dresser, 1980, Sinha, 1980).
However, systematic evaluation techniques are not generally used in con-
junction with them, besides so-called "checklist"-type approches whereby
minimum levels or targets are established for a subset of the criteria§
(NCHRP, 1978). An evaluation concept compatible with such practice is that
of the "impact tableau", as described by Manheim (1979a, Ch. 9), which
t For a general introduction to the use of evaluation methods in trans-
portation planning, see Manheim (1979a, Ch. 9) or Morlok (1978, Ch. 14).
Other useful discussions can be found in Stopher and Meyburg (1976),
Schofer (1976 and Cheslow (1980).
§Because it represents an activity that decision-makers feel comfortable
with, this feature of existing practice is taken advantage of in the
framework of the decision aid proposed in this thesis (cf. Chapter 2).
basically is a format for presenting impact information (on different ac-
tors), leaving it up to the analyst to highlight the major trade-offs.
Morlok (1978, Ch. 14) also describes a similar approach.
Recently, more formal techniques have appeared in the transportation
literature, addressing multi-objective resource allocation problems.
Building on the work of Agarwal (1973) on the multi-objective network
design problem (assuming a system optimal rule for network flow allocation),
Perl (1980) proposed a goal programming formulation to the same problem;
Friesz (1980), on the other hand, assumed a user optimal rule (for flow
equilibration) and suggested the applicability of Geoffrion's (1970) pre-
ference-incorporating technique for solving the resulting vector maximum
problem. Friesz et al. (1980) also conducted a comparative assessment of
two multi-objective optimization codes for a simplified rural road tmprove-
ment problem. At a more practical level, Sinha et al. (1980) adapted a
goal programming formulation to the allocation of funds for highway main-
tenance in the state of Indiana. While different from the selection from
a finite set of alternatives (in the decision problem environment of sec-
tion 1.1), the above well-defined optimization problems suggest an in-
creasing interest in explicit treatment of multiple criteria in transporta-
tion decision models, as well as the need to be more sensitive to the
decision environment and its constraints if such approaches are to be use-
ful in practice.
Moreover, efforts along the latter line include the application of a
new multi-criteria evaluation technique (MCQA) to the transportation system
in Phoenix (Pfaff et al,,1980) as well as the procedure developed for
tManheim (1979a) further advocates a participatory open process for ulti-
mately reaching a decision.
programming network improvements in Cairo, Egypt (Mahmassani, 1980c, 1981),
based on the ELECTRE method (Nijkamp and Van Delft, 1977).
The presence of multiple actors in the decision process has motivated
considerable attention on behalf of those interested in the study of the
policy making process. However, virtually no attempts have been made to
systematically incorporate this dimension in the evaluation methodology.
As we mentioned in section 1.1, the inter-actor interaction process
in the transportation context is not subject to formal, rigid and known
rules. Only when the decision-makers involved can be made to agree on a
formal interaction process can a systematic normative approach be used.
For example, Wilson and Schofer (1976), in one of the very few such efforts,
used a Delphi-based process to achieve what amounted to the calibration
of an aggregate group value function over a bet of evaluation criteria.
However, a generally accepted practice is for the analyst at the
"lead" agency to incorporate concerns of different actors by including
impacts or criteria of respective importance to those actors in the set
of evaluation criteria; for instance, this is possible in the context of
of above mentioned "impact tableau" approach.§
Finally, in terms of explicit techniques for multiple criteria/
actors evaluation in the face of uncertainty in future impacts, the gap is
even more apparent. Except for an application of Multi-Attribute Utility
Theory (to be critically discussed later) to an airport siting problem
tAnother use of the Delphi technique in transportation systems evaluation
is described in Leone et al. (1973).
§A somewhat more sophisticated approach, which nevertheless follows the
same rationale, is that developed for the Cairo programming procedure
(Mahmassani and Gakenheimer, 1981b), whereby an aggregate "political
desirability index" was defined and used to screen out institutionally
unacceptable options.
(de Neufville and Keeney, 1973), where ad hoc analyst intervention proved
more effective than that particular methodology, there is no significant
related literature.
The above review thus clearly suggests the lack of adquate treatment
of uncertainty both separately and in conjunction with multiple criteria,
in the methodologyfor urban transportation evaluation and decision-making.
Where efforts have been attempted (mainly to deal with multiple criteria),
steep and rigid a priori input requirements of values/preferences infor-
mation have detracted from their applicability. This lends further cre-
dence to the motivation behind this thesis, as stated in the introduction
to this chapter.
Having established the relevance of the aims pursued in this thesis,
and defined the prototpe decision problem environment for which the
decision aiding approach developed herein is intended, we next describe
and formulate mathematically the specific subclasses of decision problems
under uncertainty pursued in this thesis.
1.4 Specific Problem Subclasses Addressed
The focus of this thesis is on the methodological elements of a
decision aid for a broad class of problems involving selection from a
given finite large set of transportation options whose impact is not
known with certainty. The methodological development is pursued in the
context of a particular subclass where the options under consideration
consist of univariate random prospects, and where uncertainty is repre-
sented through mutually exclusive discrete states of nature.
Problem Formulation 1:
The problem consists of selecting a most preferred option o*, where
the decision space consists of a finite set of n non-dominated t options,
0 = {0o, 02 , ... , On '
Uncertainty is represented through a finite set of m mutually exclu-
sive, collectively exhaustive states of nature (consisting of any suitably
defined bundle of joint events) S = {SI, S2, ... , Sm), with known (objec-
tively or subjectively assessed) probabilities of occurrence; the vector
PP i' P2' "'. P ,' where P denotes the probability that S. occurs,
is independent of the option selected.
The impact resulting from the implementation of an option oi is con-
ditional upon the realization of a state of nature. It is assumed in this sub-
class of problems that the totality of the conditional impact (of oi E 0)
can be expressed by a single numeraire. The impact vector of o i is denoted
by Xi = {xil, xi2, ... , xim, where xij is the conditional payoff from o i
should S occur. The n x m matrix of xij's is denoted by A.D
tAn option o is non-dominated, or pareto-optimal, if there is no option
o c 0 such that x.k <xjk for all Sk E S, where the symbols are as
defined in this section.
This formulation is characteristic of a widely occurring type of
problems whereby alternative scenarios are identified and each option's
performance under each scenario determined. As discussed in subsection
1.2.2., such formulation seems to be the most comnmon mechanism used in
practice to formulate decision problems under uncertainty. For this
reason, and because it is intuitively understandable, it serves as a
vehicle to bring out the fundamental issues nf choice under uncertainty
and to articulate the basics of the methodology developed in this thesis.
The methodology is also generalized to the subclass of problems where
the impact of each option is specified as a probability density (or mass)
function over the payoff (or impact) set X (which is usually R, the set
of real numbers).
Furthermore, the decision aid may in some situations be applicable
to a third subclass of problems, where the impact of each option consists
of a vector of impacts along p criteria, C = {Cl, C2 , ... , Cp}, conditional
upon the realization of an S e S. The conditional impact vector of o
given Sj is then denoted by Xij = i1 2k, where is the
impact ot along Ck should Sj occur. In particular, problem subclass 3 can
effectively reduce to the first formulation if the analyst can structure the
decision problem in such a way that all criteria but one are accounted for
in the so-called elimination stage of the evaluation process. This is
particularly true in many transportation problems, where an economic cri-
terion is used as a basis of comparison subject to meeting social and envi-
ronmental impact constraints. In addition, we present in chapter 5 an
tThis stage is integral to the decision aiding framework developed in
this thesis and presented in Chapter 2. It is sufficient to know at
this point that the Elimination stage does not involve pairwise compari-
sons of options.
§This is the well-known heuristic for dealing with complex problems by
formulation objectives as constraints, to the exclusion of a more promi-
nent one which is then maximized (Simon, 1964).
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extension of the methodological elements (developed in conjunction with
problem subclass 1) to a special case of problem subclass 3.
The next section summarizes this chapter and presents an overview of
the contents of the thesis.
1.5 Overview
This chapter has presented the basic motivation for this research and
the aims it set to achieve. Section 1.1 described a prototypical decision
environment where the class of decision problems addressed in this the-
sis arise; and identified the user of the proposed methodology to be an
analyst engaged in aiding a decision maker in the evaluation of options with
uncertain impacts. An effort at classifying the types of uncertainties of
interest, as they affect problem formulation, was presented in section 1.2,
indicating the extent to which each is addressed by this thesis. Current
approaches for dealing with uncertainty in urban transportation planning
were also briefly reviewed, indicating the absence of adequate methodolo-
gical tools from current practice. Similarly, approaches for dealing with
other dimensions (multiple criteria, multiple actors), especially in con-
junction with uncertainty, in transportation evaluation were briefly dis-
cussed in section 1.3, leading to the same conclusion. Specific formu-
lations for the subclasses of problems addressed in this thesis were presented
in section 1.4, leading up to this summary and a chapter-by-chapter over-
view of the thesis.
In Chapter 2, the basic considerations underlying the methodological
development of the decision aid are presented. These are derived from the
characteristics of the decision environment as well as behavioral aspects
of individual decision making and judgement, including relevant results
from the behavioral science literature. In addition to further defining
the role of decision aiding for our class of problems, this set of con-
siderations specifies the special features that the decision aiding method-
ology should possess, and as such constitutes an important output of this
research. Based on those considerations, an overall framework for decision
aiding is then developed in section 2.3. The framework consists of three
sequential activites: elimination, pairwise comparisons and global compai-
son; the second of those is the primary focus of the analytical develop-
ment in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter 3 addresses the fundamental problem within the pairwise com-
parisons activity for problem subclass 1 and 2, namely that of choice among
single-attributed random prospects. A review of existing normative theories
and models for that problem is presented in section 3.1; those are grouped
in two categories: 1) those based on Expected Utility Theory, and 2) those
which are not. In conjunction with the latter category, shortcomings of
existing risk measures are indicated. The axiomatic foundation of Expected
Utility Theory is then critically re-examined in section 3.2, with parti-
cular emphasis on one of these axioms, known as the independence axiom; the
latter's plausibility is questioned using a new argument relying on the
implications of that axiom on the risk dimensions underlying a choice
situation. Section 3.3. then proposes less restrictive postulates, reflec-
ting the basic considerations of the previous chapter, for the methodology
developed in the following chapters. These postulates specify the proper-
ties of the preference-indifference relation over the set of options as
those of partial semi-orders, wich are defined in that section. This is
a behaviorally justified departure from the usual assumption of the exist-
ence of a complete order in decision models, and as such is an integral
part of the contribution of this research.
Chapter 4 is the centerpiece of this thesis, as it develops the pair-
wise comparisons methodology, including: 1) its structure,which is appli-
cable to all the problem subclasses addressed in this thesis, and 2) its spe-
cific elements, developed for the discrete states formulation.t The
methodology attempts to reflect the basic considerations outlined earlier,
and revolves around the construction of a binary preference-indifference
relation over the set of options, that is consistent with the postulates
of Chapter 3. Following the overview of the structure and introduction
of some essential concepts, section 4.1 describes alternative solution con-
cepts for reducing the set of options once a preference-indifference relation
is defined.
The first component of the methodology consists of a mechanism for
comparing any two given options thus defining an initial binary preference-
indifference relation (over the set of options). In section 4.2, such
a mechanism is described for the discrete states formulation, consisting
of regret-based risk measures and an associated decision rule, requiring
preferential input from the decision maker in the form of a pair of thres-
hold levels. The properties of the resulting initial preference-indiffer-
ence relation are then discussed and shown to be quite unrestrictive (sub-
section 4.2.4). In particular, the relation may exhibit violations of the
starting postulates; the detection of such inconsistencies ina given prob-
lem situation is the second component of the methodology. Section 4.2
identified inconsistencies with the properties of partial semi-orders as
cycles in the graph theoretic representation of a given preference-indif-
ference relation,§ and presents rules for their detection. The third com-
%The formulations were given in section 1.4; the discrete states formu-
lation is characteristic of widely occurring situations where the respec-
tive payoff of each element of a finite set of options is conditional on
the realization of one of a set of mutually exclusive and collectively
exhaustive states of nature with known probabilities of occurrence.
§This graph theoretic representation is itself described in section 4.1.
ponent of the methodology then consists of approaches for correcting those
inconsistencies in the initial preference-indifference relation; three
such approaches are described in section 4.4, one of which requires rela-
tion-specific elements (described here in the context of the above initial
binary relation). The remaining component of the methodology is to obtain
the kernel of the resulting final relation, which is one of the solution
concepts defined in section 4.1. A summary of Chapter 4 is given in sec-
tion 4.5.
Chapter 5 then consolidates the contribution of chapter 4 by extending
the methodology in four directions: 1) specification in section 5.1 of
alternative functional forms for the risk dimensions used to build the ini-
tial preference-indifference relation. Important properties associated
with some of the new measures are also derived. 2) Integration, in section
5.2, of the well-known notion of target (or aspiration level) within the
methodology, as an elimination rule as well as an alternative mechanism
for defining the initial relation over the set of options. Properties and
methodological implications of the latter are also described. 3) Generali-
zation of the methodology, in section 5.3, to the subclass of problems were
options are characterized by continuous probability density functions over
the impact domain. 4) Extension, in section 5.4, to the subclass of problems
where impact of each option is expressed along a multiplicity of criteria.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis, highlighting its principal contribu-
tions, and outlines directions for further research.
CHAPTER 2
BASIC CONSIDERATIONS AND FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION AIDING
2.1 Introduction
The subclasses of decision problems addressed in this study were
described in the previous chapter, along with a characterization of the
prototypical decision environment in which they arise. In that environ-
ment, the analyst's role, referred to as decision aiding, was defined as
the activity of interacting with the decision maker in order to perform
the evaluation and ultimately reach a decision. Our starting point is that
it is possible for the analyst to structure the decision aiding activity,
and employ analytical toolswithin this structure; the structure and its
analytical components constitute the methodological aspects of the decision
aid, which is the principal thrust of this thesis.
Having clarified our terminology, the purpose of this chapter is to
present the basic considerations underlying the design of the decision aid,
as well as its overall structure. In particular, section 2.2 discusses
those basic considerations, including:
- further specification of the role of decision aiding in that
particular environment, when facing a problem of the subclasses defined in
section 1.4;
- implication of the above on phenomena that the resulting
methodology should recognize; in particular, the need to ground the
methodology in behavioral principles of individual decision making
and judgement is articulated, and those behavioral aspects of concern
to us are identified.
Furthermore, in section 2.3, we develop the overall framework for
decision aiding in our problem environment and show its consistency with
the above considerations.
It should be noted that those considerations, as well as the framework
are applicable to all three problem subclasses formulated in section 1.4.
Mathematical details of the representation of the above mentioned principles,
and their translation into operational decision rules is avoided in this
chapter, and does not begin until the next one with reference to the first
two subclasses of problems (i.e., choice among univariate random prospects).
2.2 Basic Considerations
In this section, basic considerations underlying the design of the
decision aid are presented. As we mentioned earlier, these are derived
from two primary sources:
1. The nature of the problem, its prototypical decision environment
in the urban transportation context, and the constraints and requirements
it poses;
2. Results in behavioral science pertaining to descriptive aspects
of individual decision making and judgement.
Since a review of existing results and theories on human decision
making and judgement is in itself a major endeavor, which is clearly beyond
the scope of this thesis, we limit our presentation to findings of direct
relevance to our methodological development. As such, these results are
grouped by the element of the methodology that they affect the most. How-
ever, and more importantly, the basic considerations presented hereafter
are not a mere collection of empirical findings and contextual observations,
but the result of an effort at understanding the intricate interdependence
between the above two "sources", and integrating them into a coherent set
of features that the methodology should possess. Therefore, in as much as
they specify the distinguishing characteristics of the methodology, they
collectively form an integral part of the contribution of this thesis.
These considerations are grouped under eight separate headings:
1. Preferences as normative basis;
2. Extreme difficulty of a priori expression of preferences;
3. Decision aiding as preference forming process;
4. Need for behaviorally grounded methodology;
5. Progressive difficulty in preference elicitation;
6. Sequential elimination in methodological structure;
7. Conveying information in comparison measures and criteria;
8. Incomparability of options and threshold phenomena.
The above considerations are by no means independent. For instance,
the first two (respectively: no exogenous normative rule, and inability to
express preferences a priori) are somewhat "duals" of each other, and to-
gether they imply the third proposition, casting decision aiding as a pre-
ference forming process. All three then motivate the fourth point, namely
the need to ground the methodology in behavioral aspects. The remaining
considerations then elaborate on the fourth one, identifying specific be-
havioral phenomena of concern to the methodological development and defining
their implications on that activity.
2.2.1 Preferences as Normative Basis
At several points in Chapter 1, we alluded to the need of having
decisions conformto the "preferences" of the decision unit. While this
is an accepted precept in decision theory, it might seem somewhat contra-
dictory to prevailing notions of what a normative model is, especially in
the engineering and economics tradition, where the professional (analyst
in our problem environment) is expected to provide an answer as to what the
"best" option is. However, a direct consequence of the presence of uncer-
tainty and/or multi-dimensionality is the loss of the full decidabilityt
that often exists when comparison of options is based on respective per-
formance known a priori with certainty, along a single criterion. In the
latter case, provided the relevant domain of this single criterion is
Complete decidability, for a class of problems, is said to hold if decision
criteria exist which determine, in a "mechanical" way, a unique option
for selection (White, 1969).
unambiguously ordered, a "best" option is automatically implied (by the
axioms of ordinary logic, including those of arithmetic).
However, when the impact of each option is uncertain, no such exo-
genous universally (or at least professionally) accepted rules exist.
For instance, Decision Analysis (Raiffa, 1968; Keeney and Raiffa, 1976),
viewed by many as the normative tool for decision making under uncertainty
is only "normative" to the extent that the resulting decision is made to
conform to the decision maker's preferences (which otherwise have to satisfy
a set of axioms claimed to define "rationality", as discussed in Chapter 3).
Similarly, when multiple criteria are present, and they are conflicting
(e.g., they are negatively correlated: an increase in one is accompanied
by a decrease in the other), "objective" normative rules do not exist, and
preferential information is required to resolve inescapable tradeoffs.
While it is possible for a given professional community (or govern-
mental entity, through explicit legislation or policies) to evolve some
form of agreement as to appropriate normative rules for certain classes of
problems, this is generally not the case in transportation. Therefore, in
the absence of exogenous agreed upon normative rules for prescribing choices
among random prospects, nor among multi-attributed alternatives (nor, a
fortiori, among multi-attributed random prospects), the preferences
tSuch a complete unambiguous order is not always self-evident, even under
certainty. However, most criteria encountered in practice, especially
if they are sufficient to serve as a basis for selection (typically
monetary or technical criteria), can be unambiguously ordered in the
range of interest. The typical example is "money", for which "more is
better", i.e., its value is monotonically non-decreasing. We confine
our discussion hereafter to such criteria, unless otherwise stated.
§And justifiably so, as we have argued throughout this section.
(i.e. value system) of the decision-maker constitute the ultimate norma-
tive basis.t
2.2.2 Extreme Difficulty of A Priori Expression of Preferences
For this class of problems, the decision maker typically cannot,
a priori, fully express these preferences, due to a number of reasons, in-
cluding:
a. Political nature of the process, whereby no societal consensus
exists on priorities (and more generally social preferences). Since urban
transportation decisions primarily occur in the public sector, and the
"decision maker" has some form of public mandate/responsibility, he can be
viewed as basing decisions on "social preferences". However, in the absence
of societal consensus, the political process usually precludes formal
prior agreemen. on an explicit value system (which would then introduce
full decidability into the problem). It seems indeed remote to expect a
pluralistic, democratic society to adopt a clearly hierarchized and ordered
set of priorities, let alone to possess a known complete order over the set
of urban transportation alternatives under consideration.
In discussing urban transportation planning in the U.S. context,
Altshuler (1979) remarks that "it is particularly misleading to think of
the American social and political systems, with their extreme pluralism, as
having goals". He further notes that most program objectives in the urban
transportation arena are "stated in highly general fashion", adding that
"... the objectives of public policy are incredibly diverse and so weakly
tFurther discussion on the notion of "optimality" in decision making under
uncertainty as well as in the presence of multiple criteria can be found
in Keen (1977), Einhorn and Hogarth (1981) and others.
related as in some circumstances to seem directly at odds with one another".
(Altshuler, 1979). A typical example is provided by Levin and Abend (1971),
who quote the Intergovernmental Act of 1968t to illustrate how such state-
ments "tend to be contradictory or so generalized and hedged with verbiage
that no consistent policy can be discerned". The fuzziness in such expres-
sions duly confirms our premise.
b. These preferences are not necessarily fully formed. Even if deciding
strictly for himself, regardless of societal responsibilities or constraints,
there is very little reason to expect the decision maker to possess, a priori,
a complete order over the set of univariate random prospects, let alone that
of multivariate random prospects. As indicated by Fischhoff et. al. (1979),
people often have poorly formulated, even incoherent, preferences when facing
tThe particular paragraph quoted from that act is (U.S. Congress, 1968):
"Such rules and regulations shall provide for full consideration of
the concurrent achievement of the following specific objectives and, in
to the extent authorized by law, reasoned choices shall be made between
such objectives when they conflict:
(1) Appropriate land uses for housing, commercial, industrial, govern-
mental,...
... (2) Wise development and conservation of natural resources, including
land, water, minerals, wildlife, and others;
(3) Balanced transportation systems, including highway, air, water,
pedestrian, mass transit, and other modes for the movement of people and
goods;
(4) Adequate outdoor recreation and open space;
(5) Protection of areas of unique natural beauty, historical and
scientific interest;
(6) Properly planned community facilities, including utilities for the
supply of power, water, communications, ...
... (7) Concern for high standards of design;
(8) All viewpoints - national, regional, state, and local - should,
to the extent possible, be fully considered and taken into account..."
Note that the emphasis in the above text was added by Levin and Abend
(1971).
complex problems; March (1978) also discusses ambiguity in preferences
held by individuals, and its implications on the "technology question".t
c. Even if such a complete order existed, the state-of-the-art for
eliciting, representing and subsequently using this preferential informa-
tion is not, in our opinion, adequate for a problem environment like ours.
The principal operational techniques available for that purpose consist
of Decision Analysis, both for the single attribute case, and its multi-
attribute developments, both founded on Expected Utility Theory and its
extension into Multi-Attribute Utility Theory (or MAUT; cf. Keeney and
Raiffa, 1976). A brief critical review of Expected Utility Theory is pre-
sented in Chapter 3, and will not be replicated here. It is, however, suf-
ficient at this point to summarize the causes of the above-mentioned inade-
quacy as being the lack of behavioral realism in the theoretical foundation
of those procedures, thus their restrictive character and the resulting
dangers of misrepresentation (of the true preferences of the decision
maker).§ This opinion is however to a large extent affected by the behavi-
oral considerations described subsequently in this section.
2.2.3 Decision Aiding as Preference Forming Process
It follows directly from the above two points that, in addition to
uncovering whatever preferences the decision maker might possess a priori,
decision aiding involves supporting the formation of those preferences
required to reach a decision. This point constitutes a departure from the
tThis point is discussed further in subsection 2.2.8, in conjunction with
incomparability of complex objects.
Other references on this aspect include Starr and Zelany (1977) and
Schoemaker (1980).
traditional decision analytic viewpoint that assumes the existence of a
fully formed underlying preference system which only needs to be uncovered.t
In addition, it precludes the possibility of testing for properties assumed
a priori to hold for this preference system, since the latter is not fully
formed.
This further role of decision aiding has far reaching implications
for the design of the methodology, since the latter itself could become a
major force in shaping those preferences (Fishoff et al., 1979), both in
terms of their properties as well as content. It becomes even more criti-
cal when preferences are as ill-defined as they are in our problem environ-
ment, as they can be significantly affected by subtle details of the pro-
cedure, such as how and what information is presented in the interaction
process (Fishhoff et al., 1979). These concerns are discussed further in
the next consideration, which is itself strongly motivated by this point.
2.2.4 Need for Behaviorally Grounded Methodology
A corollary of proposition 2.2.1 above is that any approach for
prescribing choice among random prospects (univariate as well as multi-
variate) has to describe the preferences of the decision-maker. Further-
more, in 2.2.3, we indicated the dependence of preference forming on the
procedure followed. Moreover, even elicitation of assumedly existing pre-
ferences, in as much as it requires judgements and choices from the decision
tZeleny's "Theory of the Displaced Ideal" (1975) also departs from this
traditional viewpoint, emphasizing the process of decision making as
opposed to the mere act of so doing.
§We are alluding here to the practice in Decision Analysis whereby such
strict assumptions as to the properties of the overall preference system
of the individual provide the basis for "extrapolating" from responses
to simple hypothetical questions to real life complex problems. (Cf.
Chapter 3 for further discussion on the restrictive properties of the
underlying Expected Utility Theory.)
maker, necessitates consideration of behavioral aspects of individual deci-
sion making and judgement. Considerable evidence and insights into the
manner in which individual form judgements and incorporate them into their
decisions have been presented by behavioral scientistst and this can guide
the design of decision aids.
Decision aiding methodology should therefore be compatible with oper-
ations/activities that individual decision makers feel "comfortable" with,
in order to avoid bias andmisrepresentation of preferences. This concern
is also shared by a segment of researchers in management science and applied
decision theory (including Hammond [1975],Keen [1977], Keen and Scott Morton,
[1978], Roy [1977], Zeleny [1975], among others), some of whom view it
as one prerequiste of the applicability and subsequent successful implemen-
tation of the decision tools.§ Recent efforts at developing interactive
"preference-incorporating" multi-criteria optimization methods is a reflec-
tion of this concern (surveys of these methods can be found in a number of
references, including Cohon [1978] or Hwang and Masud [1979]).
In addition, behavioral scientists are increasingly recognizing the
importance of task structure and content, including problem representation
and framing of information, on judgement and choice (Newell and Simon, 1972;
Pitz, 1977; Fischhoff et al., 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Slovic et al.,
1981; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981), thus providing additional impetus as
well as information for reflecting these factors in the methodology.
For a historical perspective on Behavioral Decision Theory, the interested
reader is referred to the excellent periodic surveys in the Annual Review
of Psychology, including EdcW'ards (1961), Becher and Mc Clintock (1967),
Rapporport and Wallston (1972), Slovic et al. (1977) andEinhorn and Hogarth
(1981).
This recent "descriptively-rooted" viewpoint is strongly influenced by the
classic work of Simon (1957), and March and Simon (1959).
For our problem classes, these factors enter the design of the method-
ology at all its levels, namely:
1. Principles underlying preference elicitation;
2. Structure of approach;
3. Measures and criteria used to convey information to the
decision maker; and
4. Properties of specific elements of methodology.
Considerations of relevance to the methodology developed in this thesis
for each of the above items are discussed hereafter.
2.2.5 Progressive Difficulty in Preference Elicitation
The process of eliciting preference information in our methodological
development follows progressive difficulty principles, namely that:
1. We seek to minimize the aeed for value judgements and preferential
information from the decision maker. In other words, we try to proceed
with the evaluation as far as allowed by the existing level of such infor-
mation.
2. Probes for additional information are delayed until absolutely
essential, i.e., until the discriminating power of the already available
information is exhausted; this point is a direct consequence of the pre-
vious one.
3. When such information is required, a hierarchy of difficulty is
followed, going progressively from the least to the most demanding from
the decision maker's perspective (in terms of cognitive strain).
A useful perspective to view the difficulty of supplying an item of
preferential information is in terms of the risk of making an error, i.e.,
that the supplied item actually misrepresents the true preferences of the
decision maker (Roy, 1973). Conversly, we can think of the degree (or
level) of confidence attached to a particular item by the decision maker
(or the analyst, especially if the latter suspects misunderstanding by the
former of the exact nature of what is required). Naturally, it is then
easier to supply less risky (i.e. more confident) information than more
risky and ambiguous items.
The rationale behind these principles is to a large extent self evi-
dent. It recognizes that preferential imformation can come in different
shapes and forms, depending on the particular decision model used. In
addition, some options can be eliminated, and the relative desirability of
others determined, without necessarily forming a complete order over the
set of options; such information should be used to reduce the problem
space which would help the decision maker focus his attention and concentra-
tion on the more essential and probably more difficult elements of the
evaluation. Furthermore, by proceeding progressively, a "learning effect"
develops whereby the decision maker is able to better grasp the true meaning
of his preferential input in the specific problem context that he is addres-
sing. By prematurely requesting difficult information, the analyst might
induce one or more of the following flaws in representing the decision
makers preferences (Fishhoff et al., 1979);
- random error, by confusing the respondent who might then give an
answer with a low level of confidence;
- systematic error, by giving the repondent the impression that he
(the analyst) is hinting at a "correct" answer, which the respondent then
selects as a way out of uncertainty and ambiguity;
- unduly extreme judgements, by implying that the respondent should
have a clear opinion on a complex matter where attainment of such clarity
is not to be taken for granted.
Therefore, progressive difficulty in preference elicitation is justi-
fied in the interest of decision making efficiency as well as faithful repre-
sentation of decision maker's preferences.
2.2.6 Sequential Elimination in Methodological Structure
Individuals have mental processes and heuristics by which they deal
with complex decision situations. For choice, such heuristics usually con-
sist of information processing strategies. Empirical research indicates
that individuals typically use more than a single rule in order to reach
a decision (Svenson and Montgomery, 1976; Svenson, 1979; Wallsten, 1980).
While the nature of the decision task and its environment are important
determinants of the strategies used (Slovic et al., 1977; Beach and Mitchell,
1978; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981), it seems that early in the decision pro-
cess, when a large number of alternatives are present, individuals tend to
use conjunctive rules t on a single attribute (in the case of multi-attri-
buted options) to sequentially eliminate some of these options from further
consideration (Slovic et al., 1977).
Tversky's (1972) elimination-by-aspect (EBA) model, combining conjunc-
tive and lexicographic features, describes the choice process as a sequential
elimination activity, whereby an aspect is selected and all options unsat-
isfactory on that aspect are eliminated, then another aspect is selected,
etc. To the extent that decision makers feel comfortable with such stra-
tegy (and feel confident enough to supply the necessary information), it
tConjunctive, or satisficing (Simon, 1955), rules eliminate aay option
with a less than a minimum acceptable value on any given attribute.
should be taken advantage of in the decision aiding methodology. However,
this is not to say that the final decision should be reached by such non-
compensatory rules, but only reduction of the options set through partial
elimination.
2.2.7 Conveying Information in Comparison Measures and Criteria
This point highlights the whole issue of task representation and framing
in conveying information to and eliciting preferences from the decision
maker (Fischhoff et al., 1979; Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981; Slovic et al.,
1981). It follows from the more general significance of the cognitive
representation of the task ("problem space") in determining an individual's
problem solving behavior (Newell and Simon, 1972, Pitz, 1977). Indeed, it
is well established that an individual's information processing strategies
are influenced by the method of presentation of the information (Peters,
Hammond and Summers, 1974). Moreover, it appears that decision makers rely
almost exclusively on the information that is explicitly displayed to them
("surface information"), ignoring potentially useful information which needs
to be inferred from, orotherwise involves mental manipulation of the dis-
play (Slovic et al., 1981).t
In the context of risky choice behavior, Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971)
showed that individuals respond only to limited aspects of relevant inrfor-
mation (see also Payne and Braunstein [1971] and Tversky and Kahneman
[1981]). Einhorn (1972) observed that objects tend to be evaluated
tSlovic et al. (1981) refers tothis "concrete thinking" phenomenon as
"The tendency for considerations that are out of sight to be out of
mind".
according to their best or worst aspects, other aspects being irrelevant
(in the context of multi-dimensional choice).
The above observations have clear implications on the measures that
we develop to build decision rules for the problem classes addressed
in this thesis. It is thus extremely important that the information trans-
mitted to the decision maker explicitly carry the true implications of the
solicited response; it is unlikely that he would subject this information
to further manipulation, especally when time is limited and a large number
of complex options are being evaluated. On the other hand, overloading the
decision maker would defeat the very purpose of decision aiding, in addi-
tion to introducing errors in judgement and subsequently in response.
Therefore, the decision rule should have clear intuitive appeal and be based
on measures that capture the implications of the decision situation. Other
specific features that should be taken into account with regard to random
prospects include:
- characterization of random prospects as multidimensional stimuli,
which may be described in terms of basic risk dimensions, based on studies
by Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968), Payne (1973) and Coombs (1975).t
- differentiation between gains and losses, in that risk attitudes
tend to be different for each case (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
- "regret" as a major aspect of random choice situations, as mentioned
in section 1.2 in relation to our problem environment, and recognized by
Hogarth (1980), Bell (1981), and earlier Festinger (1957).§
tThis point was also behind Zeleny's (1977) "Prospect Rating Vector"
approach to portfolio selection based on a multi-dimensional measure of
risk. Further discussion of "risk" can be found in Chapter 3.
Referred to as "cognitive dissonance" by Festinger (1957).
We next discuss two important properties of the preference relations
developed in conjunction with the decision aid.
2.2.8 Incomparability of Options and Threshold Phenomena
In subsection 2.2.1, we indicated that the decision maker's prefer-
ences might not be fully formed with regard to the options under consid-
eration. He therefore does not necessarily possess a complete order on
the set of multivariate random prospects, due to the high complexity of the
problem and the ensuing ambiguity in making the required trade-offs.
Therefore, when comparing two options oi and oj, the decision maker will:
1. prefer oi to oj,
2. prefer oj to oi;
3. be indifferent between oi and oj;
4. be unable to decide.
In the latter case, oi and oj are said to be incomparable. In most
decision models, incomparability is not allowed, and a complete order is
assumed to exist over the set of options. However, as stated by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947):
"It is conceivable ... and may even in a way be more rea-
listic ... to allow for cases where the individual is neither
able to state which of two alternatives he prefers nor that
they are equally desirable."
Roy (1973) has identified three possible situations, within a decision
aiding context, where incomparability could occur:
1. Genuine preferential incomparability, whereby the individual
"simply cannot form a preference",
2. Technical incomparability, such as that due to poor or imprecise
data, and
3. Strategic or tactical incomparability, whereby the individual at
a given stage in the evaluation process is not willing to take a position,
or would prefer to postpone or defer a difficult and possibly costly
decision.
Fishhoff et al.. (1979) discuss the serious implications on preference
assessment (in the context of decision aiding) of "forcing" a decision maker
to state a preference (or indifference) when he is effectively not able
nor prepared to do so. Therefore, in as much as decision aiding for our
class of problems hinges on a true representation of the decision maker's
preferences, it is essential to allow for incomparability in the method-
ology, and not confound it with preferential indifference.
The second phenomenon of interest here concerns the discriminatory
power of the individual decision maker, whereby perceptual threshold phene-
mena in conjunction with preferential indifference might give rise to
intransitivities (Luce, 1956; Fishburn, 1979; Mirkin, 1979). In other
words, an individual could be indifferent between oi and o. given a choice
between the two, and indifferent between oj and ok (given a choice between
them), yet still prefer oi to ok . Such behavior is not necessarily irra-
tional and becomes quite understandable when the options consist of multi-
dimensional and/or random prospects, as noted by Marschak (1975):
"... To the extent that his indifference between two al-
ternatives is due to their similarity, and thus to the diffi-
culty of distinghishing between them, the decision maker need
not regret having practiced intransitivity of the indifference
(not of the strict preference!) relation."
The implications for decision aiding methodology are that the above
behavioral phenomenon should be explictly represented in the postulates
concerning the preference/indifference relation over the set of options,
and transitivity should not be forced where it is not warranted. Opera-
tionally, in the methodology developed in this thesis, the above two con-
siderations (incomparability and threshold phenomena respectively) are
translated into the representation of the preference/indifference relation
between random (and/or multiattributed) prospects by partial semi-orders;
this is a behaviorally justified departure from the usual assumption of
the existence of a complete order in decision models, which though far
more convenient and tractable, is too restrictive for our problem envi-
ronment.
The formal definition of partial semi-orders is given in Chapter 3.
At this stage, we merely point to the link between the above realities
(perceptual thresholds, incomparability) and the fact that partial semi-
orders are compatible with them.
The set of basic considerations described in this section is in many
ways central to the methodological development in this thesis. Other deci-
sion models are assessed with respect to their consistency with it. In
addition, we refer to it throughout and describe to what extent it is
reflected in the structure as well as the specific components of our method-
ology. We next develop a general framework for decision aiding in the
decision environment of section 1.1 for the class of problems addressed
in this thesis, and show its consistency with the above basic considerations.
2.3 General Framework for Decision Aiding
In this section, we develop a general framework for conducting the
evaluation process consisting of three stages. These are in turn described
and consistency with the above basic considerations is discussed. Further-
more, the focus of the methodological development within that framework
is indicated for the problem subclasses of section 1.4.
The Framework
The decision aiding framework proposed here consistsof three distinct
sequential activites: elimination, pairwise comparisons and global compar-
ison, as shown in Figure 2.1 The starting point is a finite set of n
mutually exclusive non-dominated options O = {o01 ... , on}, defining the
decision space. The problem is of course to select the most preferred
option o*~O.
1. Elimination: Each option opEO is taken individually, and a deci-
sion is made as to whether or not it should receive further consideration.
This phase attempts to use easiet level preference information from the
decision maker, in an EBA-like framework (see subsection 2.2.6,) and
conjunctive rules.
The outcome of this sequential elimination activity is a reduced
subset 01 C O0, with o* c 01.
2. Pairwise Comparisons: The elements of o1 are the object of pair-
wise comparisons, whereby a binary preference-indifference relation allowing
t Further characterization of the options is not warranted here, as it
depends on the specific problem subclass addressed.
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for incomparability is induced over 01. Depending on the properties of this
relation, different solution concepts can be used to obtain a further
reduced subset 02 C 01, with o* E 02. The size of this subset depends of
course on the relation used, the extent of preferential information that
the decision maker is willing to commit and the specific options under
consideration; we however envisage a very small subset to result from this
stage.
3. Global Comparison: If 02 contains more than a single element, and
cannot be further reduced in the previous stage, all its elements are con-
fronted jointly in a wholistic comparison for a final selection, which only
the decision maker is able to make. Alternatively, 02 could be viewed as
a small set of superior options, with final selectionleft to the political
process (see section 1.1).
In the global comparison stage, no direct systematic analyst inter-
vention is assumed; of course, ad hoc support can be expected, in terms of
re-display of information generated in the previous phase, or even possible
computation of refined impact information. The rationale is as follows:,
to the extent that the analysis is unable to extract additional discrimi-
nating preferential information that would introduce further decidability
into the problem, systematic interaction is stopped rather than introducing
decidability by forcing consistency with a set of restrictive assumptions
on a highly complex and "close" choice situation.
Consistency with Basic Considerations
The above framework is consistent with the set of basic considerations
in section 2.2 in a number of ways, some of which are relatively obvious.
For instance, note the progressively increasing difficulty of the required
preference information, where each successive stage can be seen to exhaust
all information that can be supplied at a given level of confidence (cf.
subsection 2.2.5). Thus, at every stage, greater risk is involved in terms
of misrepresenting the decision maker's true preferences and eliminating
an ultimately superior option.
In addition, the considerations insubsection 2.2.6 are reflected by
the use of a combination of rules, starting with conjunction rules in an
EBA-like format early in the process, and progressively using more complex
context dependent rules. This context dependence culminated with the un-
structured global comparison phase. Naturally, other behavioral consider-
ations of section 2.2 map into specific elements of the methodological
framework and are thus reflected in the design of these elements (e.g., the
preference relation in the .econd stage).
Focus of Methodological Development
The focus of the methodological development in the remainder of this
thesis is primarily on the pairwise comparisons phase, in which the fundamental
issues of choice under uncertainty are faced, and thus where the major
methodological issues exist. This development is pursued in the context of
problem formulation 1 (where options consist of univariate random prospects
and uncertainty is represented via discrete states of nature, as described in
section 1.4). It is subsequently generalized to problem subclass 2 (i.e.,
the continuous univariate case). The treatment of the multivariate case, or
problem subclass 3 is limited to indicating the applicability of the general
methodology to an example preference-indifference relation.
Furthermore, while the elimination phase is recognized as a plausible
activity, which should be performed within the decision aiding framework as
it can be quite effective at reducing the set of options, it is relatively
straightforward. As such, it is only explicitly treated in two instances;
1) in Chapter 5, to show how the same concept underlying the binary compari-
son relation can be adapted for elimination and 2) in Appendix A, which speci-
fies this activity in the context of problem subclass 3.t Of course, elimi-
nation assumes greater importance for this subclass since the increased pre-
ferential complexity of the multivariate case can: 1) allow a wider scope of
possibilities in terms of elimination rules and 2) benefit significantly from
such elimination (in terms of size reduction).
It should finally be noted that pairwise comparisons (and to a lesser
extent elimination) are developed not becuase they are necessarily the most
important or the most difficult, but because it is felt that those are the
areas where systematic methodology can be most relevant and effective.
Note on Evolutive Set of Options
This note concerns the case where the set of options is evolutive
rather than static, as would be the case in the design of alternative trans-
portation options. Though our focus is primarily on evaluation and selec-
tion given a fixed set of options, extensions of the framework described in
this section, to the design case is possible by allowing the outcome of the
global comparison (or any prior stage) to be an empty set, thus requiring
the introduction of new elements in 0. However, a number of other complex
considerations enter the creative design process , and we do not claim to
address them here.
The next section summarizes the contents of this chapter.
As shown in section 1.4, problem formulation 1 is only a special case of
subclass 3.
2.4 Summary
This chapter has presented the set of basic considerations underlying
our methodological development. Combining the characteristics of the urban
transportation problem environment, and behavioral aspects of individual
decision making and judgement, this set of considerations guides the
remainder of this thesis. An overall framework for decision aiding con-
sisting of three sequential activities (elimination, pairwise comparisons,
global comparison, respectively) was accordingly developed in section 2.3;
specific areas of emphasis in this thesis with respect to the subclasses of
problems addressed were indicated.
In the next chapter, the set of basic considerations is used to assess
approaches for the problem of choice among random prospects and is then trans-
lated into specific postulates for our methodological work. In particular,
partial semi-orders are defined and proposed as a possible model for a
behaviorally oriented representation of the decision maker's preferences
over the set of random prospects.
CHAPTER 3
CHOICE AMONG RANDOM PROSPECTS:
MODELS AND POSTULATES
In this chapter, we address the fundamental problem of choice among
random prospects, which arises in the "pairwise comparisons" stage of the
general decision aiding framework presented in the previous chapter. This
discussion concerns the first of the two problem subclasses described in sec-
tion 1.4, where the options consist of univariate random prospects; fur-
thermore, since it is pursued for the general case (i.e., formulation 2
in section 1.4), it is applicable to its "discrete states" version (i.e.,
formulation 1) as well.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, in section 3.1, it
presents a brief review of existing normative theories and models for choice
among (univariate) random prospects, with special emphasis on expected
utility theory. Second, in section 3.2, the axiomatic foundation of expected
expected utility theory is re-examined in light of the basic considerations
of chapter 2; in particular, by suitable framing, and with the aid of a
simple example, we illustrate the implications of the independence axiom,
casting further doubt on its otherwise apparent intuitive appeal. Third,
in section 3.3, it proposes less restrictive postulates (again based on
the behavioral considerations of Chapter 2) for our methodological devel-
opment, using the notion of partial semi-orders, which are then described.
As such, this chapter lays the groundwork needed for the methodological
development in the following chapters. In addition to placing that method-
ological work in its proper perspective, sections 3.1 and 3.2 contain the
principal ideas underlying the measures used to build the binary relation
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in Chapter 4. Furthermore, the postulates in section 3.3 are also funda-
mental to the innovative character of our methodology.
Note that in this chapter and increasingly in the following ones, we
will be using mathematical definitions and concepts that are commonly
used in decision theory. For the convenience of the reader who might not
be very familiar with these concepts, Appendix B presents a brief introduc-
tion to those necessary for the comprehension of the work presented herein.
3.1 Models for Comparing Random Prospects
3.1.1 The Problem
A random prospect consists of a probability function over
X, the set of consequences xl, x2, 
.... 
Let I denote the set of all such
probability functions, with elements fA' fB fC, ... . The elements
of I are assumed to be prospects with objective'probabilities (which may
be subjectively determined).§
The problem of concern is as follows: given a known complete order
over the set of consequences X, how should we choose between two random
prospects fA and fB. We are thus concerned with the normative facet of
selection among random prospects.
As stated in subsection 2.2.1, the unambiguous complete order over X
(which is sufcicient to determine a best choice between elements of X under
certainty) does not automatically imply a preference order over n, nor,
a fortiori, an operational choice rule. Approaches for establishing prefer-
ence between random prospects have thus done one of either of the following:
1. specify summary measures of the respective probability distribu-
tions, which then in turn become the basis of comparison (itself performed
in a variety of ways, with varying degrees of preference information re-
quirements); such approaches are briefly discussed in subsection 3.1.2,
with particular emphasis on the various measures proposed for the "risk"
of a distribution.
Ve consider, in general, that X C •, the infinite set of real numbers.
§The set of options 0, for the class of problems 1 formulated in sec-
tion 1.4, is therefore a subset of H, i.e. 0 C_ T.
&In other words, given any xi, x. E X, we can always unambiguously state
that xi is preferred to xj, or ; ice-versa, or that they are equivalent.
2. postulate a set of properties that preferences over R should possess
(presumably as tenets of rationality), resulting in a structured represen-
tation of these preferences, from which a choice rule can be derived.
Of course, this second category essentially consists of the well-
known expected utility theory (EUT hereafter), axiomatized by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1947; VN-M hereafter), which is generally viewed as pro-
viding the norm for allegedly "rational" choice among random prospects.
Though VN-M's mathematical derivations have never been questioned, the
underlying axiomatic system is subject to considerable disagreement, not
about its internal consistency, but regarding the validity of the indivi-
dual axioms and the extent to which they define retionality. Prior to their
critical re-examination in section 3.2, these axioms are presented in sub-
section 3.1.3, along with some associated operational aspects of EUT.
The following discussion is by necessity very limited. Introduction
to the rudiments and models of choice under uncertainty, at a relatively
elementary level, can be found in Holloway (1979, Chapters 1, 5), and to
varying degrees of difficulty, in any of the numerous textbooks on Deci-
sion Analysis. For a historical perspective, see Drbze (1978) or the intro-
duction in Allais and Hagen (1979). A number of surveys can be found in
a number of disciplines, notable among them being Fishburn's (1977) thorough
and rigourous survey of decision theories.
tAs such, it is the principal theory on which decision analysis has devel-
oped into a full-fledged discipline.
This controversy is most apparent in a recent collection of position
papers edited by Allais and Hagen (1979).
3.1.2 Non-EUT based Models
These approaches seek to describe each probability distribution by
some "summary" measure(s) which can then be used to compare distributions.
Mathematical expectation, or the mean of the distribution, has often been
used as a single criterion for that purpose (of course, the higher the mean,
the better). It is however well accepted (though not always recognized in
practice) that a single central-tendency measure is an inadequate choice
rule, especially for unique non-repeatable choice situations. Thus,
existing decision theories in this category typically use the mean in con-
junction with a measure of dispersion of the outcomes, or "risk" of a
distribution. The most prominent among those is the mean-variance or
EV model (Markowitz, 1959), extensively used in portfolio analysis.
Fishburn (1977) views the EV model as part of a large class of mean-
risk theories, where each fA e is characterized by its mathematical
expectation Y(fA), and a real valued measure of risk R(fA). The comparison
between fA' fB E R then becomes a bi-criterion comparison between
[(fA), R(fA)] and [W(fB) , R(fB)]. This class of theories can be further
divided depending on 1) the functional form of the risk measure R(-), and
2) the bi-criterion comparison rule used.
Risk Measures
The most commonly used form of R(-) is the variance a2(_) of a dis-
tribution, in the above mentioned EV model. However, in response to criti-
cism of the variance on grounds of its symmetric treatment of high and
tThe best known challenge to the practice of comparing distributions on
the basis of their mathematical expection only is the St. Petersburg
paradox (see Gorovitz, 1979, for an account of it), which is a hypothe-
tical game with infinite expectation on returns. It was actually this
so-called paradox that led Bernouilli (1738) to introduce the concept
of utility (Allais and Hagen, 1979, Introduction).
low outcomes, "one-sided" risk measures focussing on low outcomes such as
the semivariance have been suggested, primarily for portfolio selection
applications (Porter, 1974; Burgess, 1978). Other risk measures focussing
on low outcomes include a generalized below target measure (Fishburn, 1977a),
the probability of ruin (considered by Allais [1953] as central to the
psychology of risk), probability of loss and others. Stone (1973) con-
sidered most of those measures as special cases of the following three-
parameter risk measure:
R(f) = f c - xl f(x)dx (3.1)
where c is a reference level of payoff from which deviations are
computed;
a is the power to which these deviations are raised;
X defines the domain of X of concern in computing these
deviations.
Some dispersion measures proposed in the literature consist of compo-
sites of the standard deviation a (or variance 02) and mean of a distribu-
tion, such as Baumol's (1963) measure R(-) = Ka(-) - u(*), where K is a
real valued positive constant; also Pollatsek and Tversky's (1970) axio-
matization of the measure R(*) = 0a2 (.) - (1 - e)h(*-), where 0<0<1. The
only other axiomatization of risk measures is due to Luce (1980), who con-
siders an additive as well as a multiplicative model; its interest however
lies mainly in the mathematical derivations rather than in the actual re-
sulting measures.
In addition, note the entropy-based measure proposed by Phillippatos
and Wilson (1972), also in the context of protfolio selection.
Having characterized each distribution fA9 fB n separately in terms
of P(-) and R(*), the next component of P mean-risk model is the bi-criterion
choice model, discussed hereafter.
Bi-Criterion Comparison Models
Three types of models have been used in conjunction with the mean-risk
class of approaches, each with different preferential information require-
ments from the decision makers. These are (Fishburn, 1977):
1. mean-risk dominance model, whereby fA dominates fB; fA9 f EB
if and only if:
V(f ) > P(fB) and R(fA) < R(fB )  .
The above dominance is strict if any one of the two associated inequal-
ities is strict. It is clear that the dominance relation is only a partial
order. It does not require any additional preferential information from
the decision maker, beyond specification of the parameters of the risk
measure (particularly in the case where R(-) is defined with respect to
a maximum acceptable loss or ruin). No trade-off information between v(-)
and R(*) is needed.
The dominance model has been used primarily with R(*) = 02, yielding
the EV-dominance model, used extensively in portfolio analysis to identify
the efficient set of options (Markowitz, 1959).
2. Compensatory mean-risk trade-off model, which resolves cases incom-
parable by the dominance model through a mean-risk trade-off curve, thus
resulting in a complete order relation. However, the trade-off function
has to be supplied by the decision maker, which might prove to be quite a
The reader is reminded that decision-theoretic terminology is defined in
Appendix B.
difficult task. Again, its primary use has been with R(.) = a2 (Markowitz,
1959), though use with "one-sided" low-outcomes oriented risk measure has
also been reported (Mao, 1970; Libby and Fishburn, 1977).t
3. Mean-risk lexicographic model, whereby the option with the highest
expected return is selected, subject to the risk not exceeding a decision
maker sqecified acceptable level. This type of model is typically used
in conjunction with "probability of ruin" as a measure of risk (Allais,
1953; Machol and Lerner, 1969; Joy and Barron, 1974). The only prefer-
ential input required is the maximum acceptable probability of ruin.
Viewed from the perspective of our overall decision aiding framework
(described in section 2.3), the above model consists of an elimination rule
(if probability of ruin greater than pre-sppcified level, then reject),
resulting in a subset of options with acceptable probabilities of ruin.
The latter are then compared with respect to a single criterion only,
namely their respective expected payoff.
Observations on Mean-Risk Model
A number of observations suggest themselves from the above discussion.
In particular, concerning risk measures, we note the following:
1. No agreement exists as to a specific definition of "risk", both
mathematically and conceptually. This indicates that it is effectively
problem context dependent, and might even depend on a particular decision-
maker's asset position, as well as his ability to comprehend such infor-
mation.
tDiscussions on the consistency of EV analysis with EUT can be found in
Fishburn and Vickson (1978), Kira and Ziemba (1977), Levy (1979) and
others.
2. Risk seems to be viewed as a unidimensional concept or quantity;
given the multitude of definitions proposed for it, it seems natural to
think of it as a multi-dimensional quantity reflecting various concerns.
Such a definition, for a specific problem content (portfolio selection) has
been attempted by Zeleny (1977) who defines risk components with respect
to minimal outcomes and maximal outcomes respectively.
3. In the above measures, risk is considered as a descriptor of a
single distribution, taken individually. As such, they do not characterize
the risks relative to a particular choice situation, involving by definition
more than a single distribution. In subsection 3.2.2, we develop a choice-
related measure of risk in conjunction with the critique of the indepen-
dence axiom of EUT.
4. The above measures do not seem to have strong intuitive meaning,
with the possible exception of the "probability of loss". We articulate
this point with subsection 2.2.7 in mind, and in particular with respect
to the mean-variance trade-off model, as the latter requires considerable
preferential input through non-intuitive (and thus possibly misperceived)
information.
The bottom line, of course, is whether or not the decison maker under-
stands those measures and is able to size up the implications of the inputs
he supplies. Problem context, type of distributions encountered, and
familiarity of the decision maker (with both the problem and the models in
question) through repeated decisions are certainly important factors in
assessing the validity of such models; in the particular case of portfolio
analysis where EV models have been extensively used, it seems that a "cali-
bration" of sorts (of the decision-makers) might have occurred in some
instances. However, transferability to other contexts is rather dubious,
especially in light of the limitations of the above-mentioned risk measures.
Furthermore, we note that while the EV-dominance model places virtu-
ally no cognitive strain on the decision maker, its discriminatory power
is usually quite low, except in relatively trivial situations. On the
other hand, the compensatory model suffers from the difficulty of obtain-
ing the needed preferential information, besides being subject to potential
assessment hazards. The third approach, featuring the lexicographic deci-
sion rule is relatively better grounded behaviorally, yet still suffers
from the limitations of using a unidimensional (choice) situation-
independent satisficing risk criterion.
As mentioned earlier, in section 3.2, we propose a different, regret-
based risk concept reflecting the specific choice situation under consid-
eration. Furthermore, the above ideas are reflected again in the measures,
as well as the rationale for the decision rule presented in Chapter 4 which
is central to our methodology.
We now proceed with our review and discuss EUT in the next section.
3.1.3 Expected Utility Theory and Related Models
While recognizing that choice among random prospects should conform
to the decision maker's preferences, EUT postulates a set of properties
that these preferences should possess, resulting in a structured mathe-
matical representation of those preferences and an associated choice rule.
A brief exposition of the axiomatic foundation of EUT is presented here-
after.
A binary relation > is assumed to exist on the set ir of probability
functions, where fA>fB denotes that "fA is preferred to fB"; > is
thus irreflexive (since fA > fA is not a true assertion). An indifference
relation ' is associated with >, such that fA B f-- not (fA fB ) and
not (fB fA) ; by definition, 1 is reflexive, since fA • fA' fA E
The axiomatic foundation t set by VN-M imposes three groups of charac-
teristics on the individual decision maker's preferences; these are
(Fishburn, 1970):
A.l. Ordering Axioms, which state the completeness of individual
preferences on the set of probability functions E; in other words, for
every fA' fB E n, one of the following three conditions holds: fA > fB
or fB )A or fA B f "
Furthermore, the preference relation > is postulated to be:
- asymmetric, i.e., fA > fB => not (fB > fA)
- transitive, i.e., fA > fB and fB C fC
fA > fC' fA B' f fC E .
The relation > is therefore assumed to be a linear order. The associated
indifference relations n' is postulated to be reflexive, symmetric and transi-
tive; it is therefore an equivalence.
A.2. Independence Axiom, which is probably the most crucial to the
mathematical derivation and the most controversial. It states that if
fA > f B' then AfA + (1 - )f C > fB + (1 - X)fC, for any 0 < X < 1 and
and fC "I
tAlternative axiomatiaations leading to the same results have been proposed
by Marschak (1950), Savage (1954) and Arrow (1971); these sets of axioms
are effectively equivalent and are thoroughly discussed and compared in
MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979).
In the above axiom, the expression "XfA + (1 - A)fC" is referred to
as a probability mixture of fA and fC, and is itself a random prospect.
Thus, if we define fR as fR = XfA + (1 - A)fC, then fR E H with
fR(x) = XfA(x) + (1 - A)fB(x), Fx E X.
A.3. Archimedean or Continuity Axiom, whereby if fA > fB and fB > fC'
then: [cafA + (1 - a)fC] > fB and fB> fA + (1 - B)fC)for some a and B such
that 0 < a < 1 and 0 < B < 1.
Axioms A.1, A.2 and A.3 above are necessary and sufficentt to prove
the existence of a (uniquely defined up to a linear transformation) real
valued function u : X -+ R such that:
fA> fB if and only if E(u, fA) > E(u, fB),
E (u, fA ) = F/ i(x)fA(x)dx.
The function u(*) is known as a "utility" function, thus E(u, fA) is
the expected utility of random prospect fA"
The implications of this result are manifold. First, if a decision
maker accepts the axioms (as decision analysts and economists argue that
he should), then a utility function defined over X is all that is needed
to establish a complete order over the set of probability functions via
their respective expected utility. Second, and as a corollary
tProof for the specific version of the axioms presented here can be found
in Jensen (1967) or Fishburn (1970).
§We will also refer to u(*) as a "preference curve".
where
of this last point, a decision maker's utility function can be assessed
using his responses to simple hypothetical choice situations, and can
subsequently be used to compare more complex options. This of course is
the rationale behind Decision Analysis.
What should be re-emphasized concerning EUT, as it has bearing on
proposition 2.2.1 in Chapter 2 is that EUT is only normative in that it
prescribes choices that supposedly conform to the decision maker's prefer-
ences, as represented by his utility function. Furthermore, it is norma-
tive in that it requires these preferences to follow the tenets of ration-
ality embodied in the above axioms.
Given that one accepts those tenets, assessment of a utility function
for choice under uncertainty can be quite a complex and difficult task.§
However, in many choice situations, it is possible to reach a decision con-
sistent with EUT knowing only some general properties of the utility func-
tion, such as its monotonicity and concavity, thus obviating the need for
a full blown preference curve assessment. Such choice situations, charac-
terized by the relative shapes of the probability distributions under con-
sideration, have been identified and discussed by Hammond (1974) and are
the subject of Stochastic Dominance (Whitmore and Findlay, 1978).
While stochastic dominance is a technique that can greatly reduce the
A number of assessment procedures based on this principle have been devel-
oped in Decision Analysis; their details are however outside the scope
of this presentation, as they can be found in a number of texts, including
Raiffa (1968), Keeney and Raiffa (1976) and Holloway (1979), among others.
§That such difficulty can be due to the restrictiveness and lack of validity
of the axioms is quite a plausible hypothesis, as we see in section 3.2.
However, for the time being, let us for the sake of argument, accept that
the difficulty is not due necessarily to a violation of the underlying
assumptions.
decision maker's congitive strain in a preference assessment session, it
requires acceptance of EUT's axioms, and as such does not propose an alter-
native set of postulates for choice under uncertainty. It is therefore
not necessary to discuss it any further here.t
Finally, in this section, we note a class of models which have not
adopted EUT's axiomatic system (nor do they have a system of their own),
but have postulated the existence of a real valued value function
v : X -+- I, compatible with the theory of ordered utility differences (Pareto,
1927); presumably reflecting"strength of preference" for an outcome x e X
(see Krzysztofowicz [1981] for a discussion of such a value function and
its relation to VN-M's utility function for risky choice). This class of
models then defined a criterion function for comparing probability distri-
butions over X (transformed to distributions of rtalue outcomes), with terms
consisting of higher moments of the distribution of value outcomes, in
addition to the first moment (Hagen, 1979; Munera, 1978). The reason
for noting these models here in conjunction with EUT is that they were pro-
posed as an alternative to the expected utility criterion, claiming to
explain some of the classical paradoxes associated with EUT. Some of these
paradoxes, along with other limitations of EUT are the topic of the next
section.
tInterested readers are referred to any one of a rapidly growing list of
references on the topic, such as Hadar and Russell (1974), Borch (1979),
or Whitmore and Findlay (1978); Bawa (1981) recently compiled an exten-
sive research bibliography on the topic.
§This topic is also addressed by Sarin (1981), Dyer and Sarin (1981) and
Bell (1981a). Note in this respect that the above-mentioned "value func-
tion", reflecting "strength of preference" is what economists usually
refer to as "utility functions". Following the standard practice in de-
cision theory, we reserve the term"utility function" for a VN-M's function
for the risky choice context (Keeney and Raiffa, 1976).
3.2 Critique of Expected Utility Theory
In this section, the axiomatic foundation of EUT is re-examined in
terms of its appropriateness for our decision environment, and thus its con-
formance to the basic considerations of Chapter 2. Subsection 3.2.1
identifies a number of limitations of EUT with respect to these consid-
erations, while subsection 3.2.2 focuses on the independence axiom
(axiom A.2). The latter's otherwise apparent intuitive appeal is ques-
tioned, using reported evidence in the literature, as well as a new argu-
ment articulated through a simple example illustrating the implications
of this axiom on the underlying risk dimensions of a given choice situation.
These risk dimensions are developed in that subsection to capture the
degree of violation of the complete order over the outcome space, which
is assumed known and agreed upon.
3.2.1 General Limitations
While EUT is in agreement with proposition 2.2.1, since a VN-M utility
function is supposed to encode preferences for risky choice situations,
it assumes those preferences to be fully formed a priori (by virtue of
axiom A.1). It is thus not compatible with proposition 2.2.2, nor with
2.2.3, which casts decision aiding as a preference forming process. While
EUT (as used in Decision Analysis) may claim to "form" preferences over
the set of options, using responses to hypothetical gambles and the asso-
ciated utility construct, this is precisely where it is most susceptible
to errors and biases. Indeed, as indicated in subsections 2.2.3 and 2.2.7,
the dangers of an assessment methodology shaping and/or misrepresenting
preferences are highest when preferences are not well formed (Fishhoff
et al., 1979).
The considerations in subsection 2.2.4 to 2.2.8 articulating the need
to incorporate behavioral aspects of decision-making and judgement and
specifying these aspects, are not generally reflected in EUT. In parti-
cular, serious questions have been raised concerning the extent to which
EUT reflects some important dimensions of the psychology of choice under
uncertainty (Coombs, 1975; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Allais, 1979;
Bell, 1981a). It is interesting to note in this context that the descriptive
power of utility theory is no longer claimed (even by its staunchest sup-
porters, as in Gorovitz [1979], Morgenstern [1979] and Howard [1980]),
primarily as a result of considerable evidence gathered and reported by
psychologists on the consistent violation of EUT's axioms in observed be-
havior.t
However, the idiosyncracies of observed behavior of "common" indivi-
duals making choices among random prospects do not necessarily provide a
sufficient basis for assessing the validity of a supposedly normative
theory. On the other hand, observed choices of individuals who are explicitly
and consciously trying to act rationally, and who are qualified to under-
stand probabilistic information, should be more valid indicators of the ap-
propriateness of a theory that recognizes the decision-maker's preferences
as the basis for choice among random prospects. This argument is invoked
again in subsection 3.2.2.
A number of alternative descriptive models have been suggested by mathe-
matical psychologists todescribe risky choice behavior, including Payne
(1973), Schneeweiss (1974), Coombs (1975), Kahneman and Tversky (1979). A
review of the empirical research refuting the descriptive validity of EUT
is beyond the scope of this discussion. An excellent survey can be found
in Slovic et al. (1977); other references include Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) and Allais (1979).
One further point concerns the incompatibility of the ordering axiom
(A.1) with the considerations of subsections 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.2.8 in two
major aspects: 1)completeness of preferences over the set of random prospects,
and 2) the transitivity of the indifference relation ". Having already amply
discussed the unnecessarily restrictive nature of completeness in our deci-
sion environment, we briefly illustrate based on Fishburn
(1979), why transitivity of t is not as obvious as it might first seem.
Let fA and fB be "sure gambles"!with fA(35) = 1 and fB(36) = l,and fC a
third gamble offering a probability of 0.5 at receiving 100 and 0.5 at
receiving nothing (i.e., fC(0) = fC(100) = 0.5). According to the agreed
upon order over X C_ , [fB> fBF. since fB has a guaranteed greater payoff
than fA. However, as argued by Fishburn, most rational individuals who
exhibit [fA- fC ] will also exhibit [fg'B fC1 . Yet, it is not true that
[fA B f ] . Such "anomalies" are typically attributed to perceptual threshold
phenomena. In section 3.3, postulates compatible with these phenomena are
presented. However, we first present our critique of the independence
axiom (A.2)
3.2.2 The Independence Axiom
In the form stated in subsection 3.1.3, the independence axiom is com-
monly know as Savage's "Sure Thing" principle (Savage, 1954).t It essen-
tially says that if [fA fB] for a given individual, then rationality re-
quires that he/she should have [gA> gB], where gA and gB consist of the fol-
lowing probability mixtures, respectively:
1) fA with probability a or fC with probability (1 - c), i.e.,
gA = afA + (1 - a)fC ;
tOther independence axioms implied by the expected utility criterion are dis-
cussed in Fishburn (1972, 1979).
2) fB with probability a or fC with probability (1 - a), i.e.,
gB = afB + (1 - a)f C.  ;
and the above should be true for all fA' fB fc E C and 0 < a .1.
The argument typically given in support of the "rationality" of this
axiom is as follows: there is a (1 - a) probability that either gamble
(gA or gB) yields fc (in that regard, they are thus equivalent), and a
probability a that either fA or fB are obtained; since gA offers a prob-
ability a of attaining a preferred option, and is otherwise equivalent to
gB, then gA should be preferred to gB"
While the logic of the above argument might seem unquestionable, it
can be seriously challenged on grounds that gA and gB should be viewed and
compared wholisticallyrather than in a "two-stage" fashion (Fishburn, 1979).
In other words, gA should be viewed as the function that takes, for a
given x, the value gA(x) = afA(x) + (1 - c)fC(x), and similarly for gB'
rather than a composite of events.
The "two-stage" argument is an excellent illustration of the framing
effect discussed in subsection 2.2.4 and 2.2.7, and recently emphasized
by Slovic et al. (1981). By framing the choice situation in a two-stage
manner, an illusion is created that fA and fB are "tangible" events or ob-
jects whose value is known and received with certainty, independently of
an exogenous chance occurrence.t Furthermore, even if one could "cash in"
fA or fB (say by selling it off at a predetermined known price), the out-
tWe are implicitly assuming that the independence axiom is plausible and
uncontvoversial when the outcomes are certain quantities rather than
random prospects. In particular, let fA, f-, and f be sure gambles
yielding $100, $50 and $25, respectively (ogviously fA>fB]). If gA of-
fers fA with probability a, and fC with probability (I - a), and gB offers
fB with probability a and fC with probability (1 - a), then [gA g is
quite plausible.
come received from either mixture gA or gB is not a two-stage outcome but
a single outcome, which is ultimately evaluated according to the unambi-
guous order that is known to exist on the outcome space X. Therefore, in
as much as preference between random prospects is conditional upon the order
accepted over X, and mixtures of elements of R lead to different pdf's
over X, these mixtures should be compared regardless of their constituent
elements.
Consistent with our discussion so far, the failure of the relation
over R to satisfy the independence axiom would be a "legitimate" property
of the decision-maker's preferences towards random prospects.t It follows
from the above that preferences held (and rationally and consciously formed)
by a decision maker over a subset of H, even if they violate the indepen-
dence axiom, constitute a more valid guide for normative action than the
implications of the acceptance of the independence axiom when the latter
is presented only in abstract terms or framed in a "two-stage" fashion.
This argument is made to further support the conclusions reached in a
number of experimental and real-life situations whereby subjects explicitly
seeking to act rationally revealed, through their choices, an underlying
preference relation over R which violates the independence axiom.
The best known of these reported instances is Allais' famous so-called
"paradox" (Allais, 1953; 1979). However, there have also been "counter-
claims" to Allais' paradox, whereby decision makers whose choices violated
the independence axiom were later "convinced" to reverse these preferences,
tIn the same sense that "risk aversion" or "risk proneness" are acceptable
properties of a decision maker's preferences.
following an "explanation" of that axiom (MacCrimmon, 1968). This parti-
cular "counterclaim" illustrates further the point made earlier about
framing of explanations and their effect on a respondent's attitude, es-
pecially when the latter's preferences are ambiguous. For instance, with
regard to MacCrimmon's experiment above, Slovic and Tversky (1974) chal-
lenged those results on grounds that the experimenter placed undue pressure
on the respondents (to accept the axiom).t The argument of the previous
paragraph concurs with that challenge. Other reported instances clearly
casting doubt on the plausibility of the independence axiom are dis-
cussed in Coombs (1975), Ellsberg (1961) and Moskowitz (1974), among others.
In what follows, the independence axiom is re-examined from the per-
spective of the accepted order over the outcome space X. The implications
of that axiom are in essence "re-framed" by ccrtrasting key risk dimensions
of a choice situation between two prospects fA and fB to those of a choice
between the two mixtures gA and gB (where gA and gB are as defined at the
beginning of this subsection). A simple numerical example is used for that
purpose. First, however, the risk dimensions of interest are developed.
In order to be "valid" (from a normative standpoint), any preference
relation over H has to be consistent with the complete unambiguous prefer-
ence order assumed to exist over the relevant docmain of the reward space X.
The inherent peculiarity of random prospects, which characterizes prefer-
ences over H, is that a priori preferences (i.e., before resolution of the
uncertainty and realization of an outcome) do not necessarily imply ex-post
(i.e., after realization of the outcome) consistency with preferences over
X. To illustrate this relatively obvious point (yet fundamental to a true
According to Slovic et al. (1977), that researcher (MacCrimmon) later
acknowledged the inconclusiveness of his own previous findings.
grasp of the implications of preferences between risky prospects), consider
the lottery fA E 1H yielding xA with probability a and xC with probability
(1 - a), and fB E n yielding xB with certainty, where xA, xB, xC E X and
xA > xB > xC .  Consider an individual who consciously decides to take fA
over fB in a choice situation where both are present, indicating that,
a priori, [fAý fB] . If the realization of the outcome of fA yields xC, then,
ex-post, because xB > xC (unambiguously) the outcome of fA cannot be pre-
ferred to that which would have resulted from the selection of fBe
It is thus clear that, by definition, preference between random pros-
pects might entail a finite risk of ex-post violation of the underlying
order over X, thus resulting in regret. Denoting by x* the outcome of
fi E H, that risk is simply the probability that the outcome x2 from the
unselected prospect f2 i~ a choice situation involving fl and f2 (where
fl f2 E H) is such that x~ >x* ; denote this probability by p(x2 > x*).
For instance, if F1 and F2 are cumulative distribution functions corresponding
to fl and f2 respectively, we obtain, in the general case:
p(x2> X*) f p(x2>x Ix*=x) * fl(x)dx
2 12
" l - [p(x2 < x) x1]}) * fl(x)dx
= 1 - F2 x*=x (x) fl(x)dx (3.2)
tWithout loss of generality, the preference relation over X is considered
to be the same as that over I and is thus denoted >.
Note that in this discussion, we assume that the conditional probability
of occurrence of any outcome from a given option is independent of which
option is selected.
where F21x*.=x is the conditional c.d.f. of x* given the value of x* Of
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course, if fl and f2 are independent, then expression (3.2) becomes
p(x*'> x) = 1 - F2(xI fl(x)dx (3.3)
The quantities p(x2 > x*), p(x* > x2) and p(x* = x2) can thus be viewed
as key dimensions of a choice between fl and f2 and are as such critical
in determining their relative preference. We argue here that a change
in one or more of these dimensions clearly places the decision maker in
an altogether different choice situation which might preclude inferences
or extensions (from comparisons among certain prospects) such as the one
postulated in the independence axiom. A simple numerical example illus-
trates this point:
Consider a choice between fl and f2, where
0.8 for x = 90 0.7 for x = 100
fl(x) = 0.2 for x = 0 f2(x) 0.3 for x = 0
0 otherwise 0 otherwise
This situation can be described by:
p(x* > x2) = p(x* = 90 and x = 0) = 0.24
p(x2 > x*) = p(x2 = 100, Vx*) = 0.7
p(x = x*) = p(x = 0 and x2 = 0) = 0.06
tNote that this characterization of random prospects as multidimensional
stimuli defined by basic risk dimensions is consistent with psychological
theories and evidence presented by Payne (1973), Payne and Braunstein (1971)
Slovic and Lichtenstein (1968) and discussed in subsection 2.2.7.
It is immaterial here which of the two distributions should be preferred,
since as emphasize all along, we have no normative basis for comparing
all elements of H without explicit considerations of the decision-maker's
preferences. In this particular case, either relative ordering is possible
as neither seems to be "obviously" better nor worse than the other. Let
us now introduce a third prospect, f3 C H , defined by:
f3(x)
0.25 for x = 110
0.25 for x = 85
0.25 for x = 10
0.25 for x = 0
0 otherwise
We can form the following probability mixtures:
gA = afl + (I - a)f 3  and gB c = f2 + (1 - a)f3, where 0 < a < i.
According to the independence axiom, gA's relative preference with respect
to gB should be the same as that of fl relative to f2. We show here that
such an implication should not be taken for granted as substantial changes
in the risk dimensions associated with the new choice situation can occur,
where the direction of these changes does not necessarily have clear pre-
ferential implications (from a normative or "rational" standpoint). Con-
sider the case where a = 0.2; gA and gB are then:
AW(x)=
g,(x)=
0.2 for x = 110
0.16 for x = 90
0.2 for x = 85
0.2 for x = 10
0.24 for x 0
0 otherwise
0.2 for x = 110
0.14 for x = 100
0.2 for x = 85
0.2 for x = 10
0.26 for x = 0
0 otherwise
If we define xA and x as above but corresponding to gA and gB respec-
tively, this choice situation can be described by:
p(x* > x~) = p(x* = 110 and xB < 110) + p(x*= 90 and x* < 100)
+ p(x* = 85 and x* < 85) + p(x* = 10 and x* < 10)A B A Xi
= 0.2 x 0.8 + 0.16 x 0.66 + 0.2 x 0.46 + 0.2 x 0.26 = 0.41
p(x* > xA) = 0.48
p(x = x) = 0.182
Comparing the above values (0.41, 0.408, 0.182) to the initial set (0.24,
0.7, 0.06), we clearly see that both the absolute and relative risks of
having obtained a better outcome from the unchosen option, i.e., of "making
the wrong choice", are substantially different in the intial and trans-
formed situations. Figure 3.1 shows the variation of p(x > xB),
(x > x) and p(x xB) as a function of a. It clearly reveals the
high sensitivity of the relative risks of selecting either prospect gA or
gB to the value of a, such that the initial relative risks implied by a
choice between fl and f2 can vary widely in direction and magnitude when
fl and f2 are combined as described above with f3.
In addition to questioning the independence axiom, the above example
has served to introduce the regret-based dimensions of the risk associated
with a choice between random prospects, as opposed to the risk measures
of section 3.1 which described random prospects taken individually. How-
ever, this is not to say that the risk measures presented here are the
sole factors that should be considered in the choice. The next chapter
builds on this concept by proposing other such risk dimensions and using
these in an operational decision aiding methodology for our decision en-
vironment.
To summarize section 3.2, the axiomatic foundation of EUT was found
to be generally incompatible with the basic considerations described in
Chapter 2 and thus of limited use in the decision environment of section
1.1. In particular, the alleged rationality of the independence axiom
(A.2) was further questioned through its implications on regret-based
risk dimensions of a choice situation between random prospects. Further-
more, the requirements of the ordering axiom (A.1) were found to be unduly
restrictive and thus quite problematic for our decision environment where
preferences are not formed a priori and characterized by a high degree of
ambiguity.
We did not even discuss the continuity axiom (A.3), itself the subject
of considerable criticism (Fishburn, 1979). However, the same consider-
ations applying to the critique of the completeness of (), ') apply to
(A.3)
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Figure 3.1: Variation of Implied Risks as a Function of a
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The reason this critical discussion is necessary in the context of
this thesis stems from the prevalence, in related disciplines, of EUT as
a model of rational choice under uncertainty. However, as discussed in
Chapter 1, its application to transportation planning has been extremely
limited. The discussion herein has uncovered the reasons for its poor
applicability to that decision environment, and essentially concluded that,
despite the need for appropriate decision aiding methodology, efforts do
not seem warranted for further attempts at removing these obstacles, as
many of these are rooted in its axiomatic foundation.
In the next section, alternative postulates are presented as a pos-
sible basis for development of the methodological aspects of the decision
aid introduced in the previous two chapters. These postulates are quite
unrestrictive (vis-a-vis those underlying EUT) and consistent with the
basic considerations of Chapter 2.
3.3 Alternative Starting Postulates
While the postulates underlying this work havebeen conceptually
described in Chapter 2, this section merely translates a number of them
into specific mathematical postulates as a basis to the formal derivations
in the following chapters. More specifically, properties of the decision
maker's preferences over the outcome space X and the subset 0 of options
under consideration (where OC ) are proposed. Those are contrasted
with EUT's axioms to more clearly demonstrate their less restrictive char-
acter resulting from the basic considerations of Chapter 2.
As a starting point, we maintain the fundamental postulate that an
unambiguous known complete order exists over the outcome space X. Fur-
thermore, unless otherwise stated, we implicitly assume that Xc R the
set of real numbers.
The most important postulate concerns the preference-indifference
relation over the set of options 0 C_ . It is a direct result of propo-
sition 2.2.8, and is otherwise compatible with the collectivity of
propositions of Chapter 2. It also represents a relaxation of the most
restrictive and objectionable elements of EUT's ordering axiom, A.1, in
particular:
- the completeness of the preference-indifference relation over H.
- the transitivity of the indifference relation.
Still denoting preference between elements of 0 by the symbol >,
and indifference by %, (>, ") could be appropriately described by a partial
semi-order, though we do not claim such a description to be an absolute
inflexible norm of rationality. It does however provide a more realistic
representation of preference for the purpose of an operational decision
decision aiding methodology in our problem environment. The properties
of partial semi-orders are presented hereafter (Jacquet-Lagrbze,
1975):
Pl. for oi, oj E 0 , only one of the following holds:
oi > o , i.e., oi is strictly preferred to o.i 3 i3
oj > oi  i.e., oj is strictly preferred to oi
oi o j i.e., oi is preferentially indifferent to o.
oj I o. i.e., o and o. are incomparable
P2. [oi" o i] is true Vo. E 0 (i.e. reflexivity of 1) and
[oi, oi] is false (i.e., irreflexivity of)>).
P3. ([.oi>oj] and [o.i ok] and [ok> o]) -> [oi P o1], where
oi , oij, ok, 0 E 0.
P4. ([oi>Oj]and [oJ >ok] and [oj nuo])= [oi - o0] and [ok MU o ]
are not both true.
Representation of semi orders in numerical field is discussed in Luce
(1956), Fishburn (1973), Jacquet-Lagreze (1975) and Swistak (1980), among
others, and is not of direct concern to this discussion.
The first property, Pl, reflects the non-completeness of the prefer-
ence-indifference relation between random prospects. The justification
for this property and situations where it occurs have been discussed in
subsection 2.2.8. The second property, P2, is straightforward, and merely
reflects the basic understanding of what "preference" means versus what
"indifference" means.
The third property, P3, needs further clarification. It is effectively
a form of transitivity of>), but not of ". For instance, if [oi>0oj] and
and [oj o0Ok], then it is not necessarily true that [oi> Ok]. In other words,
while o. and o. may be distinct enough to where oi is clearly preferred
to oj, oj and ok may be too similar to cause strict preference, without
ok being distinct enough from oi for clear preference to exist.
Furthermore, [o i 0 oj I and [oj AOk] do not necessarily imply that [o i " Ok]'
also because of the perceptual threshold phenomena discussed earlier.
As to the fourth property, P4, the clearest way to explain it is visually
using a graph theoretic representation. Thus, in Figure 3.2, case (c)
illustrates a situation that is not allowed by P4, while cases (a) and (b)
illustrate two permissible situations. Note that in the figure, a directed
arc (oi, oj) is defined between two nodes representing oi and o respectively,
if [o. > o ] whereas two directed acrs (oi, o.) and (oj, oi) are defined if
[o I o j]. Therefore, in case (a) for example, we have [o i >.o ], [o i > 0k]'
[oi j ot], [o >Ok],k [oj ok .
In addition to the above properties, it should be noted that the pre-
ference-indifference relation is not required to satisfy the independence
axiom, for the reasons presented in the previous section.
Finally, it is re-emphasized here that those postulates concerning the
properties of the preference-indifference relation merely translate the
basic considerations of Chapter 2 into an operational working basis for
methodological development. While these postulates consitute a departure
from assumptions made in conjunction with conventional methods and are in
themselves an important feature of the decision aiding methodology presented
in this thesis, they are only meaningful when viewed within the context of
the collective set of basic considerations and propositions of Chapter 2.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of Property P4 of Partial Semiorders
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3.4 Sumrary
Th s chapter has presented the principal normative theories and models
for choice among random prospects, which were grouped in two categories:
those which rely on expected utility theory, and those which do not. Both
categories were described in section 3.1. In particular, and in conjunction
with the latter category, shortcomings of existing risk measures were indi-
cated in view of developing different ones in Chapter 4, reflecting the basic
considerations of chapter 2. The axiomatic foundation of expected utility
theory was presented in subsection 3.1.3, along with its operational impli-
cations. This foundation was critically re-examined in section 3.2, with
particular emphasis on the independence axiom, the plausibility of which
was questioned via a new argument relying on the implications of that
axiom on key risk dimensions underlying a choice situation between random
prospects.
The above critical review provided an appropriate setting for intro-
ducing alternative postulates adopted in the methodology developed in this
thesis. These postulates concern the properties of the preference indif-
ference relation over a subset of the random prospects set, whereby
partial semi-orders were suggested as a representation of this
relation which is consistent with the basic considerations of Chapter 2.
These postulates represent another actualization of those considerations
into an operational feature of the methodology.
In the next chapter, we describe the structure as well as the specific
elements of the methodology for the pairwise comparisons phase of the
decision aid (of section 2.3), where the options consist of random pros-
pects characterized by discrete joint distributions of payoffs, i.e.,
problem subclass 1, as defined in section 1.4.
CHAPTER 4
STRUCTURE, ELEMENTS AND PROPERTIES OF IIETHODOLOGY FOR
PAIRWISE COMPARISONS
In the previous chapter, the focus was primarily on the fundamental
problem of compairing two univariate random prospects. This chapter con-
siders the entire picture, where all elements of the set 0 of options are
compared on a pairwise basis, and it is desired to reduce the set 0 to a
smaller subset. It describes the construction of a binary preference-
indifference relation over the set 0, which is consistent with the basic
considerations of Chapter 2. The methodological development is presented
in conjunction with the "discrete states" problem formulation (i.e.,
problem subclass 1), even though the basic structure is applicable to all
formulations described in section 1.4.
General but essential underlying concepts as well as the basic logical
and mathematical structure of the methodology, which are applicable to all
problem subclasses of interest in this thesis, are presented in section 4.1.
Section 4.2 then presents the rationale and the mathematical specification
of the decision rule for comparing two options in the discrete states
problem (subclass 1); after expending further on that particular form-
ulation, an initial binary preference-indifference relation (1' , ) which
allows for incomparability, is constructed, and its properties thoroughly
discussed. While these properties are quite unrestrictive, they might pre-
sent inconsistencies with our basic postulates, manifested primarily through
the existence of cycles in the graph associated with ,~ ); violations
of the properties of partial semi-orders are identified in section 4.3,
and rules for their detection specified. In particular, the notion of
"P3-closure" of a relation is defined, and obstacles in the way of its imple-
mentation, thus leading to inconsistencies, are presented. Three speci-
fic approaches for correcting these inconsistencies are then proposed and
developed in section 4.4. Finally, section 4.5 summarizes the chapter,
highlighting the way in which the methodology adheres to the basic consider-
ations of Chapter 2; in addition, it describes the link(s) between fol-
lowing chapters and the material contained herein.
This chapter contains the essence of the methodological contribution of
this thesis, in that it describes the actualization of the features discussed
in Chapter 2. In addition to the premise and basic features of the method-
ology, the contributions in this chapter include the operational pairwise
comparison relation, based on a multidimensional representation of the risk
implications of a binary choice situation. While the rationale is adapted
from the well-known ELECTRE technique (Roy, 1974; Nijkamp and Van Delft,
1977) for multi-criteria decision problems under certainty, the adaptation
to the random prospect case is quite novel, especially since the measures
are derived from risk considerations of concern in the application context.
Furthermore, and directly as a condequence of the features of the
methodology and its underlying postulates (which, as we stated earlier, are
a departure from previous and existing approaches, and as such an integral
part of the contribution), the structure of the methodology, including the
definition and sequencing of steps, should be noted, and in particular the
correction strategies, described in section 4.5. In addition, and at a
tAs a matter of fact, as shown in section 4.2, perhaps the most
objectionable aspect of ELECTRE, when used in multi-criteria decision
problems under certainty, which is the arbitrariness of the criteria
relative weight vector, is overcome in our problem situation because of
the clear risk significance of the comparison measures.
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somewhat more theoretical level, the detection rules for inconsistencies
with partial semi-orders in graphs of partial relations, for our particular
operational definition of inconsistency, is worthy of note. However, as
we said throughout, it is the totality of the approach that constitutes the
primary contribution in this chapter (albeit this thesis), rather than the
sum of the "local" contributions.
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4.1 General Concepts and Structure
The purpose of this section is to present an overview of the methodo-
logical structure (for the pairwise comparisons stage of the decision aiding
framework), and to explain, conceptually, the nature and purpose of its
different components. As such, it is applicable to all classes of problems
described in section 1.4. In the first subsection, an overview of the
structure is presented. Subsection 4.1.2 subsequently presents different
solution concepts and their properties for the reduction of the set 0 of
options to a smaller subset.
4.1.1 Overview
Consider a set 0 of options. Assume that the issue of comparing any
two options oi, o. in 0 is resolved through the specification of some mech-
anism which yields a preferential statement between oi and oj, allowing
for incomparability. The juxtaposition of preferential statements for all
pairs of options in 0 defines a partial binary relation over 0, denoted
by (>1' 1~) , and referred to hereafter as the initial relation.
There are two things of interest about such a binary relation: 1) its
properties, in as much as they conform to or violate certain conditions or
principles deemed desirable by the decision maker (and/or his counsel) and
2) the manner in which it can be used to reach a reduced subset of superior
options (containing the most preferred one), in order to perform its role
in the overall decision aiding framework (of section 2.3).
These two points are strongly interdependent, since some solution con-
cepts are not always compatible with certain properties. For instance, if
tStrict preference is represented by >1, while ~1 denotes preferential
indifference.
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the relation is a complete order, then there exists an element o* in 0
such that o* is either preferred to or indifferent to any other element
o. E 0. However, when the relation has more general and less restictive
properties (such as not being complete), the existence of such an element
is not guaranteed, and is actually impossible in the case of a partial
relation. Therefore different solution concepts can be used, as discussed
in subsection 4.1.2.
Relative to the first point of interest, namely the properties of the
binary relation, assume that it is desired that the relation be consistent
with a set of postulates, such as those proposed in section 3.3. In this
case, inconsistencies with those postulates have to be identified. In par-
ticular, cycles might be present in the graph of that initial relation,
and these might constitute violations of the starting postulates.
This suggests that a number of operations can be carried out in order
to transform the initial relation (>,' 1i ) into a final relation (>, -)
where inconsistencies are removed. We refer to such operations as "correc-
tion" strategies or approaches.
Given the resulting final (>, '), a solution concept compatible with
the properties of (>, 1%) can then be solved for. In our case, the kernel
of (>, 1), defined below, is such a solution, as it is compatible with the
properties of partial semi-orders.
Essentially, given a set of starting postulates, the following highly
schematic structure is followed:
1. Build an initial partial binary relation (>' ~1) ;
2. Identify inconsistencies of (>I ~1) with starting postulates ;
tGraph theoretic representation of a binary relation is discussed in sec-
tion 4.3.
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3. Perform correcting strategies on (>1' 1) to obtain final relation
(b, -0)
4. Solve for reduced subset (kernel or possibly other solution con-
cepts).
Within each of the above steps, a variety of assumptions can be made
and a number of alternative approaches followed. There is, of course, no
unique best way to proceed, and considerable flexibility is allowed in fine-
tuning the methodology to the specific situation at hand. The development
in this chapter (and in the remainder of this thesis) elaborates on all
these components, and recommends specific procedures primarily derived from
the basic considerations of Chapter 2. In the process, alternative pro-
cedures, their underlying assumptions and their implications are also dis-
cussed.
A key assumption in terms of determining the structure of the approach
beyond the initial relation (>-1' 1) concerns the properties of the final
(0, '). Three possibilities are identified and discussed in this chapter,
namely:
a. accepting the resulting initial (>1,  1 ) "as is", in which case
the second and third steps in the above structure become irrelevant, since
(>1' 1~) automatically becomes (>, 'I);
b. making further preferential assumptions in interpreting the existing
(>1' 1 ). For example, the reduction procedure followed in ELECTRE I
and II (Roy, 1973) assumes cycles to indicate preferential indifference,
thus defining equivalence classes, as described in section 4.3;
c. performing operations aimed at removing inconsistencies with
starting postulates, in particular with partial semi-orders.
It is, of course, the latter which is the primary focus of this chapter,
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consistently with the basic considerations of Chapter 2 and the resulting
starting postulates of section 3.3.
In relation to the above structure, section 4.2 addresses its first
component by specifying the binary comparison measures and rationale used to
construct the initial relation (>1, L1) for the single attribute "discrete
states" problem formulation (i.e., problem subclass 1), and investi-
gating its mathematical properties. Section 4.3 addresses the second com-
ponent in the above structure, namely the issue of consistency with the
properties of partial semi-orders, and derives rules for detecting such
inconsistencies in the graph of (>1' 1 ). Correction strategies, forming
the third component of the structure, are described in section 4.4; while
these are generally applicable to all problem subclasses of interest, sc-.=
of their elements are specific to the binary relation (>1 IL ) developed
herein.
Having described the logic and structure of the methodology developed
in this chapter, the next subsection presents different solution concepts
for the reduced subset obtained using the final relation (>, ') induced
over the set 0 of options. The reason for presenting these concepts at
this stage is two fold -- the first being that it helps place things in
perspective, and thus clarify the point of the discussion, while the second
is that these are general decision theoretic concepts, which are indepen-
dent of our development, yet essential for its proper understanding.
4.1.2 Solution Concepts
Given a binary preference indifference relation (>, ) defined over
the elements of a set of n options 0 = {ol , 02, ... , On ) we are interested
in a reduced subset K CO of "superior" or more preferred options. The pur-
pose of this reduction and its role in the overall decision aiding framework
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were described in section 2.3. Of course, if there exists an option
o* E 0 such that ([o* >- o ] or [o* n oi], V oi E 0), then this option
should be selected and the problem is solved. However, as we said in the
previous subsection, the existence of such a solution is by no means guar-
anteed under the general properties of (>, %).
A commonly used solution concept for the reduced subset is the kernel
of the relation (>, ).t
Definition 4.1: A subset K C 0 is a kernel if and only if:
(i) o. E O and o.0 # K, then 3o. E K such that (oj > o0i ), and
(ii) for all o , ok C K, then not [oj > ok ].0
In other words, property (i) requires that for every option excluded
from the kernel, there is at least one better option retained in the ker-
nel; condition (ii) excludes the possibility of having elements in the
kernel such that one is preferred to the other.
A less strict concept accepts to eliminate a given element when there
exists at least one option that is as good retained in the reduced subset;
a weak kernel is thus defined by changing condition (i) in Definition 4.1
as follows:
Definition 4.2 : A subset K C 0 is a weak kernel if and only if
(i') o i e 0 and o i t K, then3Boj K such that ([o >0 o i ] or [o. Ai o.])
and condition (ii) above is true for K.0
Definition 4.3: A kernel (or weak kernel) K C 0 is minimal if and only if
(ii') for all oj, o k  K, then (not [oj > ok] and not [oJ 0% Ok]) and
condition (i) (or (i'), if K is a weak kernel) is true for K.,
tThe definitions given in this section are adapted from White (1976).
105
In other words, a minimal (weak) kernel differs from a (weak) kernel
in that condition (ii') replaces condition (ii) in its definition, meaning
that a minimal (weak) kernel does not contain any two elements that are
either preferentially indifferent or such that one is strictly preferred
to the other.
It should be noted that these concepts developed in the graph theoretic
literature (Berge, 1970) the connection of course being that a graph repre-
sentation can be associated with any binary relation, as described hereafter.
Graph Theoretic Representation of (>, n). The binary relation (>, U) de-
fined over the set 0 of options can be represented by a graph consisting
of a set of nodes, where each node corresponds to an element oi of 0, con-
nected by a set of arcs defined as follows. If oi > oj, then a directed
arc (oi, o.) is defined, with oi as its origin and oj its end node. When
o.i V o., then two dizected arcs (oi, oj) and (oj, oi ) are defined. No arc
is defined between oi and o. if they are incomparable by (>, ,).
The resulting graph is denoted by G(>, n). The kernel K of G(>, ')
would thus consist of the set of nodes such that:
(i) no two nodes oi , oj E K are connected by an arc (oi, oj) without
(o, o.i) existing as well, and
(ii) every node in {0 - K t is the end node of an arc the origin of
which is in K, with no return arc going from that origin node back to o£.
For illustrative purposes, consider the following:
{0 - K} denotes the complement in 0 of the subset K, i.e.,
i E {O - K <---> o i O and oi I K.
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Example 4.1: Let 0 = {ol, 02, 03, 049 05, 06}
, 
and assume a relation
(>, ') is defined such that o1 > o2; 01 o3; o02 ' 04; 02 > 03; o4>06
and 04 > 03. The graph G(>, m') is shown in Figure 4.1; its kernel is
{o
, 049 0o5}, and it is also minimal. D
However, the existence of a kernel for any graph is not guaranteed,
though it is well known that an acyclic graph (i.e., with no circuits, or
directed paths originating at and returning to the same node) always has
one and only one kernel (Richardson, 1946; Roy, 1971). In the general
case where cycles are possible in (>, n) , a kernel may or may not exist
(Hansen et al., 1975). In the event a kernel does not exist, and assuming
that the decision maker/analyst no longer wish to transform the relation
(>1, ),t then a different solution concept may be used, namely that of a
quasi-kernel, defined hereafter.
Definition 4.4: A subset K CO is a quasi-kernel if and only if
(i) o. e 0 and oi i K, thenBo. c K such that (o >.oi). o
The difference between a quasi-kernel and a kernel can be seen to be
the absence of condition (ii) in Definition 4.1 above. A weak quasi-kernel
can be similarly defined by replacing property (i) in Definition 4.4 by
property (i') in Definition 4.2 above.
While kernels might not always exist, every graph has at least one
quasi-kernel (Lovasz and Chvatal, 1974), as illustrated in the simple
example below.
tSee discussion in section 4.1.1 on assumptions concerning the final rela-
tion (C, ") and approaches to obtain it from the initial relation (>1, 1 )
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Figure 4.1: Graph Representation of (>, ') in Example 4.1
05
01 01 ,6
Kernel here is {ol, 04 , o5 .
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Example 4.2: Let 0 = {ol, 02, 031 , with associated (>, %) defined as
follows: o01 > 2; 02 >03 and 03 o01. A quasi-kernel for this case
is K = {oi, 0o2, since forevery point outside K (in this case 03) there
exists at least one element in K that is preferred to it. However, K is
not a kernel because ol> 02 violates property (ii) inDefinition4.1;
furthermore, it is obvious that no other subset of 0 can be a kernel.D
In general, since a kernel is a smaller reduced subset than a quasi-
kernel, it is a more desirable solution concept from the perspective of
decision aiding. In early efforts by Roy (1971, 1973) in conjunction with
the ELECTRE I and II techniques for multi-criteria decision problems under
certainty, the motivation behind making further preferential assumptions
in the interpretation of an initial general relation was the reduction of
cycles in order to guarantee the existence of a kernel. In the case of
the methodology described herein, the properties of the final relation
(>, -.) that we seek to construct over the set 0 of options, as described
in Section 3.3., are compatible with kernels as a solution concept.
Having described how to use a final binary relation (>, ') to reduce
a set 0 of options in the context of our decision aid, we begin the construc-
tion of (>, ) in the next section, which defines the initial relation
tThese assumptions are described in section 4.3.1 in conjunction with
further operations on the initial relation (>-1, 1)'
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4.2 Specification and Properties of Initial Binary Relation
In this section, the rationale and mathematical specification of a
decision rule for comparing two options in the "discrete states" problem
(i.e., subclass 1) are presented. To facilitate the reader's ability
to follow the discussion herein, subsection 4.2.1 presents the formulation
of problem subclass 1, highlighting some of its special features. An
outranking relation R, which uses a multidimensional representation of the
risk implications of a binary choice situation to convey to and seek infor-
mation from the decision maker, is then developed in subsection 4.2.2, and
its properties discussed. Rules for using the above relation and its asso-
ciated risk measures to build an initial binary relation (>1' l) are spe-
cified in subsection 4.2.3. The properties of this initial relation are
shown to be quite unrestrictive in subsection 4.2.4, which concludes this
section.
4.2.1 Decision Problem Formulation
We merely restate problem subclass 1, first presented in section 1.4
as a very important special case where alternative options can be represented
by their respective impacts (or payoffs) under discrete states of nature.
Such situations, broadly referred to as "strategic planning" problems (where
alternative future scenarios are identified and the performance of each of
the options predicted under each scenario) were recognized in Chapter 1 as
being of particular importance in transportation planning, as well as other
fields such as facility location (Schilling, 1981) and others. These can be
generically formulated as follows.
The problem is to select the most preferred element o* of a given
finite set of n options 0 = {ol, 02, ... ,OnP . The impact or payoff resulting
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from the implementation of an option o. is conditional on the realization1
of an element of a set of m mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive
states of naturet S = {Sl, S2 , ... , Sm). It is assumed that the (possibly
subjective) probability of occurrence P. of state S. is known, for all
S. E S, yielding the vector of m probabilities P = {PI' P2 ,..., P } ;3 1' m
of course I P. = 1. It is further assumed that these probabilities are
j=1 3
independent of which option in 0 is implemented.
The conditional payoff from action oi should S. occur is denoted by
xij, while the n x m matrix of xij's is denoted by A. By definition, it is
assumed that the totality of this conditional impact can be expressed in
terms of a single numeraire (X-domain, where X is typically a subset of E),
over which the decision maker's preferences can be characterized by a com-
plete order, as postulated in section 3.3.
In addition to all the decision models discussed in the previous
chapter, such discrete states problems have been tackled, in practice,
by some of the following approaches:
- use of a single aggregate desirability index, such as the expected
value of the payoffs computed over the possible states of nature. This
approach suffers from the well-known limitations of comparing probability
distributions based on a single central tendency measure, as discussed in
section 3.1 and 3.2.
- basing comparison solely on most likely scenario, i.e., using Xik'
tThe reader is reminded that a "state of nature", as used here, may indicate
any suitably defined bundle of joint events.
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for Sk such that Pk = max P., as a single figure of merit for any o. E0.
Of course, such an approach is inefficient as it discards valuable infor-
mation on the impact of alternative options.
- basing comparison on worst case scenario, i.e., using min (x k) forik
for each o. E 0 as figure of merit, this is the well-known mini-max rule1
(MacCrimmon, 1968a; Foerster, 1979); the same comment as in the previous
approach is applicable here as well.
- other ad hoc approaches, usually combining two or more of the above
approaches, such as using an expected value criterion in combination with
a worst case scenario, not unlike the mean-risk models discussed in section
3.1. However, such combination is usually made in an ad hoc manner as well
and as such may become quite unmanageable or dangerously restricted in the
presence of a large number of alternative options.
In this section, we describe an alternative comparison mechanism that
reflects the basic considerations of Chapter 2 and the critical discussion,
based on those considerations, of existing risk measures in the previous
chapter.
It is important to note the special characteristic of this problem,
which is that we are able to establish a conditional order over the set 0
under each of the possible states of nature, since the joint possible
realizations of the conditional payoffs resulting from the elements of
0 are fully specified and assumed to be known with certainty. Note also
that we cannot treat oi  O0, for all i, as probabilistically independent
random prospects, as the covariance pattern is essential to the nature of
the problem. The unidimensional random prospect choice problem thus formu-
lated can be viewed as a multiple ctiteria (MC) decision problem where the
conditional payoffs under each state of nature constitute independent cri-
teria known with certainty, with one fundamental difference between the two
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classes of problems: in the MC problem, the payoff on each criterion
occurs with certainty if an option is implemented, whereas here one and
only one of the states will occur, and we do not know which one it is,
regardless of which option is implemented.
As such, concepts developed in conjunction with the MC problem have
been found useful here, in particular the notion of "outranking relation",
and its underlying rationale, used in conjunction with the ELECTRE method
(Roy, 1971; Jacquet-Lagreze, 1974). The next subsection develops such
an outranking relation between any two options in 0 which recognizes the
special nature of the choice situation and associated risk dimensions.
4.2.2 Definition and Properties of Outranking Relation R
This subsection presents the measures summarizing the implications of
a binary comparison, the evaluation rationale or decision rule for accepting
that one option outperforms another, along with the accompanying preferen-
tial information needed from the decision maker. The measures used to con-
vey information to and elicit information from the decision maker have to
be considered jointly with the decision rule. Following the discussion
of the behavioral considerations in Chapter 2 in general and proposition
2.2.7 in particular, the measures used should be intuitively meaningful
and convey the implications of the choice situation of concern to the
decision maker and the decision problem at hand. It was also noted there
that the decision rule, in as much as it has to be communicated to and
tThe reader is reminded of the comments made in subsections 2.2.3 and 2.2.7
concerning the issue of framing of information.
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understood by the decision maker, should avoid using more than two or three
measures, and not require further "hidden" manipulations (Fischhoff et al.,
1979; Slovic et al., 1981).
Furthermore, in our problem context, where irreversibility was found
(in Chapters 1 and 2) to be an important issue when taking decisions in the
face of uncertainty, as well as in our discussion of risk measures in
Chapter 3, regret was identified as a major concern in comparing uncertain
options. However, unlike existing risk measureq,we are interested in a
multidimensional risk representation that summarizes the risk implications
of a binary choice situation (as opposed to summarizing a single option).
Therefore, a regret-based two-dimensonal risk measure is presented here-
after. One of its dimensions was introduced in section 3.2 as the risk of
selecting the option which ultimately yields the less preferred outcome once
the uncertainty is resolved (by the occurrence of one of the states of
nature); in other words, it can be viewed as the occurrence of regret. The
second dimension considered is the magnitude of the potential regret (or
opportunity cost) in the event of its occurrence. We express the above
representation mathematically and show its use to define an outranking
relation R hereafter. In doing so, we keep with the terminology of the
above-mentioned ELECTRE technique from which the evaluation rationale was
adapted, even though our definition and interpretation of the risk measures
is entirely specific to the class of decision problems under uncertainty
As a matter of fact, as shown in Chapter 3, most existing models rely on
a single measure.
§As discussed in section 3.2, this risk is that of violating the accepted
complete order over the outcome space X, thus causing the occurence of
regret.
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of interest here (and not the MC problem for which ELECTRE is intended).
Note that Figure 4.2 summarizes the notation used in this section.
Given two options oi, oj O0, the set S of states of nature is parti-
tioned into two subsets: the concordance set Cij , where
Cij = {Sk  S I ik > Xjk } ,
and its complement, the discordance set D.., where
D..ij = {Sk S I Xik < Xk .
By definition, C.ijn Dij {0) and C.ij. Di = S. The concordance set
Cij is further partitioned into two subsets: The dominance set Bij, where
B..ij = {Sk Cij Xik > Xjk
and its complement in Cij, the indifference set Eij, where
Ei = Sk E C..i I Xik - Xjk
The first risk dimension cij is defined as:
c = Pk (4.1)ij k-kkCik
which is the probability of occurrence of a state where the impact of o i
is not inferior to that resulting from oj. In other words, it is the prob-
ability that no regret occurs if oi is selected over o.t Using the ELECTRE
analogy, cij can be viewed as a concordance index, indicating the degree to
tUsing some of the notation of section 3.2, cij is identical to
p(x* > X*).
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Figure 4.2: Summary of Notation for Section 4.2
S = Set of states of nature
Sk  = k-th state of nature, k=l, ... , m
Pk = Probability of occurrence of state Sk
O Set of options
o. = i-th option, i=l, ... , n
xi = impact of oi should S. occurij3
Cij = concordance set; Cij = S E S I Xik > Xjk}
Di = discordance set; D.. = Sk ES x. ik< Xjk}
ij 3 k ik>X
B = dominance set; B..i =S E S I Xi > Xjk}
Ei = indifference set; E.. = {k ES Xik = Xjk}
c.. = concordance index
d.. = discordance index
13 critical concordance level
c = critical concordance level
d = critical discordance level
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which oi dominates or outperforms option o.. The range of values taken
by c..ij is the interval [0,1] with cij = 0 (implying that Cij = {0}) indi-
cating complete dominance of o. over o• while cij = 1, implying that
Cij = S,indicates the reverse. Values of cij between these two extremes
indicate the existence of at least one non-null element in each of C.. and
Dij respectively. While Cij depends exclusively on the number of states
where o. outperforms o. and their associated probability of occurrence, the
second risk dimension of selecting oi over o. consists of the magnitude of
the worst case loss (vis a vis oj); a "discordance" index dij is thus
defined as follows:
d.. = max
1j kSkeDij
(4.2)
where dma x is the maximum difference in payoff between any two options for
a given state of nature, i.e.,
dmax= max max IXjk - Xikl (4.3)
i,jjoio 0 klSkES
The term dm ax is used here as a normalizing constant which constrains
di. to be in the interval [0,1]. This discordance index dij can be inter-
preted as the maximum regret or loss that could result from the implemen-
tation of option oi instead of o.. Note that alternative forms for d.. are21 13
discussed later in Chapter 5.
tIt is implicitly assumed here and throughout this thesis that the trivial
case where two options have identical payoffs for every state, i.e. where
Eij = S, does not arise.
§Note that in this case, the discordance index is different from the ELECTRE
index as the latter is meant for evaluation in the presence of non-commen-
surable attributes or cirteria, thus requiring the use of criteria-specific
normalizing parameters.
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We now define the outranking relation R over the set of options 0. We
say that [o k R o.] if c. > ~ and d < d, where E and d are two threshold
values, set in a "satisficing" manner, expressing the preferences of the
decision maker for the specific problem at hand. In other words, in com-
paring oi and o., we accept that o. outperforms o. if the probability of
receiving a higher payoff from oi exceeds a minimum acceptable level, while
at the same time the maximum potential regret or loss (vis a vis o.) is
less than a tolerable level. Of course, one would want -E to be as high as
possible (max = 1) and d as low as possible (min = 0), reflecting a high
degree of dominance (or low risk of regret) accompanied by low level of
potential regret.
The indices c..ij and dij thus summarize the impact information along two
risk dimensions, providing complementary information which fcrms the basis
of an intuitively appealing heuristic decision rule, which can be expressed
as follows: "option oi performs better than oj on a number of states
(cij > E, which means that it is more likely than oj to be a candidate for
ultimate selection), so let us look at where it is not doing so well; con-
sider the worst performance (of oirelative to oj) under any of the possible
states (i.e., d < d), then o. can be safely considered to outperform o.".
Acceptance of tLe above logic is a prerequisite for the usefulness of this
decision aiding approach.
When assessing whether or not oi outranks oj, for all oi, oj 0 0, one
and only one of the two following situations can arise:
1. (cij < c o dij > ) not (oi R oj), in other words, we can
only state that oi does not outrank oj , or
.18
2. (c.. > c and d.. < d) => o. R o..1J- - 1J - i j
The properties of R, as defined here are:
- reflexivity, since cil = 1 and dii 0 guarantee that [o i R oi]
since 1 and 0 are the upper and lower bounds respectively on c
and d.
- R is not symmetric (since [oi R o.] does not necessarily imply
[o. R o.i]), not antisymmetric nor asymmetric (as it is possible for
both [oi R o ] and [oj R oi] to be true without necessarily having
o0 = o0).
- R is not necessarily transitive, because of the presence of thres-
hold levels. R is therefore not an "order" relation in the strict
sense of the term.
- R is obviously not complete, as it is possible to have both not
[o i R oj] and not [o. R oi].
As such, R serves its purpose of establishing pairwise preferences
between options outside of a priori restrictive assumptions as to the re-
sulting relation on 0, consistently with the behavioral considerations of
Chapter 2. However, further assumptions are needed in order to proceed
from the pairwise assessments [o i R oj] or not [o i R o.], for all oi, o. E 0,
to the selection of a preferred option o*, or at least to the identification of
a reduced subset KC 0 which contains o*. We specify in the next subsec-
tion rules for using R and its associated risk dimensions to build the
tNote also, that in terms of requirements from the decision maker, satis-
ficing levels are usually the easiest type of preference information to
supply.
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the initial binary relation (>i' "i) over 0, then discuss the properties
of the latter relation, in particular its consistence with the properties
of partial semi-orders.
4.2.3 Rules to Establish (>i' o1) on a Pairwise Basis
For any given pair o i , oj 0 O, i # j, we can distinguish one of the
following cases:
i. ([o k R oj] and not [oj R Ok])= > [o k  0.j]
2. (not [oi R oj] and [o. R o i.] = [oj 1 i]
3. ([o.i R o.] and [o. R oi]), which can be further refined into anumber
of subcases, depending on the relative magnitudes of cij, Cji dij
and d... Note that we have in this case that cij > c and di.. d,31 ij- 1_-
as well as c.. > c and d.. < d. The subcases identified here31 - 31 -
are:
3.1. cij = cji, and
3.l.a. d.. < d..i, in which case [o >. o], since for the
13 i i 1>
same level of concordance, oi offers a lower maxi-
mum potential regret than oj.
3.1.b. dji < dij , in which case [oj >1 oil
3.1.c. dji = dij, which we define as implying [o o0 j],
i.e., oi and oj are preferentially indifferent.
3.2 cij > cji, and
3.2.a. d j < dji, implying [ois I oj] since oi offers a
higher degree of dominance (and a guarantee that
Bij # {01) as well as a lower maximum potential loss
with respect to oj.
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3.2.b. d.3.2.b. ji < dij; in this case B.ij 0 0), and o0 has a
higher probability of dominance over o j, whereas
o. offers a lower maximum potential regret with
respect to o.. We view this situation as reflecting
preferential indifference, i.e., [oi "1 oj], given
that the outranking relation R holds in both direc-
tions.
3.2.c. dij = dji, implying that [o1i>l o].
3.3. cij < cji, and
3.3.a. dij < dji, which is similar to situation 3.2.b.
for which [o i " o.] was concluded.
3.3.b. dij > dji, implying that [oj> 1 o i ] in an analogous
manner to 3.l.a.
3.3.c. dij = dji, implying that [o >1 oi (analogous to
3.2.c).
4. (not [o Ro ] and not [oj Ro ])1 :[oi I oj], where I denotes the incom-
parability relation, indicating that no preferential assertion can
be made concerning oi and oj at that point in the decision process.
Figure 4.3 provides a summary of the situations arising in the compari-
son of two options oi and o. E O.
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Having specified the mechanism for a "first-pass" comparison of any
two options in 0, we investigate in the next subsection the properties of
the resulting initial binary relation (>1 , 1) over 0.
4.2.4 General Properties of Initial Binary Relation (>1 ~1i
Investigation of the properties of ( l '1 ) in this subsection is
primarily concerned with consistency of such a relation, in the general
case (i.e., in any problem context), with the basic considerations of
Chapter 2 and resulting starting postulates. Completeness, reflexivity,
symmetry, transitivity as well as properties P3 and P4 (of partial semi-
orders, described in section 3.3) are discussed hereafter.
Completeness. By definition, (>1' 1r) is not necessarily complete
as it allows for incomparability, consistently with proposition 2.2.8.
It can thus be seen in Figure 4.3 that, Voi , oj O0, only one of the
following holds: [oi > o], [oj >1 i]', [o i"1 oj] or [o i I o].
Reflexivity and Symmetry. Since [oi > oi] cannot be true, V oi E 0,
then > is irreflexive; >1 is also asymmetric, since [oi> o] --->not [oj11 oi].
Both reflexivity and asymmetry are usual properties of preference relations.
Figure 4.3 further reveals that the indifference relation "1 is both
reflexive and symmetric.
Transitivity. It is relatively easy to produce counter examples to
prove that neither >1 nor ,1 are transitive, as the following example
illustrates for >1"
tThe reader is reminded that most of the properties and concepts used in
this section are summarized in Appendix B.
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Example 4.3: Consider a situation with 5 equiprobable states of nature
(Thus P. = 0.2, j = 1, ... , 5), and where 0 = {ol
, 
o2, o03 has the fol-
lowing impact matrix A:
100 150 175 125 200
A = 130 110 160 125 150
170 70 150 100 150]
Using Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we compute:
30
c12 = 0.8 d12 = 80 = 0.375
1 2  12 80
40
c = 0.8 d = 8- = 0.523 23 80
70
c = 0.8 d13 0 = 0.87513 13 80
If c = 0.7 and d = 0.6, then o1> 1 02 and 02 >1 03. However, even
though c1 3 = 0.8 > 0.7, we have dl2 = 0.875 > d, indicating that possible
loss should S1 occur might be sufficiently significant to where we cannot
affirm (at least prior to further assessment) that [ol )1> 03]. The rules
of Fig. 4.3 here yield [ol I o3] , in a typical example of operational or
tactical incomparability (see section 2.2).0
While the non-transitivity of the indifference relation is consistent
with proposition 2.2.8 and the postulates of section 3.3, the non-transi-
tivity of the preference relation >1 is a more serious concern. Because
transitivity is a key property in further developing the use of the pre-
ference relation >1 for decision aiding, it is explored more carefully here-
after. In particular, we address the question of whether there are condi-
tions on the values of the thresholds c and d that would ensure that the
124
resulting preference relation >1 is transitive in the general case. In
addition, the definition of the transitive closure of a binary relation
is presented; and violations of the transtive closure of >1 are discussed.
Definition 4.5: The transitive closure of a binary relation ) over a set
t0, denoted by >), is defined as follows:
[o i >t oj] if and only if [oi > o.] or there are ol, o 2, ... , O E 0i jOP 2 m
such that o i > o and o01 > 02 and ... and om > oj (Fishburn, 1973a).0
Let us see what building the transitive closure of a relation implies.
Consider three options oi, oj, ok e O, with [o 1. oj] and [oj > 1 ok].
Intransitivity can arise in one of three ways:
1. [ok I oi], as in Example 4.3 above;
2. [Ok>1 oi] ; or
3. [Ok 1 oi '
While the first of these (i.e., [o i I ok]) indicates the absence of
sufficient basis for asserting a more positive association or relation
between oi and ok, it does not go as far as saying that there exists suf-
ficient basis for establishing the reverse of what transitivity would have
implied. As such, either of [Ok 1 o i ] or [ok A1 oi] constitutes a more
serious obstacle in the way of building the transitive closure of >it
For the same reason, preference cycles, defined hereafter, when
present in>l, constitute an obstacle to building the transitive closure
of >1.
tThe transitive closure relation thus obtained would not be asymmetric
nor irreflexive, and would thus not be a preference relation.
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Definition 4.6: A preference cycle connecting any two options
oi, o0 E 0 is a finite sequence of elements {o, 0o2 , ... , o ), such
that o = o.i and o = o. with o = ok for some 1 < k < p and [o >1 o.j+l]
for all 1 < j < p (Fishburn, 1973a).O
Note that in the next section the cycle defined above is considered
as a special type of more general cycles that occur in the graph of (>1' 1,i)
Having identified the different forms of intransitivities that may
occur in (>1' \1 )' an interesting question concerns whether conditions on
the values of c and d can be found such as to prevent such intransitivites
from occurring, regardless of the specific options under consideration.
As it turns out, no such general conditions exist (except for the trivial
case where c = 1.0 which reduces to the definition of a complete dominance
relation). The occurrence of intransitivities may be controlled or pre-
sented with appropriate values of c and d only within specific problem
situations. We have however, been able to establish some interesting
properties of transitive behavior when the concordance index c.. is defined
only over those states where strict dominance exists (i.e., over the domi-
nance set Bij), as seen in Chapter 5.
Since >1 is not necessarily transitive, the "first pass" relation
(>1' 1) is not in general compatible with property P3 of partial semi-
orders (described in section 3.3), as discussed hereafter, along with com-
patibility with property P4.
Property P3. As defined in section 3.3., P3 says that
{[o"1) o.] and [oj ok] and [ok) l  oP]}= [oi> 1 oL], for all oi , oj,i )j11k kl l ii J, 1
ok , o0 c 0. Of course, transivity of > 1 is implied by this property, since,
by the reflexivity of 'j, {[oi > oj] and [oj>)1 k]} is equivalent to
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{[o i> oj] and [oj v1 oj] and [oj>l Ok]}, which, by P3, implies that
[oi> 1 ok ] . Therefore violations of transitivity of >1 are violations
of P3 for ()>' c )'
Property P4. Also stated in section 3.3, P4 says that if
{[oi 1 o j] anad [oj> Ok] and [oj %1 ol]}, then [o i r n oE] and [o k "1 0o]
are not both true, for all oi, o0, ok, oq E 0. This property does not
always hold for (>)' %1) as shown in the following counter example.
Example 4.4: Consider a situation with 6 equiprobable states of
nature (then P = 6, j = 1, ... , 6), andwhere0 = {oi , 02, 03, 0o} has
the following impact matrix l:
1 =
105 80 80 100 100 140
100 100 100 100 100 100
100 120 60 95 100 120
120 100 80 80 100 120
Using Equations (4.1) and (4.2), we compute:
2 20c12 d12  =0.512 3 12 40
c21 d 21 = 1.0
cd2 = 0.523 3 d23
c32 d32  = 1.0
2c24 = 2 d24  = 0.5
S2 d42  =0.5
c14 - d 14  = 0.52
c41 d4 1 = 0.52
c34 d34  = 0.5
S3 d3  = 0.5
431 3 43
r
I
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- 2 -If weset c = and d = 0.55, then oi> 1 02, 02>1 03, 02 1~ 04' yet both
[oi1 1 04] and [o310lo4] are true, using the rules of Figure 4.3. Again,
the principal causes for the occurrence of such cases is the "veto power"
of the discordance threshold, even though options ol, 02 and 03 are other-
wise relatively "close" to each other. O
It is thus apparent that (>l' 1-) is quite unrestrictive in its prop-
erties, and does not subject the outcome of the binary comparisons using
the intuitively meaningful risk measures, or notions of concordance and dis-
cordance, to a priori constraints on the resulting preferences in option-
domain. In that, it is consistent with the behavioral considerations of
Chapter 2. However, as explained in section 4.1, there is no reason to
claim (>1' u ) as an inflexible representation of the decision-maker's
preferences. Rather, a case can be made for operating on (>1' "1) and
affecting adjustments towards whatever tenets the decision maker and his
analyst can accept as essential to their sense of rationality. Three
alternative assumptions were discussed in section 4.1, each leading to a
different set of methodological steps for building the final relation
(>, n-) given (>i, u1). Of particular interest is the third one, proposing
consistency of (>, '%) with the postulates of section 3.3, namely the proper-
ties of partial semi-orders.
In what follows we develop possible operations by which adjustment
can be affected in (>)l' 1) towards obtaining a final (>, ') in confor-
mance with the properties of partial semi-orders. The next section first
describes rules for detecting inconsistencies with those propoerties in a
given (,, 1) , while section 4.4 describes possible correction strategies.
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4.3 Inconsistencies in Initial Relation (>1' i1)
This section addresses the issue of proceeding beyond the initial
relation (>1' "i) in view of obtaining over the set 0 a relation (>, n)
which is subsequently reduced to a subset K containing the most preferred
alternative, as explained in section 4.1. In particular, three possible
assumptions on the resulting preferences were mentioned in subsection 4.2.1:
1. accept (>1,' L ) as is and equate it to (>, 1,); should a kernel
prove not to exist, then one could settle for a quasi-kernel (Hansen et al.,
1975).
2. affect further assumptions of ()•' 1) as in the ELECTRE technique.
3. perform operations to make the final (), %) conform to the starting
postulates of section 3.3.
While all three are "viable" possibilities that the analyst could fol-
low once the initial (>l 1 1) is obtained, our primary concern here is
with the third of these assumptions, thus the need to identify violations
with partial semi-orders in a particular (>1 1)9
In this section, the approach corresponding to the second assumption
above is first described in subsection 4.3.1 along with its preferential
implications so as to provide a "base of reference" for our approach. The
latter begins in subsection 4.3.2 where we introduce the notion of "P3-
closure", in a manner parallel to that of the "transitive closure" of a
binary relation, as a useful construct to analyze the consistency of a bi-
nary relation with the properties of partial semi-orders. We then identify
the types of violations of those properties and define rules for their detec-
tion in subsection 4.3.3.
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4.3.1 Assumptions for Reduction of (>1' -1)
This subsection describes the reduction assumptions of the ELECTRE tech-
nique (Roy, 1973) and discusses its preferential implications.
As mentioned in section 4.1, the primary motivation for those assump-
tions was to eliminate cycles in the graph of the binary preference-indif-
ference relation so as to guarantee the existence of a kernel in the final
(., >). This is done by assuming cycles to indicate preferential indiffer-
ence, thus defining equivalence classes as follows:
1. Two elements oi , oj c 0 are defined as [o i ^ oj] if and only if
there exists in the graph of (>O1 ' ) a cycle connecting oi and oJ. The
resulting binary indifference relation v is then an equivalence relation
(reflexive, symmetric and transitive), which defines a partition on the set
O into mutually exclusive and collectively -xhaustive equivalence classes
Q = Q1,, Q2 ... , p,--. , n , such that:
{[oi E Qp] and [oj C Qp]} if and only if [oi ' o],Vo I , oj E0 .
Of course, some elements of Q can be singletons. Effectively then, these
assumptions render any individual element in each of the clasess Qi C Q,
representative (preferentially) of all the elements in the same class.
2. The preference relation ),is then defined over Q, such that:
[Q 1> Qj] if and only if 0o, E Qi and 3 ok E Qj I Ok> 1 Ok}
In other words, since each equivalence class is represented by any of its
elements, the existence of "initial" preference (via)>1 ) between an element
Note in this regard that oi 1I o. would effectively define a cycle since
arcs (oi, oj) and (oj, oi) existsin G(>1, ~1). Thus the transitive closure
of "1 is a subset of u .
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of any equivalence class Qi c Q and another element of another equivalence
class Qj # Qi is taken to imply the "final" preference (via>) of Qi over
Q . Note that if G(l1, i1) has no cycles (including no two distinct ele-
ments for which ,1 is true), then ) is identical to >1"
The graph associated with the above defined >)
(with Q1 ' Q2' "' ' Qn E Q as its nodes) clearly contains no cycles, as
c
it is a strict partial order.
The preferential implications of this approach are quite strong. Vio-
lations of transitivity of the preference relation >1 are construed as indi-
cating indifference,and the transitivity of the preferential indifference
relation is imposed. These assumptions may be interpreting too freely the
preferential information elicited from the decision maker (in the form of
[ ~ ' 1I]), thus running the risk of misrepresenting these preferences while
trying to have them conform to a priori restrictive properties.t
The alternative approach we propose tolerates the presence of some
types of cycles resulting from the non-transitivity of the indifference rela-
tion, while preventing violations of the normatively desirable transitivity
of the preference relation, as stipulated in our starting postulates in
section 3.3. In the next subsections, we seek to identify possible incon-
sistencies with those basic postulates in the graph of a given initial
relation (>)l "i) I1
4.3.2 Violations of Basic Postulates
In the investigation of the general properties of the initial relation
(>' 1) defined in section 4.2, two important properties of partial semi-
$The reader is referred to Chapter 2, and in particular, subsections 2.2.3
and 2.2.8, where concerns about such restrictive assumptions are expressed.
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orders that could be violated by a given (>l' r1) were identified; these
are the two properties P3 and P4, defined in section 3.3. In order to iden-
tify how such violations might occur, we first introduce the notion of
P3-closure, in an analogous manner to the transitive closure of a binary
relation (in subsection 4.2.4).
Definition 4.7: The P3-closure of a binary relation (>1' ~1) over a set 0,
denoted by ()O, "-), is defined as follows:
- [oi _P o ] if and only if [oi ~1 oj]
- [oi>0~ oj] if and only if
{[o i  1 oj]}
.r 0 E 0 o ([ >10 o ] or [oi). o0])and (oa >1 o] or 0 o )
or {o>, ok C 0 ( [o i >l o] or [oi> o]j) and ([o 1 Ok]) and
([Ok>1 oj] or ]ok) o ]) .
Example 4.5: Consider a relation ('1' 1') defined over the set
O = {o0 , 02, 03, 049, 5, 06} and shown in Figure 4.4.a. Figure 4.4.b
illustrates its P3-closure (> , 'l)'.
By definition, property P3 holds for the P3-closure of a given (>1' ~
much in the same way that the transitive closure of a binary relation is
transitive. However, it may violate one or more of the other properties of
tNote that a given (>1 I1) is the result of a particular problem configur-
ation (i.e., the set 6) and the threshold levels supplied by the decision
maker. As such it may or may not violate properties P3 and/or P4.
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Figure 4.4: Example of P3-Closure
0 001 020
_1 2 3
•0- 04
6
a) (yl1 n1
4
b) P3-closure of (>• , 1)
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partial semi-orders, again in a similar manner to the obstacles identified
is subsection 4.2.4 in conjunction with the transitive closure of> 1 . In
particular, obstacles might arise in the face of the P3-closure of (>, l1 )
due either to the existence of "opposite" preference or indifference where
P3-closure would have indicated preference in a particular direction. For-
mally, if [o01 02] and [ 02 1 03] and [03>1 04], then [o > P 04]; how-
ever, if either [04o 1 01] or [04 1 01] is true, then [04 o ol ] or
[o > oi0], both being clearly inconsistent with [o0l, 04] if > is to be
an asymmetric preference relation (as we postulated it to be). Furthermore,
(O, ,P) might violate property P4.
Note that incomparability of two elements (by [>1' %1] ) that should
be connected by >,P is not considered an obstacle in the face of the P3-
closure of (>1' 1) . As such, we consider a partial binary relation
(>, %) to be consistent with our basic postliates if its P3-closure
()P, -P) does not violate properties Pl, P2 and P4 (defined in section 3.3)
As a corollary, given an initial relation (>1' '1 ) , we seek to identify
obstacles to its eventual P3-closure that lead to violations of those prop-
erties. All those obstacles appear in the form of directed cycles or cir-
cuits in the graph of (>l, 1)  The next subsection identifies special cases
of such cycles, and determines whether or not they are inconsistent with
partial semi-orders, developing a general rule to that effect.
4.3.3. Cycles and Inconsistencies with Partial Semi-orders
Given a partial binary relation (>' 1) defined over the set 0 of
tAs we said, by definition, (>, .P) conforms to P3.
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options, we seek to identify those cycles, in the assciated graph
G(>l, '),t which would produce violations of the properties Pl, P2 or P4
by the relation (>p, ip), the P3-closure of (l, 1). As seen hereafter,
not all cycles in (>al ~1) are inconsistent with our basic postulates. We
identify hereafter four (collectively exhaustive) distinct types of cycles
that might be encountered in G(>1, "' ) . The first two of these are always
obstacles in the face of P3-closure, while the third and fourth types are
each respectively subdivided into one subtype that is (consistent) and
another subtype that is not consistent with partial semi-orders. We also
present in conjunction with the fourth type a general systematic rule for
distinguishing between cycles that constitute violations and those that do
not, based on the number and nature of the preferential connections along
those cycles. As such, all different types distinguished here"fter are but
special cases of that general rule, with the primary reason for their defi-
nition being clarity of exposition as well as the need to give a stronger
intuitive feeling as to the implications of the properties of partial semi-
orders.
Type 1: cycles with no difference relations, i.e., no two elements
along the cycle are preferentially indifferent, as defined hereafter.
Definition 4.8: A directed cycle C = {ol , o2 , ... , o } in G(>l, ~ 1 ) is
a type 1 cycle if and only if
loi, oj c C and [oi> 1 oj]) > not [oj 1 o i ] and not [oj %1 Ok] 1  0
tThe reader is reminded that the graph theoretic representation of (>1' "
was described in subsection 4.1.2.
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Figure 4.5 illustrates a type 1 cycle. These cycles are straight-
forward , and are clear obstacles in the face of the P3-closure and its
implied transitivity.
Type 2: cycles with non-consecutive indifference relations.
Definition 4.9: A directed cycle, C = {ol, o2 , ... , o1), with ok = ol, in
G(>1' '1) is a type 2 cycle if and only if, for oi-1
, oi , oi+1, oi+2 E C,
{[oi-1, 1 o i ] and [oi "1 0 i+l]} I > [1i+i>1 oi+2] '0
Figure 4.6.a shows a type 2 cycle in its simplest form, with [o011 02],
[o2 ~1 03] and [03> 1 o1]. It is evident that such a configuration implies
by P3, that [ol>1  ol], which is of course a violation of the irreflexivity
of ,>
Figure 4.6.b. shows a relatively more intricate example of a type 2
cycle. Its P3-closure would lead to a multitude of violations, including
simple type 2 cycles in G( >. P), such as {ol0, 04, o5.
Type 2cycles are always inconsistent with the properties of partial semi-
orders, and constitute obstacles in the face of P3-closure.
Type 3: Cycles with two (but not more) successive indiffer-
ence relations; this type of cycle is quite intricate to deal with, as the
presence of only two successive indifference relations does not in all cases
lead to violations of the properties of partial semi-orders. We thus iden-
tify, hereafter a number of subtypes, differentiated by the number of nodes
and presence and distribution of other indifference pairs in the cycle:
Type 3.a: 3-node cycles with only two consecutive indifference rela-
tions.
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Definition 4.10: A directed cycle C = {ol0, 02 039, o1 in G(>l, %1) is a
type 3.a cycle if and only if
[i >1 oj] => {[oi "1 ok] and [oj 1 Ok]}' for i,j,k = 1.2,3 and i#j#k .O
Figure 4.7 exhibits a type 3.a cycle. Such cycles do not violate the
properties of partial semi-orders and are invariant with respect to P3-
closure.
Type 3.b: Cycle with more than 3 nodes and only two consecutive indif-
ference relations.
Defintion 4.11: A directed cycle C = {ol, o2 , 0o3 , ... , o* with o = o01
in G(>1, ^ 1) is a type 3.b cycle if and only if, for oi-1 , oi , oi+1 , oi+2 E C,
{[oi-1 oi ] and [oi "i1 oi+l] and [oi+1 loi+2]} => not [oi+2 "1 oi+3]
and oj , oj+l E C and j # i # i+l I [oj oj+l])}'$ _j+ j 1 3+l1Jfl
Figure 4.8.a shows a type 3.b cycle in its basic form. This type of
cycle is not consistent with the properties of partial semi-orders, both
in G(>I  1) and its P3-closure G(>p , ,P). This violation is however not.
self evident and requires further explanation. Consider the subgraph of
G(>1 , i l) shown in 4.8.a, where o1 and o3 are incomparable by (.>1' I1) as
well as by (>., P). Noting that the use of incomparability in our approach1' 1
to decision aiding is primarily operational and "strategic" (as discussed
in subsection 2.2.8), the incomparability between o1 and 03 would have to be
resolved ultimately. However, an inconsistency is obtained regardless of
the preferential relation between ol and 03; this assertion is proved here-
after.
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Figure 4.5: Type 1 Cycle
Figure 4.6: Type 2 cycle
a - Simplest Form
Figure 4.7: Type 3.a cycle
b - More Complicated Form
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Figure 4.8: Type 3.b cycle
a. Basic Form
b. Violation 1: o0 >1 03 c. Violation 2: 03 1 °i
d. Violation 3: o 1 o3
11
- -
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PROOF. If incomparability is resolved, one and only one of the follow-
ing would be true: [o0>1 03]' [03>1 oi] or1 [0o1 o1 03]. If [o011 03] , then
{oI , o3 , o0, o0) is a type 2 cycle. Moreover, if [03 >1 ol]' then {ol, 02'
039 oI ) is a type 2 cycle. Finally, if [o 1 1 03], then we obtain a
straightforward and clear violation of property P4.t These three possible
cases are illustrated in Figures 4.8.b, 4.8.c and 4.8.d respectively.0
It is very easy to extend this proof to the case where there are more
than four nodes, since the same configuration as the one in the above proof
is obtained in the P3-closure of (>1' 1)'
Type 4: Cycles with 3 or more indifference pairs, at least two of which
being consecutive. Though such cycles may at first seem to be compatible
with partial semi-orders (primarily because the non-completeness of the rela-
tion may conceal violations), situations may arise, depending on the number
and nature of the preferential connections between the elements of those
cycles, where violations to the desired properties might occur. Fortunately,
we can show that a relatively simple systematic rule exists to tell whether
any give type 4 cycle is a violation or not. As for type 3 cycles, we refer
to those non-violating types as type 4.a cycles and to the others as type 4.b
cycles. Let us first consider different examples of type 4.a and type 4.b
cycles respectively.
Example 4.6: Figure 4.9a shows a type 4.a cycle in G(>1, 1) ; we can check
that it is not an obstacle in the face of the P3-closure of C> 1, "l) *0
tProperty P4 was defined and illustrated in section 3.3. As a convenience
for the reader, we restate it here: Given oio.,o,ooEe0, P4 says that
f[01 >1 02] and [02 1 03] and [02 "' 04] > tno([1 1 04] and [03 "1 04])}
A graphical illustration is given in Figure 3.2.
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Example 4.7? Figure 4.9.b illustrates a type 4.b cycle in G(>1, nI ) , which
differs from the previous example only in that it has one additional node
069 such that [o5 >1 06] and [o6>1 01o]*
We contend that the cycle in Example 4.7 is not compatible with the
properties of partial semi-orders, and support this contention hereafter,
in a manner similar to the one used above to demonstrate the incompatibility
of type 3.b cycles. In that cycle {ol, 02, 03, 049 05, 069 01o,o3 and o6 are
incomparable by (1' 1) as well as by (>p, 2P). We prove hereafter that
regardless of the relation between o3 and o6 , we obtain an inconsistency.
PROOF. If incomparability is resolved then one and only one of the
following would hold: [03)1 06], [06>1 03] or [06 '1 03]. If [03>1 06],
as shown in Figure 4.9.c, then {ol, 02, 03, 06, 01} would be a type 2
cycle, which is unacceptable. If [o6 .1 03], as shown in Figure 4.9.d,
then {03, o4, 05, 06, o03 is a type 3.b cycle, also unacceptable. Finally,
if [03 i1 06], as shown in Figure 4.9.e, then {06, o01' 2' 03' 06} is a
type 3.b cycle..
The basic difference between the graphs of Figure 4.9.a and 4.9.b re-
spectively, is that the number of strict preference arcs connecting o05 to
02 has increased. This brings us to the above mentioned rule separating
type 4.a from type 4.b cycles, and more generally determing if any cycle
can be consistent with the properties of partial semi-orders.
Consider a cycle in the graph of a partial relation; let n. denote the1
total number of indifference pairs, and n the total number of strict prefer-
ence pairs along this cycle. For example, the cycle in Figure 4.9.a has
n i = 3 and np = 2, while in the more complicated cycle of Figure 4.10,
ni = 7 and n = 6. Whenever np > ni-l, then the corresponding cycleiP P
141
Figure 4.9: Examples of Type 4 Cycles and Associated Violations
(a) Type 4.a
(b) Type 4.b
(c) 03 06
(d) 06 03
(e) 06 N 03
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Figure 4-10: Cycle with ni =7 and n - 6i& D-
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cannot be compatible with the properties of semi-orders, and is thus a type
4.b cycle; otherwise, i.e., if n < ni - 1, it is a type 4.a cycle whichp-- i
is not necessarily a violation. This rule can be shown to hold in the above
mentioned examples of Figure 4.9, whereby in Figure 4.9.a, np = 2 < n i - 1i,
whereas in Figure 4.9.b, for the same value of ni (=3), n = 3 > ni - 1.p
A notable special case of type 4.a is the one depicted in Figure 4.11, where
n = 0, i.e., the cycle consists of consecutive indifference pairs, high-
lighting the non-transitivity of ~11
Similarly, the properties of all previous types of cycles discussed
above can be obtained as special cases of this general rule. For instance,
type 1 cycles have n. = 0 and as such any value of np would exceed n. - 1.
The non-consecutiveness requirement for indifference pairs in type 2 cycles
implies that np > ni, which is why that type is always inconsistent with
our postulates. The same rule applies to type 3 cycles as well.
The above rule can be derived in a straightforward manner using the
numerical representation properties of semi-orders mentioned in Section 3.3
in particular the "constant representation" property. However, so as not
to complicate this discussion any further, we will not present this deri-
vation as it is not, in itself essential to the further development of this
discussion.
Definition 4.12: Cycles of types 1, 2, 3.b and 4.b, in the graph of a partial
binary preference and indifference relation, are referred to as inconsistency
cycles. 0
A graph theoretic proof by recursion is also possible, but we choose not
to diverge in it in the context of this discussion.
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The above definition reflects the fact that inconsistency cycles in
(>' 1) are sources of violation of the properties of partial semi-orders
by the eventual P3-closure of (>9' 1) . Strategies for dealing with in-
consistency cycles in a partial relation (>lx1 ) resulting from the decision
rule of section 4.2 are discussed in the next section.
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4.4 Approaches for Correcting Inconsistencies
To place things in perspective, an initial partial binary preference-
indifference relation (>)1 1 is defined over a given set of options 0
using the mechanism specified in section 4.2. The properties of this rela-
tion being generally unrestrictive, the specific preference configuration
obtained may not be consistent with the basic postulates of section 3.3;
situations in the graph of (>1' '1) that imply violations by the P3-closure
of (>l' ' 1) of the properties of partial semi-orders consist of certain types
of directed cycles identified in section 4.3 and referred to as inconsis-
tency cycles.
We are thus faced with an initial relation ()01 .i1) containing a num-
ber of such inconsistency cycles. This section describes three possible
approaches, along with their underlying preferential assumptions and norma-
tive implications, for dealing with these inconsistencies soas to obtain a
final relation (>, ') which is consistent with our basic postulates. Again,
consistency is defined in terms of the P3-closure of ( > ,^), denoted by
(>P, .P), satisfying properties Pl to P4 of section 3.3.
The first of these corrective approaches, described in subsection 4.4.1,
treats each inconsistency cycle as an indication of indifference among its
elements. The second approach seeks the "weakest link" in each inconsisten-
cy cycle, as described in subsection 4.4.2. Finally subsection 4.4.3 des-
cribes the third approach which declares mutual incomparability of cycle
elements and presents a summary comparative assessment of these approaches.
4.4.1 Approach 1: Indifference Among Cycle Elements
This approach assumes that two elements of 0 connected by an inconsis-
tency cycle are preferentially indifferent to each other. Thus two elements
are considered preferentially indifferent (by the "final" relation ru). when-
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ever they are preferentially indifferent by the initial al' or there exists
an inconsistency cycle in (>1' '1) connecting them. In order to express
this formally, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 4.13: Let F1 be a relation defined over 0 such that, for a
given o i , oj E 0:
[o 1r oj] <=> {"there exists an inconsistency cycle in G(>1 , ' )
connecting oi and o"}.
We thus state, that given oi, o.j O,
[o i  0 o.] if and only if {[o.i 1 oj] or [o.i r 0]}
While this approach bears similarity with the reduction procedure asso-
ciated with ELECTRE (described in 4.3.1), it differs from it in that it
does not require the final indifference relation to be transitive; thus
" is not necessarily an equivalence relation.
In this approach, the final preference relation > is obtained directly
from >1, with some node pairs initially connected by >1 changing to indif-
ference pairs in the final relation (when they are elements of an inconsis-
tency cycle). Formally,
[oi > oj] if and only if {[o i l oj.] and not [oi FlOj]} .
The resulting final relation (>, 1%) would thus not contain any incon-
sistency cycles, meaning that no violation of the properties of partial semi-
orders are present in its P3-closure ()P, ,P).
This approach makes relatively strong preferential assumptions to resolve
tThe reader who is not familiar with the exact definitions of the prefer-
ence theoretic terminology is again referred to Appendix B.
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inconsistencies, and does not really address the question of why these incon-
sistencies arise. In other words, violations of the initial postulates
guiding the selection among alternative options ought to be looked at more
carefully as they might provide clues to mistakes or anomalies in the
result of the process up to that point.
4.4.2 Approach 2: '"Breaking" Weakest Link
Alternatively, one could attempt to remove the inconsistency in a cycle
by "breaking" its weakest (one or more) critical link(s) (in the sense that
if removed, so is the inconsistency). Ideally, of course, all the elements
conncected by an inconsistency cycle could be reappraised on a pairwise
basis as well as globally by the decision-maker so as to identify that cri-
tical link. However, especially when a large number of options are under
consideration, it might be useful to devise operational rules, based on
the principles underlying this decision-aiding approach, to detect such in-
consistency links, with minimal risk of violating the decision-maker's true
preference structure.
In the general case of any partial binary relation with inconsistency
cycles, the approach requires some rule for identifying the critical link(s).
Onceidentified, the end nodes of a critical link are declared incomparable,
thus eliminating the source of inconsistency.
In this subsection, this approach is described for the particular case
when the partial binary relation (>1' I ) is obtained by the mechanism spe-
cified in section 4.2. In this case, the concordance and discordance thres-
tWhich is generally the case when the use of such a decision aid is warranted.
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holds (c and d respectively) used to define the outranking relation R and
to subsequently build (>.' %1) provide a powerful mechanism for this task.
The identification decision rule is discussed hereafter, following a des-
cription of its underlying logic.
From the definitionof R (see subsections4.2.2 and 4.2.3), the higher
the value of c and the lower that of d (within the range [0, 1]), the
"stronger" is the assertion of outranking and the lesser the risk associated
with the decision to prefer one random prospect over another. Subsequently,
an outranking assertion which can be made for a given threshold level
value pair (Co, do ) is less than or as risky as a corresponding assertion
with (c1, dI) where c > c and d < d (with one of these inequalities strict
for the "less than" to hold). This is best illustrated by an example.
Example 4.8: Consider oi, oj, ok , o k O0, characterized by the following:
c =j 0.9 and dij = 0.2
Ckz = 0.8 and dkk = 0.3,
where cij and dij are given by equations (4.1) and (4.2) respectively.
The decision [oi R oj] is considered less risky than and thus to take prece-
dence over [ok R oA] in a given decision problem. §
tFor instance, if c = 1 (maximum value), we can accept oiRoj if and only if
oi outperforms o on every possible state of nature, i.e., if Xik 2 Xik,
V Sk E S, which tolerates no risk whatsoever that oi might not be preierred
to oj.
Note also that the concept of riskiness of a decision was discussed
amply in conjunction with the basic considerations in Section 2.2. Roy
(1977, 1977a) also elaborates on the risk rationale of outranking relations
in decision aids.
§As a matter of fact, we used this same rationale to build (>l,v1l), in
Section 4.2.3, when both cij and cji were greater than or equal to c and
dij and dji were both less than or equal to d.ii ji
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In the above example, if c and d are respectively set at 0.7 and 0.4
(based on overall problem considerations), then both [oi R oj] and [ok R o9]
would be true. If these two assertions do not lead to inconsistences, then
both are accepted. However, if inconsistencies occur, then we consider
[o i R oj ] to take precedence as being more credible than [ok R o9], since it
can be reached with a higher c and d.
The operational rules for removing inconsistencies in a given cycle de-
rive from the above logic. Thus the weakest link in an inconsistency cycle
is that which can be broken for the lowest c and highest d. Mathematically,
given a directed inconsistency cycle C = {ol, 0 2 , ... , o0 } , with o. = ol0,
we seek a pair (ok , Ok+1 ) E C such that:
Sk+l= min (c +)] and [d,+l= max (d + )
Ikk iloiEC '9 iloiEC '
If such a pair (ok, Ok+l) exists in C, then ok , Ok+1 are declared incom-
parable by the final relation (>, '.), thus removing the inconsistency. If
more than one pair of options in C satisfy the above conditions, then all
such relations are declared not to hold.
In the event that no such pair of consecutive elements exists in C
(and there is no compelling reason for one to exist), the problem is akin
to a bi-criterion evaluation problem, where we are minimizing one of the
criteria (c) and maximizing the other (d), and no solution exists that
achieves both objectives simultaneously. In this case, we first identify
tThe decision space of course consists of the set of all pairs of consecu-
tive elements (Ok, oi+1) in a given inconsistency cycle C.
We will not elaborate here on the characteristics of multi-criteria deci-
sion problems and their solution techniques. For a review, see Mahmassani
(1980b), Keeney and Raiffa (1976, chapter 3), Cohon (1979) among others.
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the efficient set of option pairs along a given inconsistency cycle. The
efficient set is defined in the usual manner as comprising all pairs
(oi, oi+l) E C for which {A(oj.j+ ) C c < cii+. and d. > dii+l}.
The link to be removed is then selected from the efficient set in one of
two alternative ways:
1. on a situational basis, whereby the decision maker is presented with
all the efficient pairs in a given inconsistency cycle and asked to directly
select the "weakest" relation among them. The risk of misrepresenting the
decision maker's preferences is thus minimized as he is given the opportunity
to reconcile his own inconsistencies in the specific situation where they
occur (and not in an abstract a priori wa9. However, whenever a large num-
ber of inconsistency cycles have to be resolved and the decision maker's (as
well as the analyst's) time is severely constrained, this approach quickly
becomesimpractical, thus the motivation for the second rule hereafter.
2. On the basis of the concordance (or probability of dominance)
measure only, whereby we remove the link (o i , oi+l) with the lowest ci,i+1
in the efficient set associated with (inconsistency) cycle C. A strong case
could be made for this rule in conjunction with the binary relation (>1' Ii )
of section 4.2. The underlying rationale is that for a given level of
acceptable regret (defined as the difference in potential payoffs for a
given state of nature between oi and oi+1), the higher the associated
cii+ 1 , the "stronger" the decision and the lss risky it is. Thus, since
we have accepted the d at which the inconsistency cycle arise, it seems plau-
sible to feel more comfortable with a relation offering a greater probability
tIn that sense, this selection approach would be analogous to that typically
followed in the so called "generating" techniques for multi-objective
optimization problems (Cohon, 1979; Mahmassani, 1980b).
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of outperforming (or no occurrence of regret) rather than a lower
one.
The analyst could of course devise other "weakest link" identification
strategies if appropriate to a particular problem situation. In any event,
once identified, that link is removed by declaring its end nodes incompar-
able by the final relation (), I,).
A numerical example is presented hereafter to illustrate the link re-
moval approach to resolving inconsistencies.
Example 4.9: Consider a problem characterized by seven possible statesof na-
nature S = {Si, S2 , S3 , ... , S7} with the associated probability of occur-
rence vector P = {0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.2, 0.21. We have the subset
of options 0 = {ol, 02, o03 0o41 with the conditional impact matrix shown in
Table 4.1 and the values of the associated cij's and dij's shown in Table 4.1
as well.
If we set c = 0.6 and d = 0.7, we obtain the following initial binary
relation (>1i 1 ):
[0o>1 02]; [04 >1 oil]; [04>1 02]; [03>1 04]; and [02 1i 03]'
The graph representation of this relation, depicted in Figure 4.11.a
readily reveals the existence of two inconsistency cycles: {04, 02, 03, 04}
and {ol, 02, 03, 049 0o } . In trying to remove the lowest link from the
latter cycle, (o3 , 04) is easily detected as having the lowest concordance
value and highest discordance value (among those pairs included in the rela-
tion [~' I ]) . Removing link (03, o04) from the graph of Figure 4.11.a,
resolves the inconsistency in both of the above cycles, as shown in Figure 4.11.b
which represents the final relation (>, %) on 0. Note that [03 I 04]'
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Table 4.1: Impact Matrix of Example 4.9
States
Probas
S1
0.1
S2
0.1
S3
0.1
S4
0.1
S5
0.2
S7
0.2
S6
0.2
Options 150 100 130 170 110 160 180
01 150 100 130 170 110 160 180
02 130 125 130 170 125 110 175
03 1 135 120 150 190 125 110 155
04 130 120 140 180 110 130 190
Risk Measures
c 1 2
c 2 1
c13
c 3 1
c14
C4 1
c 2 3
c 3 2
c2 4
c4 2
c 34
c 4 3
= 0.7
= 0.5
- 0.5
= 0.5
= 0.5
= 0.7
= 0.7
= 0.7
- 0.4
= 0.7
= 0.6
= 0.5
Note: dmax = 50 in this problem
= 0.3
= 1.0
= 0.4
= 1.0
= 0.4
= 0.6
= 0.4
= 0.4
- 0.4
- 0.3
- 0.7
= 0.3
d1 2
d21
d13
d31
d14
d41
d23
d32
d24
d42
d34
d43
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Figure 4.11: Graph Representation of Problem of Example 4.9
a. Inconsistency Cycles
b. After Removing (o3
,
o4)
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indicating their incomparability in (>, -). Moreover, in this particular
example, {o3, 04} is the kernel; thus, this decision aid has succeeded in
eliminating ol and o2 and selecting 04 and o03 for further comparison.0
The third approach for resolving inconsistency cycles is presented in
the next subsection.
4.4.3 Approach 3: Mutual Incomparability Among Cycle Elements
This approach makes more extensive use of the non-completeness property,
and is the most conservative of the three approaches (in terms of risking
Misrepresentation of preferences). Simply stated, it consists of declaring
all elements connected by an inconsistency cycle as mutually incomparable.
Formally,
[oi r1 o] => [oi I o1 ]
This approach is similar to one proposed by Whitt (1979) in conjunction
with non-transitive stochastic dominance. The rationale for our suggesting
it in this context is quite obvious: in as much as inconsistency cycles
indicate possible trouble, the least risky assertion concerning a given pair
of options is that they are incomparable, indicating the absence of suffi-
cient basis for a more positive statement. It is of course expected that
closer scrutiny of those options will take place at a later stage of the
decision aiding procedure, if no other basis exists for the elimination of
any of them. Therefore, this strategy is indeed a very cautious one, and
is "passive" preferentially in that it does not require strong preferential
assumptions. However, the price the analyst pays for this "unobtrusive"
approach is a potentially drastic reduction in the decidability of the over-
all problem.
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In summary, while the first approach gives a positive interpretation
of inconsistency cycles by equating their presence to the prevalence of
mutual preferential indifference among options connected by such cycles,
the second and third approaches treat them as possible causes of prefer-
ence misrepresentation or other errors in the course of the conduct of the
decision-aiding process. Therefore, rather than taking this risk in a
"mechanical" fashion, the options in question are declared incomparable
according to the available preferential information. The difference between
the second and third approaches lies in how specific they are in terms of
"diagnosing" the problem and detecting it: while the third one "refuses"
to accept any of the comparisons of the inconsistency connected options, the
second one takes further steps in pointing out to a specific pair of options
that is at the root of the inconsistency cycle.
It should be noted that one need not be confined to the use of a single
approach, as it is possible to use any two or all three of them in the same
problem. For instance, all elements in an inconsistency cycle could first
be declared incomparable (i.e. approach 3), followed by rebuilding of the
relations using the relational precedence concepts of approach 2. Or, cer-
tain cycles could be construed as indicating indifference (if for example,
all the relations connecting pairs along the cycle are all efficient with
respect to c and d), while other cycles are reduced by approach 2. The
range of possibilities is quite wide here thus providing flexibility to
adjust to specific decision contexts.
Ultimately, we obtain a partial relation (>, "), over the option set 0,
which is free of inconsistency cycles. Its P3-closure, (P, ,P), therefore
follows all four properties of section 3.3. A reduced subset K c 0 of
superior options (containing the most preferred one) can then be obtained
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by solving for the kernel of (>P, P). As discussed in section 4.1, a
kernel can be shown to exist when the relation is consistent with our basic
postulates, as neither type 3.a or 4.a cycles (which are allowed and pos-
sible here) prevent kernels from existing (as could some other types of
cycles, as discussed in subsection 4.1.2, and in Hansen et al. [1975]).t
It is however possible to solve for the kernel of (>P, nP) directly from
(>-, u) (as obtained after removing inconsistency cycles), without having to
first establish (,P, ,P) (by implementing definition 4.7 of the P3-closure
of a relation). Indeed, we prove hereafter that a necessary and sufficient
condition for an element of o. E 0 to be in the kernel of (>P, ' p ) is that
1
there exists at least one element o. e 0 which is strictly preferred to it
by the relation >.
LEMMA: Let (>, ) be a partial relation defined over 0, such that the graph
of (>, v) does not contain inconsistency cycles (cf. definition 4.12). If
()P, P) is the P3-closure of (>, u) (cf. definition 4.7), and K the kernel
of (>P, up ) (cf. definition 4.1), then
{o E K} if and only if { oj E 0 I oj >oi, V o. E 0.
PROOF: To establish the necessary condition, consider oi E K and assume
that {goj E O I0 > oi}. If oj E K, and noting that by definition 4.7
(of the P3-closure of a relation), [o.j>oi ] = [oj > oi ], then there is a
contradiction to condition (ii) in defirtion 4.1 (of K). On the other hand,
It is of course possible to solve instead for the kernel of (>, i), which
is possible larger than that of its transitive closure (>P, 1P). Such a
kernel can be shown to exist for (>, i) as well since the only cycle types
it allows are type 3.a and 4.a cycles. Of course, one could always solve
for the quasi-kernel, if a kernel does not exist, in the event that (>, i)
has not been made to be consistent with the properties of partial semi-
orders.
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if o.j K, then {3 o2 E K I o. >P oj0, by condition (i) in definition 4.1.
However, by P3-closure, {[oj> oi ] and [o>0 o]} =[o> oi], which
also contradicts condition (ii) of definition 4.1. Having shown that
{oi E K}=- {$ o E O oj > o i } establishes the necessary condition in the
lemma.
The sufficient condition can be established by shown that if
{o oj E 0 i o >- o i }  then o i c K. Assume that { o EO C 0 o o };
if o. K, then {3 oc E K oz>P oi,} by condition (i) of definition 4.1.
Noting that, from definition 4.7, a necessary condition for [ok >P oi ] is
that {3 oj E 0 oj > o }1, it is not possible that o. j K. This establishes
the sufficient condition, thus completing the proof. 3
The above lemma has two very important algorithmic implications in
terms of solving for the kernel of (>P, 'P). The first is that it is not
necessary to implement the P3-closure of (>, %)t in order to solve for its
kernel. The second consists of the above straightforward rule for iden-
tifying the dlements of this kernel, namely to eliminate all options o. e 0
1
for which3oj c O oj > oi .
The next section summarizes this chapter, and presents some concluding
remarks concerning the conformance of the methodological development herein
with the basic considerations of Chapter 2.
tProvided of course that (>, ") is free of inconsistency cycles, such as
after applying the corrective approaches described in this section.
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4.5 Summary and Concluding Remarks
This chapter has presented a methodology for conducting the pairwise
comparisons phase of the overall decision aiding framework. While the
structure of the methodology and some of the supporting theoretical results
are applicable to all problem subclasses formulated in section 1.4, the
details of its major components were pursued for problem subclass 1, char-
acteristic of frequently encountered "alternative scenarios" situations.
Section 4.1 provided an overview of the general structure and logic of
the methodology. It consists of building a partial binary preference-in-
difference relation (Q, 1) over the set of options 0, insuring its consis-
tency with the starting postulates (of section 3.3), and then using that
relation to obtain a reduced subset K of superior options. Solution con-
cepts for the reduced subset K and their properties were discussed in sub-
section 4.1.2. The remainder of the chapter addressed the procedure for
building the binary relation (>, ").
This procedure starts by building an initial partial binary relation
(' 1) ' developed here for problem subclass 1, and reflecting the basic
considerations of section 2.2. After restating the problem and elaborating
on its characteristics in subsection 4.2.1, an outranking relation R was
developed in subsection 4.2.2, using a multidimensional representation of
the risk implications of a binary choice situation to convey information to
and seek input from the decision maker. Rules for using the above relation
and its associated risk measures to build the above mentioned initial rela-
tion (>1' 1) were specified in subsection 4.2.3. The properties of
tThis framework was presented in section 2.3.
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(>1' %1) ' thoroughly discussed in subsection 4.2.4, were then shown to be
quite unrestrictive and not necessarily in conformance with the startinxg
postulates.
While not claimed as an absolute model of preferences for random pros-
pects, partial semiorders, as discussed in section 3.3, could be considered
as possessing relatively rational properties for the final relation (>, A)
to follow, within the context of operationally forming that relation.t For
that reason, sections 4.3 and 4.4 developed rules and operations for trans-
forming the initial unrestrictive (>,' 1 ) to a final relation (>, L) con-
sistent with those properties. After briefly presenting other possible
assumptions for proceeding beyond (>i , 1) in subsection 4.3.1, the notion
of P3-closure of a relation was defined in subsection 4.3.2, and obstacles
in the way of its implementation, which constitute inconsimtencies with the
properties of partial semiorders, were identified. Accordingly, different
types of such inconsistencies, which take the form of cycles in the graph
of the binary relation (>1' 'i ) were described and rules for their detec-
tion specified, in subsection 4.3.3.
Finally, in section 4.4, three approaches for correcting these incon-
sistencies were described, resulting in a relation (>, I) satisfying the
desired properties, which could then be used to obtain a reduced subset of
options (in this case, a kernel, as discussed in section 4.1.2). These
three approaches are applicable in the general case of resolving incon-
sistencies (with the desired properties) in a partial binary relation;
however, since the details of the second approach are dependent on the
See also Chapter 2 for further discussion on this and related points, in
conjunction with the basic underlying considerations.
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the specific mechanism for building the initial binary relation, we pur-
sued their development for the specific relation (>1' A1) described in
section 4.2.
From the overall perspective of the thesis, this chapter has proposed
an alternative to existing decision models forproblem subclass 1, reviewed
in Chapter 3 and found inadequate with respect to the basic considerations
presented in Chapter 2. This methodology distinguishes itself from those
models in a number of features, reflecting the above-mentioned basic consid-
erations. In particular, it does not embody an overriding normative rule,
nor does it assume an a priori complete preference system on behalf of the
decision maker. Instead, it recognizes the importance of an intuitively
understandable decision rule, that can be explained and communicated, yet
captures the essential implications of the choice situation in a given
problem context. The regret-based risk measures and the associated evalu-
ation rationale, in our opinion, possesses those features, as discussed in
section 4.2, and reflect a number of specific behavioral considerations
presented in Chapter 2.
Moreover, consistently with proposition 2.2.6, only satisficing informa-
tion, known to be relatively easy to supply, is required from the decision
maker. §
However, its usefulness is contingent upon the willingness of the
decision maker to accept and trust its logic, as explained in section 4.2.
It is however possible to use other risk measures in conjunction with the
same evaluation rationale, thus defining a family of possible decision rules
tIn particular, the points in conjunction with proposition 2.2.7 were
explicitly considered, as discussed in section 4.2.
§Of course, the fit of the pairwise comparison methodology of this chapter
within the overall decision aiding frameowrk (of section 2.3) reflects
proposition 2.2.6 even further.
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which increase the flexibility of the methodology in being fine-tuned to
specific decision situations. Such alternative risk measures are discussed
in the next chapter.
Furthermore, a significant feature of this methodology is due to propo-
sition 2.2.8, namely the recognition of incomparability and threshold pheno-
mena in an operational decision aid for choice among transportation options
under uncertainty. As such, the basic postulates articulated in section 3.3
whereby partial semiorders were proposed as an alternative model of prefer-
ences among uncertain complex options (instead of the usually completely
formed order), and the development of a procedure consistent with these
postulates, constitute a departure from previous and existing decision making
techniques.
However, Pq we noted in section 4.1, other assumptions concerning pre-
ferences are possible which would require different methodological steps.
In particular, we identified 2 such other assumptions and associated pro-
cedures, namely:
1. accept initial (>l 1) ''as is"; and
2. declare cycles as equivalence classes, as in the ELECTRE method.
These assumptions are presented as possible options, alongside our
basic postulates, in the highly schematic suimmary of the methodological
structure depicted in Figure 4.12.
In the next chapter, extensions and variations of this methodology are
investigated.
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Figure 4.12: Overview of Pairwise Comparisons Methodology
Given 0 - {ol
, 02 , ..., on0
S = {S 1 , S2 , ... , Sm
P = {PI, P2' "..' Pm }
A = {x, i , ... , n; =1, ...,m)
BUILD INITIAL BINARY RELATION (>I' 1 )
For. each pair o , oj,
1. Compute c .'s and d..'s
2. Assess oulianking R lhen (>~' 1)
Accept
(>i, "1)
as is?
NO
FIND CYCLES
ELECTRE?
NO
YES
CYCLE = EQUIVALENCE CLASS
IDENTIFY INCONSISTENCY CYCLES
DEFINE > OVER
EQUIVALENCE CLASS
(>, I)I
SOLVE FOR KERNEL
(or quasi-kernel, if needed)
YES
SET
( > 1 = ' )
CORRECTION STRATEGY
one of the following:
- declare indifference
- remove weakest link
- declare mutual incomparability
YES
= . !
m
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CHAPTER 5
VARIATIONS AND EXTENSIONS
This chapter presents a number of variations and extensions of the
methodology developed in Chapter 4. Section 5.1 describes alternative
functional forms for the risk measures used in section 4.2 to build the
outranking relation R and the subsequent initial preference-indifference
relation (>l' 'I1 ). Problem situations where these alternative definitions
would be appropriate are identified. These definitions are independent
of the rest of the methodology of Chapter 4, and could be directly sub-
stituted to their respective counterparts insection 4.2 to define an ini-
tial relation (>1 ~1l'
Section 5.2 presents an alternative evaluation rationale featuring
the notion of "target" or "achievement level" (for the impact resulting
from the implementation of an option). The use of this feature to con-
struct an "initial" binary preference indifference relation between
options is described. While this relation can be used within the same
methodological structure presented in Chapter 4, some associated details
concerning the corrective approaches for inconsistency cycles (of sec-
tion 4.4) are specified. Furthermore, we briefly discuss the use of
a target oriented approach for individual option elimination (which pre-
cedes the pairwise comparisons phase in the decision aiding framework of
section 2.3).
Both types of variations in sections 5.1 and 5.2 respectively are
aimed at increasing the flexibility of the methodology , thus allowing
the analyst to fine tune its details to the specific decision problem
situation and decision-maker being counseled. In essence, a family of
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decision rules is developed herein for use within the methodological
structure of the previous chapter, for problem subclass 1.
Section 5.3 generalizes the methodology of Chapter 4 as well as its
above extensions to the case where options consist of continuous probability
distributions, i.e., problem subclass 2. Essentially,the task primarily
consists of reformulating the risk measures in the continuous case, resul-
ting in some loss of intuitive appeal (compared to the discrete case).
Section 5.4 then presents an extension to problem subclass 3 where
options are explicitly evaluated with respect to their uncertain impact
along a multiplicity of criteria. In this case, when more than one cri-
terion forms the basis of the pairwise comparisons, the methodological
structure described in chapter 4 is directly applicable. The principal
problem specific element needed is the mechanism for building the initial
preference-indifference relation over the set of options. The extent of
our development in this section is limited to illustrating how the basic
mechanism introduced in section 4.2, and extended throughout the previous
sections in this chapter, may be applicable to the multi-criteria case.
The contents of this chapter are subsequently summarized in section 5.5.
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5.1 Alternative Functional Forms for Risk Measures
This section describes alternative functional forms of the risk mea-
sures introduced in section 4.2 as the basic mechanism for establishing
the initial binary preference-indifference relation (' ~ 1). Alternative
definitions for both risk dimensions (of section 4.2) are presented and
their implications discussed. Subsection 5.1.1 considers alternative forms
for the concordance (or regret avoidance) measure (Eq. 4.1), and proves
additional properties concerning transitivity of the resulting relation
and cycle formation. Subsection 5.2.2 discusses alternative measures of
regret magnitude, or discordance (equation 5.2), highlighting the appli-
cability of each through numerical illustrations.
5.1.1 The Concordance Measure
Using the notation introduced in Chapter 4, the concordance measure
cij was formulated in equation 4.1 as the probability that option oi per-
forms at least as well as o. (where oi, oj E 0), thus making it an indicator
of degree of weak dominance of o. over o.. We consider here two cases where
the index is defined so as to reflect only strict dominance of one option
over another. In the first case, the marginal probability of one option
strictly outperforming the other is considered, whereas in the second the
conditional probability of outperforming (given that payoff from either
option would not have been identical) is presented.
a. Strict Concordance
+ +
Let us denote this version by cij... For oi, o. 0, c. is defined as:
ci+ • k (5.1)
ij kISkcBij
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where the sum is taken only over those states of nature where oi strictly
outperforms o., i.e., the elements of B.., defined in section 4.2 as the
dominance set. Formally, Bij {Sk  C SI Xik > x jk}.t Of course,
+
c+j is in the interval [0,1]. Moreover, it is very easy to see that
+ + + +
c j+ c. < 1, with the difference ( 1 - cij - cji) indicating the marginali j Ji- ji
probability of oi and oj yielding an indentical outcome.
+
The use of c..j (instead of c ) to define an outranking relation could
1J ij
be justified in situations where a more clear cut dominance is judged neces-
sary before outranking can be accepted (though this aspect could be reflect-
ed to a large extent with a higher c in the case of c..). Rather than
advocate the desirability of either index over the other, we simply point
out to the possibility of its use, and prove an important property of the
transitive behavior of the resulting ()'' "1). which does not hold with the
+
previous cij. It is thus assumed hereafter that cij is used in exactly
the same fashion as was cij, in conjunction with dij, to define the out-
ranking relation R, as described in subsection 4.2.2,and subsequently the
"first pass" relation (>, 21) described in subsection 4.2.3 (as shown in
Figure 4.3, which is a prerequisite for a clear understanding of this dis-
cussion). Note that c still denotes the threshold level of the concordance
+
measure, though it applies to ci.. In this case, i.e., given o., o. 0 0.
+ -- J
we declare [o i R oj] if and only if c+j > c and d.i < d.
The principal result that we want to establish in conjunction with this
alternative definition of (>1, ~1) concerns its transitive behavior, and
in particular the relationship between the threshold value c and the occur-
It is essential to note that in the definition of cij in 4.2, the sum was
taken over Cij, the concordance set with its elements SkES such that
Xik Xjk'§ +
Note that Jacquet-Lagreze (1974) uses a parallel to c4+, along with other
indices, to define, in a different manner, an outrankig relation for multi-
criteria decision problems under certainty.
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rence of violations to transitivity, as alluded to in subsection 4.4.2. In
that subsection, obstacles in the way of building the transitive closure of >1
were identified. For instance, given oi, o., ok  O0, with [o i > oj] and
[oj >1 Ok] , a serious inconsistency exists if either [ok >1 oi] or
[Ok n1 oi] is true. We show hereafter that either case can only occur if
c is set at or below certain levels.
LEMMA: If [o i >I oj] and [oj )1 Ok], a necessary condition for either
[Ok I1 oi] or [ok >1 oi] is that the threshold (strict) concordance measure,
c, be less than or equal to , o, o', ok 0.
PROOF: First note that a necessary condition for either violation is
+ -
that [ok R oi]. For this latter to be true, it is necessary that cki > c
and dki < d. We are interested in the relative performance of oi with
respect to ok for each state of nature S E S, given that [oi >1 oj] and
[oj >1 Ok]. We have that since [oi> lo ], then [oi R oj ] and thus
+
c > C, implying that the probability of occurrence of a state of nature on
which oj strictly outperforms oi is at most equal to (1 - c) i.e.,
,Ptp <_ (1 - c).t Similarly, since [oj>l 0k] the elements of Bkjls cBi
are also such that Pz < (1 - c).
£AISIcBkj
For any state of nature S£ I S where xk£ > xi£, and is thus an element
of Bki, we can have that either S£ £ {Bij U Eij} or S k Dij, since, by defi-
nition, B ijEij ( Dij { (} and Bij U EijU Dij = S. If the former is true,
In the case Ei { , then P (1 - c).
ISE cBji
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i.e. S P {E(Bij ) Eij) f Bki), then (S E {Bij )Eij..) and (S E Bki)
Xk£ > xit 2 xj£ =>xk > xj., meaning that S. E Bkj as well, therefore,
{(Bj U E ij)B .i C Bkj which allows us to write thatij ij i  EB ij)
t S dB.)E3 L )flB I tS cB
Since we have established above that Pk <- (1 - c), then
£I S EBkj
IPk <_ (1 - c). If, on the other hand, S c {Di.. j B k}, then
I SRBijUE ij Bki
noting that Dij = B. and e P< (1 - c), it is obvious that
£ jiC P < (1 - c). We are, of course, interested in ci =
P . We have that:
A£S cEBki
P = P + P < 1 - c + (1 - c)
£1SE Bki £jS E{(BijUEij)nBki} £ IS~E{DijBkiI
which yields that
+Cki < 2 - 2c (5.2)
We noted earlier that a necessary condition for either of the two above-men-
+ - +
tioned violations is that cki > c. However, since c < 2 - 2c, the neces-
ki -
sary condition as to the value of c is that:
2 - 2c > c
2
which yields c <
-j
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The implication of this result is of course that if (the decision
maker supplied) c > , then the above described violation to transitivity
will not occur, suggesting that a conservative (risk minimizing) attitude
(reflected in high c) will not lead to the above-mentioned violations of
transitivity.
However, another type of obstacle to the transitive closure of >1
might occur, namely cycle formation, as described in subsection 4.2.4,
whereby we might obtain ol>1 02 0"' °•1 o 01 Therefore, while no ob-
- 2
stacles to transitivity will occur for c > 1 for any three elements o i ,
oj, ok EO where [oi>1 oj] and ]o ' > Ok], there is no guarantee that,
for some o E 0 such that [ok> om ], we do not obtain either [om >1 oi] or
- 2[om '1 Oi], even if c > -2
We show hereafter that it is still possible to find values of c for
which no cycles connecting a given finite number of elements will emerge.
However, our results hereafter indicate that, starting at oi, the further
down we go along a path emanating from oi, the larger the value of c needed
to prevent a "reverse" arc to oi which would consecrate the formation of a
cycle. Let us first examine the situafion with four elements
oi, oj, Ok, Om e 0 such that [oi >1 oj], [oj il ok] and [ok >1 Om]. We are
interested in the relative performance of om with respect to oi, so as to
+
compute an upper bound for cmi which will allow us to assess whether it can
lead to [om R oi] and, if so, for what values of c.
LEMMA: If [oi >1 oj] and [oj >1 ok] and [ok >1 om] (with [o i I ok ] and
[oj I om] ), a necessary condition for either [om >1 oil or [om 'l oi] is
SNote that [o i I ok ] means that o i and ok are incomparable by (>i' 41)'
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that the threshold (strict) concordance measure, c, be less than or equal
to ' - ., oj, ok , om E 0.
PROOF: Since [oi 1i oj] and [oj )1 ok], we have established above
(in equation 5.2) that
we have that
SP kP 2 - 2c. Moreover, because [ok >1 o ],
k k SeBki
P < 1 - c. We are interested in the value of the sum
tIS EBmk
of the P 's for P E Bm C S. For any state of nature S E Bmi, we have
that either S E {Bik UJ Eik} or Sk E Dik. If the former is true, i.e.,
S ({(BikUEik)nB mi then S E {B.ikUEik} and Sz E B i => X > x. >
. ik ik mi u k ik -2 mi m2. iR -
----> Xm > xk, meaning that S, E Bmk as well; therefore
{(Bik UEik)flBmi C_ Bmk, implying that P
a S E i kEik)nBmi
E Pk
k c mk
1 - c. If, on the other hand, S£ E (Dik ~ Bmi then, again noting that
D.ik Bki, and pk P 2 - 2c, we obtain that P 2 < 2- 2ckk ki k - ml
Using the definition of cm (i.e., equation 5.1), we have:
mi
lY. Pmi £Is2. B 2 Z9Ii x S{DiklpBmil 2 .I SE {B uEik nB P 1 - c+2-2c.2.-
which yields that:
+
cmi < 3 - 3c (5.3)mi -
Since a necessary condition for either [om  i] oor [om > oi] is
that c > c, we can compute a minimum value for c if this condition is tomi -
be satisfied, by setting
3 - 3c > c
3
which yields c <4 .3
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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3Therefore, only if c ~ 4 can we have that [om >1 0i] or [om ~l 0i] when
[oi >'1 o. ], [OJ >1 ok] and [ok >1 om] (and [oi I 0 ], and [0 i I ok]) • WeJ m
notice that to absolutely prevent the formation of 4 node cycles, we need
- 3 2to set c at a higher level than needed to prevent 3 node cycles (4 vs. 3
respectively). We can now generalize the results obtained so far to cycles
connecting any number of elements. First of all however, note that all the
results derived so far in section 5.1 concerning the transitivity of >1
actually apply to the transitivity of the underlying outranking relation R. t
Therefore, this discussion concerning cycle formation applies to all types of
of cycles (identified in subsection 4.3.3) and not just strict preference
cycles (i.e., type 1 cycles). For this reason, to be more complete in pre-
senting the following general necessary conditions for cycle formation, we
use R instead of >1.
Consider a situation were [01 R O2], [02 R 03], •.. , [om_l ROm]'
[om R 0m+l]' for m ~ 2 with no two elements 0i' OJ with j ~ i-I and j # i+l
otherwise connected (except by incomparability, of course). In other words,
we have a directed path from 01 to 0m+l' with (m+l) nodes and m arcs, such
that no two non-consecutive nodes along it are connected by R. We are inter-
ested in finding a sufficient condition on the value of c as a function of
m for [0m+l R 01 ] not to be true, thus preventing an (m+l)-node cycle from
forming. We prove hereafter that:
LEMMA: For any 01 , O2 , 03, ••• , om' 0m+l E 0, m ~ 2, such that [01 R O2],
[02 R 03], ••• , [om-l ROm], [om R 0m+l] and {[oi I OJ]' -Vi, j E [1, m+l] I
j ~ i-I and j ~ i+l}, a necessary condition for [0m+l R 01] is that
- m
c < ----
-m+l
t Indeed, the only property of 0i >1 o. needed in the above proofs is that
ct. > C , which is a necessary condition of o. R o. as well.1J - 1 J
••
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PROOF: We first prove the following result, for all m > 2:
+
cm+l, 1 ~ m - mc (5.4)
•
We proceed by recursion. We can readily see that equation 5.4 is valid
for the three cases examined so far, i.e., for m = 2, m = 3 and m = 4. Assume
that it is valid for m = i+l; we need to show that it is valid for m = i+2
to complete the proof.
•
We thus have
+(5.4) that ci+l,l
We have, from
•
•
•
I
~ P£2 1 - c, since [oi+l R 0i+2]· Again, we are interested in
t StEBi+2, i+l
the elements of Bi+2,lS; S. For any SR, E Bi +2,1 we have that either
SR, E Dl , i+l or SR, E {B l , i+l U El , i+l}' If SR, E {B l , i+l U El , i+l}
Xl,R, ~ xi+l,R, ~ xi +2 ,R, > xi +l ,£' implying
gives us as before, that
- c. If on the other hand
•
write:
then, since Dl,i+l = Bi +l , l' then
+
< c < i - ic by equation (5.4).
- i+~,l We can thus
•
•
•
+
c i +2,1 =
Having established that c:+2,1 ~ (i+l) - (i+l)c proves the result
stated in equation (5.4) above.
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•
Since a necessary condition for either [0m+1 ~1 oil or [0m+1 >1 oil is
+ -that cm+1 1 ~ c, we can compute a minimum value for c if this condition is
,
to be satisfied, by setting (using equation 5.4)
m - mc > c
• which yields
•
m
c < ---
-m+1 (5.5)
thus completing the proof.C
At the limit, i.e., to absolutely prevent the formation of cycles of
•
any length (m -+ + 00), the threshold value c would have to be set at:
= 1mlim
m + 1
m -++00
>c
• which means of course that only absolute dominance (on every possible S£ £ S)
will guarantee that cycles are not formed in R. Table 5.1 shows the minimum
•
value of c needed to prevent the formation of cycles of different lengths
(defined as the number of elements connected by the cycle, i.e., number of
nodes), using equation 5.5. It is interesting to note that progressively-
•
higher values of c are needed to prevent longer cycles.
+To con1ude this part of c .. , the strict concordance measure, it should
1J
be noted that the results derived have assumed a "worst case" analysis (in
•
that the maximum possible performance contradicting transitivity was assumed)
therefore, the minimum values c derived to eradicate intransitivities are
only necessary conditions for the existence of cycles, but are by no means
•
sufficient. It would indeed be almost pathological to find real world prob-
lems exhibiting such "worst case" characteristics as the one assumed to
derive the above conditions. However, we are not advocating the use of
•
•
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Table 5.1: Minimum Values of c Needed to Prevent Cycles of Length n
•
Cycle Length Minimum
-
n c
2 0.5
• 3 0.667
4 0.75
5 0.8
• 6 0.833
7 0.857
8 0.875
• 9 0.889
10 0.9
15 0.933
• 20 0.95
30 0.967
100 0.99
•
•
•
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
•
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+
c .. , but merely pointing out to the possibility of defining a stricter cri-1J
terion than c .. (which includes equivalence along with strict dominance),1J
and more importantly to some of its interesting properties which are not
equally valid for c ..•1J
+Though different decision rules can be used with c .. and c .. than the
1J 1J
ones in subsection 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, which we have assumed to apply to this
discussion, the latter rules could be inadequate when dealing with situations
where considerable equivalence in conditional payoffs is present. The next
section presents a more effective alternative concordance index from the
viewpoint of treating states on which different options yield identical
payoffs.
b. Normalized Strict Concordance Measure
The rationale for this specification is that only states on which two
given options do not have equal or otherwise identical payoffs should be
considered in comparing these two options with the purpose of establishing
preference. In other words, if, for St £ S, xit=Xjt' then St is not a decisive
factor in the comparison. We thus define the normalized or conditional
strict concordance measure, c~. as:1J
• c ~. =1J L
R, Iso £B •.
N 1J
(5.6)
•
•
•
The term in the denominator is the probability that the payoffs from
OJ are not equal, and~ ): p~iS the conditional probability
tiS 0 £ { •.un .. }
N 1J 1J
o. and
1
of S£
••
•
•
•
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given that a "decisive" state for o. and o. occurs (i.e., one where payoffs
1. J
are not equal). Thus c~. can be interpreted as the conditional probability
1.J
that the outcome obtained from o. is better than that of o. given that a
1. J
decisive state occurs. Of course, the higher c~. the more desirable o. is1.J 1.
with respect to 0 .•
J
We illustrate this measure with the following numerical example.
Example 5.1: Assuming six equiprobable states of nature, 5 = {Sl' S2' S3'
154' S5' S6}' thus Pj = 6' ¥ Sj E S, consider two options 0i and OJ with the
following impact matrix
[ 100 150 120 160 200 170]
100 110 180 190 200 170
In this example, E.. = E.. = ~Sl' S5' S6~' and oILly B •• U D•• =ls2' S3' S4}1.J Jl 1.J 1.J
are the decisive states, with a marginal probability of occurrence equal to
The three alternative concordance measures considered so far (equations•
~ · 5ince Bi j = {S2},
cji ~ U- + i] •2 ~ ~ ·0
•
4.1,5.1 and 5.6, respectively) are equal in magnitude only if E.. = {¢}o1.J
+However, generally, c~. > c. 0' and c~. can be obtained from c .. as1.J - 1.J 1.J 1.J
follows:
•
c ~ .1.J =
c. o - p(E .. )1.J 1.]
1- p(E .. )1.J
•
•
where p(E .. ) is the probability of occurrence of an element of E.. , i.e.,1.J 1.J
p(E o. ) = L: Po
1.J I NR, So EE .•
N 1.J
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no longer possible to have [0. R 0.]
J 1.
(in conjunction with c~.) then it is1J
if [0. R 0.], V 0., o. t; 0, nor to ob-
1 J 1. J
tain indifference by ~l.t Thus c~. allows the decision maker or his analyst
1J
to exercise a stricter basis for accepting the preference of one options over
When c~. is substituted for c .. in section 4.2, the resulting outrank-1J 1J
ing relation and initial ()l' ~l) possess the same general properties as
with the initial specification c ..• A possible difference could be that if1J
c is set at a value greater than 0.5
•
•
•
§
another.
In conclusion, in as much as one can control the value of C, a stricter
basis for preference could be imposed using a high value of c in conjunc-
•
tion with the initially specified cij • However, in problem situations where
options results in equal payoffs under a number of states of nature, one of
the strict measures above m:ght be more appropriate.
•
The concordance measure is, however, only one dimension entering the
comparison of options. The other, namely the discordance measure, reflecting
the maximum loss of regret resulting from a "wrong" decision, is quite as
•
important, and, as discussed hereafter, can be very effective in adapting
the methodology to problems exhibiting different general characteristics.
In Section 4.2, the discordance d .. between o. and o. was defined in1J 1. J•
5.1.2 The Maximum Regre t or Dis cordance Measure
equation 4.2 as:
•
•
t The reason is that Clj + cji = 1, ¥ 0i' o. E 0, therefore, if c > 0.5, then
[0. R oil wo~d ~e impossible if [oi R 0J.~ since it would imply that
,J ,
c i . + c.. ~ C + C > 1.J J l.
§Note that the possibilities of using such an index, along with others to
define an outranking relation are quite numerous; see, for example, Jacquet-
Lagreze (1974) for a relation based on a similar strict index used in con-
junction with an index of equivalence defined over E.. (for multicriteria
problems under certainty). 1J
•
••
d .. =lJ Max{k ISk£D, ,}lJ
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(x'k - x'k)] 1 (5.7)
where dmax l'S the maXl'mum dl'fference l'n ff b ' '0payo etween any two optlons 1n
if 0, is selected over 0" appropriately normalized over all options pairs
1 J•
for a given state of nature. As such, d" is the maximum loss that might occur1J
•
in O. We present here four
R, c mdenote as diJ" d", d" andlJ lJ
situations where each might
alternative specifications for d", which welJ
d7, respectively, and briefly discuss problemlJ
be more appropriate or desirable for defining the
•
initial relation (~l' rvl )· The basic form of all four specifications is the
same, namely, it is the ratio of a quantity oe" reflecting maximum regretlJ
due to o. with respect of 0" to~max, the maximum value of~" for all
1 J ~
pairs; this form always y~elds an index in the range [0, 1]. We now give
the mathematical definition for the alternative measures.
•
a. Likelihood Compensated Discordance Index:
This index is specified as follows:
R,
d ..1J
• R,d, ,lJ = Max{k ISk£D, ,}lJ
(5.8)
•
•
•
•
where [6.p]max is defined as max {max [(x, - x, )P ]},
, ,10kIS D J k 1k k1,J 0,,0,£ k£ "1 J lJ
or the largest probability weighted difference on any given state between
any two elements of 0; of course [6. p]max is the same for all pairs of
options Ok' OJ £ o. The numerator is what we refer to as a likelihood com-
pensated loss which might result from the implementation of 0i instead of
0" and is simply the difference between the two outcomes for a given state
J
multiplied by the probability of occurrence of that state.
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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The rationale for likelihood compensation is relatively intuitive in
that the maximum loss for a state in D.. might occur for a state of nature
1J
which has very low probability of occurrence. Thus, a more appropriate re-
flection of worst case performance in building R is to mul tiply loss for each
state Sk £ Dij by its probability of occurrence Pk , thus providing a measure
which reflects the magnitude of a loss as well as its likelihood relative to
t
other possible losses, as illustrated in the following example.
Example 5.2: Consider a situation with S = {Sl' S2' S3' S4' S5' S6}
and associated P = {0.25, 0.15, 0.03, 0.15, 0.22, 0.2}; we also have
0 1 , O2 £ 0 with the following impact matrix:
0 1 --> [100 100 170 95 130]
O2 --> 100 120 90 155 90
Using equation 5.7 in computing d2l , we would have had the difference
occurring at S3 in the numerator, i.e., 170 - 90 = 80. However, when we
realize that P3 = 0.03, it might seem more appropriate to be concerned by
the difference in S6' equal to (130 - 90) = 40, but with P6 = 0.2. Thus,
in d~l' we would have Max {(80 x 0.03), (40 x 0.2)} = Max {2.4, 8~ = 8,
in the numerator, as the basis for a preferential statement between 0 1 and
O2• The denominators in both cases are, of course, a function of the rest
of the options in 0, and though different for each of the measures respec-
tively, they do not affect the general conceptual issue highlighted in this
example. 0
It should be noted, of course, that such likelihood compensation, as in
~. is not necessarily desirable in all problem situations and, furthermore,
1J
might be quite misleading and dangerous in others. For instance, when a
t See Guiguou (1971) for a similar logic in the context of multicriteria
problems under certainty.
••
•
•
•
•
•
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very high loss of a catastrophic nature is possible, though it has a very
small probability of occurrence, it would be desirable to be aware of such
a loss and have it appropriately captured in a preferential comparison,
without it being unduly scaled down by multiplication by the very small
probability of occurrence. 5uch problems usually occur in the context of
public safety hazards,where very small probabilities of catastrophic fail-
ure exist, such as nuclear power plant siting and operation. 5uch situations
might also arise in transportation problems, where some options might re-
suIt in significant irreversible impact. Thus, when "catastrophic" losses
9.-
might be involved, the use of d .. instead of d .. is discouraged as it might
1J 1J
masksome essential information. However, when high non-catastrophic losses
could occur with very low probabilities, then d~. might be more appropriate.
1J
cb. Conditional Weighted Discordance Index: d ..
1J
Th~ alternative definition is best motivated through the following
example:
Example 5.3: Consider a decision pro~Jem with 5 = {51' 52' 53' 54' 55' 56}
and associated probability vector P = {0.2, 0.2, 0.1, 0.2, 0.1, 0.2}, and
two options 0 1 and O2 characterized by the impact matrix:
[
100
100
150
150
150
100
100
150
100
150
125]
100
•
•
•
It is easy to verify that c12 = c2l = 0.7. Each option is strictly out-
performed by the other on two states of nature respectively, with D12 =
{54' 55} and D2l = {53' 56}; using the initial definition of dij (equation
5.7), we obtain that d12 = d2l = 50/d
max
• Moreover, simple inspection reveals
••
•
•
•
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to us that the payoff from O2 under 54 and 55' i.e., when O2 outperforms
0 1 , exceeds 0 1 by 50 for both 54 and 55. However, payoff from 0 1 for 53
and 56' where 0 1 would outperform O2, exceeds O2 by 50 in the case of
53 (with P3 = 0.1), and only by 25 in the case of 56 (with P2 • 0.2).
Because it yields a lower probability of lower loss (everything else being
equal), O2 should be chosen over 0 1• However, using equation 5.7 for the
discordance measure in conjunction with any of the concordance measures
described so far, would have yielded that [01 ~l O2], indicating preferen-
tial indifference where there seems to be a clear case for unidirectional
preference·c
We now define the conditional weighted discordance index d~j' which
would have given the procedure the discriminatory power needed to detect
cases such as the one above:
•
•
cd ..
1J =
(5.9)
•
•
•
•
where Pk\D ,denotes the conditional probability of occurrence of Sk
ij
given the occurrence of an element of Dij , thus
PkiD ..1J
(5.10)
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The numerator of equation 5.9 is the conditional expected loss from
choosing oi over oj given that the realized state (denoted by S*) is one
where o outperforms oi (i.e., S*cDij). The denominator is defined for
normalizing purposes as described earlier in subsection 5.1.2.
In example 5.3 above, using equation 5.9 yields
c 0.1 0.2 max maxd = (50 x + 50 x / [0] - 50/[A ] and12 0.3 0.3 c c
c  0. 1 0 2 - max - [c]maxd = (50 x + 25 x ) / [c ] x 33.3/[Z21 0.3 0.3 c c
thus reflecting the better performance of 02 vis a vis o1 (everything else
being equal as in this problem).
cHowever, as in any linear additive rule, dij could conceal important
differences between states. Therefore, in situations where very large vari-
ations in relative loss exist between states for a given pair ofoptions,
dij is not recommended, especially when the elements of Dij have strongly
dissimilar relative probabilities. In general, the initial dij is more
conservative than d as it gives the absolute worst case preemptive power,
and as such, prevents the "dilution" of possibly unacceptable losses by other
less drastic ones. Again, the salient issue here is that of the catas-
trophic loss, low probability situation which dij handles quite well but the
other indices might not detect. On the other hand, many problems have less
drastic relative loss profiles, and as such, might be more adequately repre-
sented by measures which consider more than just the worst possible loss
(such as d~ ), or that compensate for likelihood of occurrence in the defi-
nition of highest loss (such as dij). The next alternative measure presented
here attempts to reflect both concerns respectively represented by dij and
; we refer to it as the marginal weighted discordance index: dmij ij*
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c. Marainal Weighted Discordance Index: d
This measure is specified as follows:
E-(x - )P
kIS cD i 1J ik km k i(dj [max (5.11)
where [m]max max { 1 (xjk- xik)Pk (5.12)
i,jJoio,o CO kjSkeD ij
The main difference between this index and the previous one(de )isij
that the probabilities used in (5.11) and (5.12) are the marginal probabili-
ties rather than the conditional PkD used in the definition of d D
ij
Thus the numerator in (5.11) is the expected loss or regret of oi with respect
to oj.t It is obtained from the numerator of (5.9) by multiplying the
latter by E Pk' or the probability that S* Dij. In essence then,
k ij
d j is a likelihood compensated version of dij, in the same sense that d.ij jij
is a likelihood compensated version of dij. The difference between dij and
d is however similar to that between dc and d in that dc considersij iji ij iji
all the sates in Dij in the definition of the discordance index, whereas
dij considers the worst one only.
Again, the same caution expressed earlier in connection with the use
of dij in problem situations where catastrophic-like losses might exist
applies here. Furthermore, dj, when used with the concordance index
cij to define;the preference-indifference relation ( 9' ,) , has some redun-
dancy in the information it conveys. In particular, given cij, the proba-
bility that S* c Dij is simply 1 - cij, which is also used in the defini-
TNote that we do not mean net loss here, nor do we implicitly assume that
gains are negative losses.
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tion of dij. Therefore, rather than give an independent complementary
item of information on the choice situation (such as the maximum possible
loss), dij reflects again the probability of oj outperforming oi . As
such, dij might be a more effective complement to c in defining R thannii
dm would.ij
The next, and last, measure we discuss, introduces a dimension not
present in any of the above-mentioned four indices, namely the willingness
to accept a larger absolute potential loss for larger payoffs than for
lesser ones.
d. Relative Discordance Index: d
We motivate the definition of this measure by the following example:
Example 5.4: Consider a decision situation with S = {S1 9, S2, S3 S}) and
associated probability vector P = {0.3, 0.2, 0.21, and ol
, 
02 E 0, charac-
terized by the following impact matrix:
01 1400 200 150 20001
02 1400 200 50 2100
It can be seen that o1 and 02 perform better than the other respec-
tively on states S3 and S4, which have P3 " P4 = 0.2. While dij and all
the other indices discussed so far would have yielded equal values of the
maximum regret measure, since (x1 3 - x2 3 ) = (x2 4 - x1 4 ) = 100, it seems
that having lost 100 when we receive 50 (if 02 is selected over o, and
S3 occurs) is more "serious" than losing 100 where we receive 2000 (if 02
is selected and S4 occurs). In the first case, the loss is equal to 200%
of the realized payoff, whereas in the second, it is only 5%.a
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This suggests the following alternative specification of the regret
measure:
ij klSkcDij Ar max
where [ ]max = max max (jk- Xik ) (5.14)
ir ,joi, ojCO klSk Dij Xjk I
This specification is especially appropriate in decision problems where the
range of payoffs over S of the different options is quite wide (i.e., order[s]
of magnitude), whereby the ratio of relative losses is significantly dif-
ferent from that of absolute ones.
As noted earlier in this section, all indices discussed above are inter-
changeable as far as their role in the mechanism for building the initial
preference-indifference relation (1' 11 ) ', described in Chapter 4, and thus
do not change the general properties of the resulting relation. The dif-
ferences lie in their respective preferential implications, and the dif-
ferent degrees to which they lead to a more faithful representation of the
decision maker's preferences (by conveying relevant information) in any
given decision situation.
The last point to be made concerning the discordance measures is that
they are by no means mutually exclusive, as one could opt for the use of more
than one index, such as the use ofdc in conjunction with dj whereby
the latter guarantees that no cataatrophiclosses are being diluted by dij,
tNote that the use of dlj effectively corresponds to the existence of a
concave monotonically increasing utility function over X, the impact
domain, since the marginal utility of X-units is increasing at a rate
which decreases with higher values in X.
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which would otherwise prevail as a basis of relative discordance between
options.
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5.2 A Target Oriented Approach
The motivation behind this section is the realization of the importance
of the notion of "target" or "aspiration level" in many problem situations
in the evaluation of transport options, and thus the desirability of inclu-
ding such features in the decision aiding approach pursued in this thesis.
A modified evaluation rationale is thus presented herein, which extends
the "concordance" and "discordance" risk measures to include this feature.
The principal difference with the rationale previously introduced (in sec-
tion 4.2) is that each option is characterized by its performance with
respect to a common "benchmark'consisting of a target value for the desired
impact or payoff from the implemented option.
In addition to incorporating this feature in constructing an initial
binary preference-indifference relation (~1' 0 ) over the set O,that could
be used within the methodological structure of Chapter 4, this section
presents a target oriented elimination rule for use in the first stage of
the decision aiding framework (of section 2.3). While we have not elaborated
on the elimination stage for this subclass of problems, because it is rela-
tively straightforward, and exception is made for the target oriented rule
presented herein, which can be viewed as a particularly useful extension of
the concepts of section 4.2.
Subsection 5.2.1 el]aborates further on the notion of target and its
interpretation in this context, and describes the use of this feature for
individual option elimination. Subsection 5.2.2 presents a target oriented
approach for pairwise comparisons. The properties of the resulting binary
preference indifference relation are then investigated in subsection
5.2.3, and their methodological implications briefly discussed in subsec-
tion 5.2.4. Subsection 5.2.5 offers some concluding remarks on this
approach.
tOf course, the discussion of elimination presented in Appendix A is appli-
cable here as well.
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5.2.1 Target Oriented Elimination Rule
The notion of "target" or "critical level " is germaine to theories
of decision making and is featured in a number of well-known approaches.
From the earlier concepts of satisficing and bounded rationality (Simon,
1955) in the decision sciences, to the more recent "process" oriented deci-
sion making theories and models in the context of multi-criteria decision
making (Benayoun et al., 1971, Zeleny, 1975, 1977a), including the well-
known goal programming techniques (Ignizio, 1976, Sfeir-Younis and Bromley,
1977), the concept of "target" is fundamental. Note however, that the
understanding of "target" for this approach is not one of "minimum accep-
table level" (as in satisficing) nor one of (usually unattainable) "ideal
point" (Zeleny, 1977a), but somewhere in between. In other words, the
desired target should be achievable but with uncertainty as to its realiza-
tion, yet it should not be a"bare"minimum requirement that' loses most of
its discriminating power.
For the class of decision problems under uncertainty addressed here,
the desired option is one that offers a high probability of achieving that
(high) target, yet does not yield an unacceptable loss (or regret) other-
wise. This trade off is operationalized hereafter.
Let xt denote the target set in a given problem situation. In an
analogous manner to the outranking relation R defined in subsection 4.2.2,
we define the concordance set Cit C X as the subset of states of nature where
the impact from option oi meets the target xt; its complement in S, the
discordance set Dit consists of course of those states where the impact from
oI falls short of the desired target. Mathematically,
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Cit {Sk E S Xik 1 xtS
Dit = {Sk C S Xik <  xt
A target achievement, or concordance, measure is thus computed as:
c t W E Pk (5.15)
k ISkEC t
This measure is simply the probability that the payoff from oi is not
below Xt.' Alternative specifications for the concordance index, described
in subsection 5.1.1, could also be used.
It is obvious that larger values of cit are more desirable than lower
ones. However, as in the development of the outranking relation R, another
dimension needs to be captured, namely the possible loss or underachievement
should the outcome S* be a state of Dit instead of Cit. A discordance
measure dit is thus defined as follows, as in equation (4.2).
(xt - Xik)
d a max (x ik (5.16)it kISkEDit dmax
k it t
where dmax is the maximum difference between the performance of any option
t
maxin 0 (on any state Sk c S) and t, i.e., d t W max) max (xt - xjkJojcO kISkEDit
This index reflects the maximum possible underachievement of option oi
with respect to the target value, i.e., the potential regret. It is thus
clear that lower values of dit are more desirable than higher ones.
This measure can be recognized as the "aspiration criterion" defined by
Charnes and Cooper (1963) and used by Geoffrion (1967) in conjunction with
stochastic programming. It is also a special case of Stone's family of
risk measures described in section 3.1.
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The decision rule for the elimination of an option becomes transpar-
ent when the target is viewed as a hypothetical option ot yielding xt under
any state of nature; the risk measures thus defined can be seen to be
those comparing all oi C 0 to ot by the outranking relation R defined in
subsection 4.2.2. In this case, however, only one-directional outranking
is of interest, i.e., whether or not oi outranks ot.
Denoting the subset of options reduced using the targetx t by 0 t , the
elimination rule can be formally stated as:
o c 0 t if and only if c > c and d it d
thus oi 4 0t if and only if cit< c or dit d .
As before, c and d are user-supplied thresholds levels., Such thres-
hold values are often used in practice, along with the intuitive logic
implied in the above decision rule, as illustrated hereafter.
Example 5.5: Consider a situation where a design standard is set requiring
a proposed facility to carry vehicles at a 45 mph speed. Alternative pro-
posals thus generated will be evaluated according to the extent that they
meet this standard. However, deviations from this desired service level
will usually be tolerated, whereby a proposed option will be accepted if
it achieves this level 90% of the time. In this example, x t = 45 and c =
20, while the underachievement magnitude is not taken into account (which is
equivalent to setting d - 1.0).0
In summary, this elimination rule is a mere formalization of frequent-
ly used and very intuitive concepts. The interesting aspects are that:
Use of the same notation as in subsection 4.2.2 by no means implies that
the thresholds mentioned in this case should have the same numerical
value as those used in 4.2.2 to define the outranking relation R.
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1) it is a two-dimensional representation of the risk of an individual
option, unlike the unidimensional measures discussed in section 3.1; and
2) it follows the same logic used in the initial outranking relation of
section 4.2.
5.2.2 Pairwise Comparisons Relative to Target
In this subsection, we investigate how performance vis-a-vis a target
can provide a basis for defining a binary preference-indifference relation
between the dlements of 0, for the pairwise comparisons stage of the deci-
sion-aiding framework. This is thus an alternative mechanism for defining
the initial relation ()1' ) introduced in Chapter 4. The same notation
is used here, in that ()1' ) does not refer to the specific relation
obtained with the comparison mechanism of section 4.2.
To further place matters in perspective, the same methodological
structure of Chapter 4 for the pairwise comparisons stage is adopted here.
Therefore, once the initial (>1' 1%) is formed according to the new target
oriented mechanism, the same issues faced earlier are present. As it turns
out, the relation defined in this subsection is not necessarily consistent
with the properties of partial semiorders (postulated in section 3.3), as
shown in subsection 5.2.3. Thus subsection 5.2.4 relies on the results of
the previous section to suggest the relation specific details of a correc-
tion strategy for removing these inconsistencies from (>1' 1 i) and thus
convert it to the final relation (>, u), as discussed is section 4.4.
In what follows, the target-oriented mechanism for building (•1 ' i )
is presented. Each o i  0 is characterized by the two risk dimensions
defined in the previous section, namely cit and dit, as per equations
5.15 and 5.16 respectively. The problem of comparing two options,
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Oi, oj E 0 can thus be viewed as a bi-criterion evaluation problem, where
it is desired to jointly maximize cit and minimize dit over all oi E 0. As
is usually the case with such problems,t the first thing to do is to eliminate
dominated (or inferior) options. In order to keep the presentation free
from non-essential elements, we restrict our defintion of (•l, '1) to the
non-dominated (or efficient) subset of options. Furthermore, in keeping
with the notation used throughout Chapter 4, we still denote by 0 the set
of options over which (•l, 1) is defined, even though it is assumed that
dominated options have already been eliminated.
While it is theoretically feasible to assess a joint value function
over "concordance" and "discordance" and use it as a basis to induce a
complete order over the elements of the efficient subset, it is not as
appropriate approach for this problem, given the -nature of the concordance
and discordance criteria. €  Instead, the interpretation of these criteria
as risk measures, coupled with the following assumption on the preferences
over the payoff X-domain, suggests a possible definition of ~l' "1) using
the same logic as in section 4.2.
As an "operational" assumption on the preferences in X-domain, payoff
See earlier discussion in section 4.4.
§It is implicitly assumed that this subset is sizeable and requires fur-
ther reduction (prior to the Global Comparison stage of the decision
aiding framework of section 2.3).
&See Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Chapter 3, for a value function approach
to trade-offs under certainty, as well as a brief survey of other
possible approachs; see also Dyer and Sarin (1979).
¢Those criteria are only meaningful within a specific unique problem con-
text and do not have a consistent value in units that the decision maker
is familiar with or conducts transactions with.
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values exceeding the target level are considered preferentially equivalent.
Formally, if xik x t and xjk > xt, VSk CS and Voi,oj  c 0, then xik and
xjk are preferentially equivalent. An equivalence class is thus effectively
defined over the range of X containing all values greater than or equal to
Xt. This assumption is critically discussed in subsection 5.2.5, as it may
be quite inappropriate in some situations. It is however used here to
interpret the target-based concordance measures (cit and cjt, relative to
individual options oi and o respectively) into a pairvise concordance
measure, reflecting the probability of outperformance, as per section 4.2.
It is easy to show that this assumption allows us to state that if
cit > cjt, then ci > cii (where cij and cji are as defined in section 4.2).
Furthermore, a measure of pairwise discordance (reflecting relative
potential regret) could be defined by considering the difference between
the respective maximum possible shortfall from the target, characterizing
each option.
Subsequently, the initial relation (O1,1) is specified as follows:
given o oj  C 0;
a. [oi~) 1 oj if and only if
1. {(it - ct) and 0 < (dit - dt) <
or
2. < 0 (c - cit) < 6 and (dt - dt)>6 2;
b. [oi 1 oi] if and only if
1. {0 cit-ct < 6and 0 < (d - djt) 61
or
2. {0 (c - ) < 6 and < (d - dt) <
The reader is again reminded that all options in 0 are assumed to be non-
dominated. Therefore, it is not possible to have oi and oj such that(C > ct) and (dit< dit).
it jt-- it jt
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1 2
where 6d' 6d and 6 are user-supplied threshold levels.
61 is a "rejection" threshold which, if exceeded by the differenced
between dit and djt provides a sufficient basis for rejecting
the preference that would have otherwise prevailed based on the concordance
measure alone.
26d is an "acceptance" threshold which, if exceeded by the difference
(dit - djt), provides a strong enough basis for accepting the preference
of oj over oi, subject to the difference between cit and cjt not exceeding
the concordance rejection threshold 6 .
1 2 1 .2In general, 6d, 1 d' , 6c [0,1] and 6d . Of course, o and o
are declared incomparable whenever we have not ([oi 1o oj lr l[oj 1 o ]
or [oi 1 oj0). The decision rule underlying ()1 ul1) is summarized in
Figure 5.1. The properties of this relation are discussed in greater
detail hereafter.
5.2.3 Properties of Target-Oriented (>1 1)
It is clear that (>1' u1) as defined above is a partial relation,
since incomparability is allowed. The indifference relation %1 is by
definition reflexive and symmetric; it is however not necessarily transi-
tive, as a simple counter example can show, and is as such consistent with
proposition 2.2.8.
On the other hand, the preference relation >1 is irreflexive and
antisymmetric (since [o. >1 oj]=>not [oj 1 oi]). It is however not an
order because it is not necessarily transitive. Intransitivities occur
primarily as a result of the threshold concepts used in defining this
tA family of such thresholds is discussed by Roy (1977) in the context of
multiple criteria decision aids.
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Figure 5.1: Ikcision Rule for Target Oriented ~i2i' )
Given:
{oi, Oj E 0 I not (cit cjt and dit C djt)
0<0d% - d0.1
Scit - c < 1c
- it it - c
cit a cj
Legend:
1
I:
cjt) 1. 6
- it -jt - d "i 1 -j
c dt - dj 62_. [o i oj]
2
j - d1t > 6d "0, [o 1 of
1
c dit djt d i 1 j
1, 6dit - d dt 6 [o I o]it jt di
Strict Preference
Indifference
Incomparability
: cl - cj _• o
.0
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relation.t However, it is possible to prove an important result concerning
the type of intransitivities encountered. In particular, keeping in mind
the discussion in subsection 4.2.4, we show that no obstacles arise in the
face of the transitive closure of )1. In particular, we prove that only
incomparability can exist when preference implied by transitivity does not
hold.
LEMMA: If {[oi >1 oj] andd [1 j 1 Ok]), then either {[o i  1 k] or
[o I ok0 .
PROOF: From Figure 5.1,
0 < c - c < 6 and d - d > 62 (Condition I.1)jt it C jt it c
[oi 1 o1] cotR
c - c > 6 and 0 < d - d 6 (Condition 1.2)
0<c -c < 6 and d - d > 2 (Condition II.1)
0oCkt cjt - c- kt t d
[o J I Ok] OR
1jt - Ckt 6 and 0 < d - d 1 (Condition 11.2)jt--kt c-c - jt kt --16 d
We are interested in the relationship between (cit and
hand and (dit and dkt) on the other.
If conditions 1.1 and II.1 hold, then the inequalities
dance index yield 0 < ck - ci ~ 26c, while the inequalities
dance measure yield
ckt) on one
or the concor-
on the discor-
dk - dt > 26~ > 62d={not [okl > o and not [o k  1 oi ]}.
tAs such, intransitivities constitute the potential price that the analyst
pays in order to obtain an intuitively appealing and flexible decision aid.
IAs discussed in subsection 4.2.4, incomparability is not considered an
inconsistency in the same way as indifference or especially preference
in the "opposite" direction.
)
)
)
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Furthermore, depending on the value of (ckt - cit), then either
[oi >1 ok] (for 0 _ (ckt - cit) < 6 c ) or [oi ok] (for 6c < (ckt - cit)
< 26 ).
If conditions 1.2 and II.1 hold, we obtain that (ckt < cit and
dit < dkt), which means that oi dominates ok, which is impossible by the
very definition of the domain of ()1' *I). Thus conditions 1.2 and II.1
are mutually exclusive.
If I.1 and 11.2 hold, then (cit > ekt and dit < dkt), thus proving
that I.1 and II.2 are mutually exclusive, by the same argument as above.
Lastly, if 1.2 and II.2 hold, then cit - Ckt > 26c (=>not [o k  o.])
and 0 d - d < 26k; again, depending on the value of the latter
quantity, we can obtain that either [oi 1 ok] (for dit - dkt <1d ) or
1 i[o i I ok] (for 6d < dit - dkt < 26d). The proof is thus complete. o
This result has significant bearing on the strategy to be followed for
detecting and correcting inconsistencies uith any desired properties of the
resulting preference-indifference relation, as discussed in subsection 5.2.4.
This proof can be extended to show that in general no type 1 cycles can
occur in the above relation2.
This result does not however rule out the occurrence of other types of
cycles, especially since the indifference relation %1 is not transitive.
Recalling properties P3 and P4 of partial semi-orders (defined in section
3.3), it can be shown that violations of both properties can indeed occur,
leading to the formation of cycles in G(01 , 1.). We support this contention
hereafter by presenting a case where violations of P3 could occur.
Example 5.6:
Consider oi
, 
oj, Ok, oX C 0, such that [oi 1 oj, [oj ~ 1 Ok] and
ok> I oJ]. P3 of course stipulates that [Oi>I ox] should hold as well.
tTypes of cycles are defined in section 4.3; type 1 cycles are preference
cycles withoutudifference pairs.
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Of particular concern are situations where [oi 10 otJ or [ot > 1 oi] instead
of [o±> 1 o]..t We show that if three sufficient conditions for
[oi >11 oj], [oj %01 Ok] and [ok >1 o1 ] respectively hold simultaneously,
then it is possible that [oi '1 o U . These three conditions are:
C1. cit - ct >  and 0 <dt - d < 6 (d Oit it c - it jt- d i 1 k
C2. O Ckt cjt <6 c and 0 < dkt - djt _ 6d (=>[o 1 ok
C3. 0 < ct - ckt 6 and d - dkt > 6d ( [oj > Ok])
From C1 and C2 above, we obtain
1C4. O kt < c and dt - dkt < 6d,kt < cit It kt .- d
which, in turn, coupled with C3 yields:
C5. O< ct;- cit < 6c  and dt - dit > 6 d - d
Since we have that 62 d , then d -dit > 6d  > 0,d d At it d d
thus dit > dit. Since 0 < cet - cit < 6c, the ve.lue of the difference
(dtt - dit) determines the relation between oI and oi .
If dt - dit < 61, which is feasible, then [oi  1 o 0 , which is a violation
of property P3, and can thus lead to an inconsistency cycle in G (>1' d1)'
Consider for instance the following numerical illustration:
cit - 0.72 dit M 0.5
cit - 0.69 djt - 0.47
Ckt - 0.71 dkt ' 0.48
c - 0.73 d t 0.53
Assume further that for this problem, 6 - 0.03, 61 0.03 andc d
62 - 0.04. It is easy to see that the values above satisfy conditions
tThe same definition and rationale of inconsistencies as in Chapter 4 apply
here. Thus [o I oa] is not considered an obstacle in the face of the P3
closure of a relation.
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Cl, C2 and C3. Furthermore, we have that cLt - cit - 0.01 < 6c and
dit - dit = 0.03 <6 ', implying that [oi 1 oJ], thus defining a type 2
cycle, which was found in section 4.3 to be inconsistent with the properties
of partial semi-orders.0
This subsection has discussed the properties of the target-oriented
binary relation (>1' %1) defined in the previous subsection, and concluded
that inconsistency cycles, as defined in eection 4.3, with the exclusion
of type 1 cycles, could occur in the graph of (01' .1)
5.2.4 Implications for Correcting Inconsistencies
The problem from this point on is essentially the same as the one ad-
dressed in section 4.3, i.e., an initial partial relation (>' '1l) has been
established with properties that may or may not be acceptable to the decision-
maker and/or his counsel. According to the framework of Figure 4.12, we
face the methodological choice of how to proceed beyond establishing
(>)' 91 ) over 0. The same discussion of sections 4.3 and 4.4 applies here
as well. The only element which can benefit from further specification
concerns correction strategies aimed at removing inconsistencies from
G(>1, 1) so as to be compatible with the properties of partial semi-orders.
The same three strategies described in section 4.4 are thus applicable
here, namely:
1. assuming all cycles to be equivalence classes
2. identifying "weakest link" in each cycle and declaring its end
nodes incomparable
3. declaring all elements connected by a cycle as mutually incom-
parable.
Only the second strategy requires procedures whihec are specific to
the particular relation under consideration. In particular the definition
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of the "weakest link" in a cycle in G (>'l' 1 ) needs to be specified.
Recalling the definition given in section 4.4.2, the %"eakeet" or critical
link in a cycle is the one with the highest risk of misrepresenting the
decision-maker's preferences. An interpretation of this definition is
thus soughtin the context of (>,, -1)'
In the decision rule of (>1, "'), the assertion of [oi ' oj] can be
recognized as being prone to preference misrepresentation, since it posits
preferential indifference in situations where incomparability might have
been more appropriate. Moreover, since no type 1 cycles (i.e., without
indifference pairs) can occur in G (>1' 1), a strong case can be made to
consider option pairs connected by .1 the likely candidates for "weakest
link."
Furthermore, among those likely candidates in a given cycle, the
magnitude of the difference in the target achievement measure (i.e.,
concordance index) between the two connected options provides the basis
for further identifying the link(s) to be removed. Thus, given oi, oi+l
oj, oj+l, all part of an inconsistency cycle in G(>1 , 1), with [oi 1 Oi+l]
and [oj l oj+l], the indifference pair (oi, oi+ 1) is considered "weaker"
than (oj, oj+l) if and only if Icit - Ci+l,tl >Icjt - c j+l,tl.t The
rationale is that the larger that difference, the less reason there is for
1§the two options to be indifferent preferentially, for a given value of 61 §
In summary, given an inconsistency cycle C = (ol, o2 ,...o01, with
tOf course, since [o01 oli and [oa uo ], we have that Ic - c
S and cjt - cj+,.1 6cI+ accordi g to the" rules of Figure 51
It is assymed in 2this operational rule that the dichotomy of threshold
levels (6d and 6 ) for the discordance measure allows a more faithful rep-
resentation of pieferences than the single threshold Sc
.
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o 01 o, in G (>1' l). we search for the option pair(s) (oi, oi+1l) C x C
such that [oi i oi+] annd cit - c a• cj - Cjcll
where the maximum operator is taken over all indifference pairs in C. The
pair(s) of options thus obtained is then declared incomparable, thus
removing the inconsistency with the properties of partial semi-orders, and
forming the final relation (>,,).
5.2.5 Concluding Comments on Target-Oriented Approach
A number of comments are in order concerning the above target-oriented
binary preference-indifference relation. In particular, questions as to
why such an approach is at all needed (that is in addition to or as alter-
nate for the more soundly anchored and carefully motivated binary relation
developed in section 4.2), and how it is different from that relation of
section 4.2.
Three significant yet interrelated points speak against the target-
oriented approach vis a vis the previous one:
a. It is critically dependent on the target level; changing that
target (xt) yields a different relation altogether, with possibility of
preference reversal at higher target levels.
b. The assumptions made in subsection 5.2.3 concerning preferences
over the payoff domain, whereby all values exceeding the target form one
equivalence class, may be wholly inappropriate in some situations.
c. It uses a limited portion of the information on relative per-
formance of each option on each state Sk E S, and does not directly compare
options on each state, beyond whether or not they exceed the target level xt.
In that sense, it transmits less information to the decision-maker and in-
creases the risk of making an inappropriate selection.
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The relation of section 4.2 does not possess these limitations, and
is indeed generally more appropriate for pairwise comparisons than the
target-oriented approach. However, there are situations where the latter
would nevertheless be useful, namely:
a. when the above-mentioned assumption of preferential indifference
for all values in X greater than xt is for all practical purposes, valid;
b. when only limited information is available;
c. in the case where the options oi c 0 consist of (probabilis-
tically) independent density functions defined over a range of X. The
extension of the techniques developed in this section to that case are
relatively straightforward, as shown in section 5.3 hereafter.
Note that the above comments apply only to the binary preference-
indifference relation presented in this section, and not to the sequential
elimination rule described in subsection 5.2.1. For the latter case, the
target-oriented approach is quite appropriate and remains a powerful and
intuitively appealing tool for the elimination stage of the decision
aiding framework, and as such could be used to reduce the set of options
prior to using any binary preference-indifference relation (in particular,
that of Chapter 4).
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5.3 Generalization to the Case of Continuous Distributions
This section generalizes the applicability of the pairwise comparisons
methodology developed in Chapter 4, along with its major variations presented
earlier in this chapter, to problem subclass 2 (defined in section 1.4).
In this subclass, each option :is characterized by a (known) continuous prob-
ability density function over the impact domain. The methodological struc-
ture of Chapter 4 is applicable to this subclass as well; thus the
principal task in this section is the specification of a binary prefer-
ence indifference relation which can then be integrated within that struc-
ture. In particular, the contribution of this section is to adapt the
mechanism of section 4.2, articulated in the context of the more apparent
problem subclass 1, where uncertainty is represented through discrete states
of nature, to the less intuitive continuous case of subclass 2. This is
primarily achieved by appropriately respecifying the risk measures used
within that mechanism. Though straghtforward mathematically, some concep-
tual issues have to be resolved in the process, in particular with the mea-
sure of potential regret, i.e., discordance.
The next subsection presents the formal definition of problem subclass
2, followed in subsection 5.3.2 by a specification of the risk measures
for the relation described in section 4.2. A straightforward gereraliza-
tion for the "target oriented" approach of the previous section is presented
in subsection 5.3.3, which concludes this section.
5.3.1 Problem Formulation
The problem consists of selecting a most preferred option o*, where
the decision space consists of a finite set of n options 0- ol, 02,..., Om
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The impact x* that would result from the implementation of oi is not known
with certainty and is therefore represented as a random variable following
a known (objectively or subjectively assessed) probability density function
fi' defined over the impact space X (usually R, the set of real numbers).
The random variables x*, for i a 1, ... , n, are not, in the general
case, independently distributed. The joint (or compound) probability
density functions of all pairs x*, x*, for all oi , j O0, are thus assumed
to be known; fij denotes the bi-variate probability density function of
the pair [x*, x*], defined over XxX
Additional notation used in this section includes:
F - cumulative distribution function of x*i i
F i joint cumulative distribution function of (x*, x*)19 ij j
Fi xx conditional cumulative distribution function of x* given
that the random variable xt has taken the actual value x.
J
fix =x =  conditional pdf of x* given x- = x.
A fundamental difference exists between this formulation and the
discrete states problem (subclass 1) in so far as building the preference-
indifference relation is concerned. In the latter, the experimental
outcome consists of a state of nature which determines not only the payoff
from the selected option, but also the forgone payoff from the unselected
ones. This results in unambiguous conditional preference between any two
options given the state of nature, thus giving regret-based risk measures
a clearer and more direct significance than in the generalJ ase. This
tThis point can be seen very clearly in the special case of the "discrete
states" formulation (1), where the impact of a given option is conditional
upon the realization of an exogenous state of nature.
205
point is apparent when interpreting and respecifying the risk measures under-
lying the decision rule of section 4.2, but it is less pronounced in the
target oriented approach, as seen hereafter.
5.3.2 Adapting the Pairwise Regret Based Risk Measures
In the introduction, respecification of the two risk dimensions of
section 4.2 was identified as the principal task needed for the generaliza-
tion of the methodology of Chapter 4 to this problem.
Concordance Measure
Given two options oiloj 0 0, the concordance measure cij was defined
in Equation 4.1 as the probability of no regret resulting from the imple-
mentation of oi (relative to oj). As such, it is quite straightforward
to adapt in this case, especially since it was already introducted in sec-
tion 3.2 for the general case in conjunction with the critique of the inde-
pendence axiom.
The measure cj is thus the probability that the value taken by the
random variable x* exceeds, or is equal to x*; mathematically,i J
ci -p(x > x) F *x) * fi(x)dx (5.17)
X
where the terms are as defined above.
In general, the conditional cumulative distribution function of xt
F
given x, jIFx* is such that Fj -~ . Of course, when the two ran-
Si i
dom variables x* and x * are independent, then Fj x F , and equation
do v i
(5.17) becomes
ciJ Fj (x).fi(x)dx (5.18)
X
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It is of course possible to similarly express the alternative func-
tional forms presented in section 5.1. For instance, the strict concor-
+dance measure c.. defined in equation 5.1, simply becomes:
c.. = p(x > xt) [1 - F (x)].f (x)dxjij1i i x i x=x j
S1 - Fijx =x (x).fj (x)dx (5.L9)
The normalized strict concordance measure, cjj, defined in equation
(5. ), also becomes
[p(x* > x*)]
S3 i [i - p(x[ = x )]
1 - FlIxt = x (x)'j (x)dx
- (5.20)
1 - fi,j(x,x)dx
The interpretation of these measures in the general case is essentially
the same as in the discrete states case and will not be duplicated here.
However, this is not the case for the potential regret, or discordance
measure as shown hereafter.
Discordance Measure
The initial specification of that measure in section 4.2 (equation 4.2)
expressed the maximum potential regret that might result from the preference
of a given option over another. In the discrete states formulation,
that maximum occurred under a particular state of nature. Such a definition
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is however not meaningful in the continuous case, especially if one of the
random variables is not bounded. Even if both random variables are within
bounded ranges, it is not clear that a maximum possible regret (defined as
the difference between the upper bound of one variable and the lower bound
of another) is an appropriate measure for this case, as the probability of
such a worst case occurence would typically be barely significant.
Rather than consider the worst performance at a point (which was very
meaningful in the discrete states case), it might be more appropriate to
consider a definition of regret across a continuum, as in the conditional
weighted discordance index, dic, defined in subsection 5.1.2 (equation 5.9).
This measure reflects the conditional expected regret from selecting o0
given that regret occurs, i.e., that x* > x* .j i
Keeping in mind the general ratio form of the discordance measures,
c cdescribed in subsection 5.1.2, we specify the numerator Ai of dij
ii
Letting z oaenote the random variable equal to(x - x*), we areii j i
interested in the conditional mathematical expectation of zj given thatii
z* > 0, i.e., that x* > x*. Denoting the pdf of zj by fzj we have that:
iif
fz* 1 (x, x+y)dx
and the conditional pdf of z* given that z* > 0 is:ij ij
tCases where such a worst case are of interest would typically be formu-
lated as a strategic planning problem with discrete states of nature,
where one of the states would exhibit this worst case behavior.
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zj ij>0
fx fij(x, x+y)dx
P(x >x)
x fij(x, x+y)dx
1 - Fj x*(x)-fi(x).dx
(5.21)
By inspection, the denominator of equation 5.21 is equal to 1 - c..
(see equation 5.17), which yields:
Z~jJ Z*J>Oi S1- iJ f (x, x+y)dx
i x
(5.22)
The expression for A is therefore:ij
c
ij 1-1 ,J(x,x+y)dxdy
1i 0 X
(5.23)
Following the general form of subsection 5.1.2, we denote the denomi-
c -max max c
nator of dij by [Alc ]  , whereby [zc ]  is the maximum value of Ac across
all pairs (j cc ijin .e.,
all pairs (oi , oj) in 0, i.e.,
[ max .
Thus, for problem subclass 2, di can be specified as:ii
dc
ij S1 fi (x, x+y)dxdy[1 - Ci] [c ] max J 0
(5.24)
,ma I A I .
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It should be noted that the above risk measures can be substituted for
their counterparts in section 4.2 to build an initial binary preference
indifference relation which can then be integrated within the methodological
structure of Chapter 4.
5.3.3 Adapting the Target Oriented Approach
The extension of the target oriented approach to the general case is
relatively more straightforward than that of the relation specified in
section 4.2. In the target oriented approach, options are characterized
individually, vis-a-vis the target, regardless of other options in the
choice set. However, while the target achievement (concordance) measure
is directly generalizable, the discordance measure raises the same issues
faced in the preceding subsection.
Given an option oi E 0, the target achievement measure cit, defined
in equation 5.15 for the discrete states case, can be respecified as
follows:
cit p(x*>x )  f (x).dx (5.25)it 1 -- t i
x
t
where xt is the target level, as defined in the previous section.
The definition of the maximum shortfall from the target, or discordance,
is however, not as simple. Note that the same comment made earlier con-
cerning bounded random variables applies here. However, in this case, the
use of the relative difference between the target and the lower bound on
x* may not be totally inappropriate, especially if the bounds are realistic
for the problem under consideration. However, for the general case, a
definition parallel to the one described in the previous subsection is pre-
sented.
••
•
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Given option 0i E 0, the target-oriented conditional weighted discor-
cdance index, denoted by dit , reflects the conditional expected shortfall
from the target level x t given that xl < xt .
It is easy to show that the numerator ~c of dC is then given by:it it
•
c
flit •
1
.raJ yef (x - y)edy:10 i t (5.26)
•
The denominator [6c ]max is again defined as max {6C } , yielding
i/oi 0 it
the following expression for dCit
•
•
•
•
•
•
• (5.27)
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5.4 Extension to Multicriteria Decision Problems Under Uncertainty
This section addresses problem subclass 3, where options are explicitly
evaluated with respect to their uncertain impact along a multiplicity of
criteria. Most of the concepts, results and procedures developed in the
previous chapters are applicable to this subclass as well, including the
underlying basic considerations and the overall decision aiding framework
(described in Chapter 2). Furthermore, in that framework, the details of the
elimination stage were developed and described in Appendix A in the context
of this subclass of problems. As stated in section 1.4, it may be possible
in many problem situations to satisfactorily deal with the multiplicity of
criteria through elimination, leaving only one as a basis for pairwise
comparisons, which is the problem directly treated in the previous chapter.
However, even when more than one criterion forms the basis of the
pairwise comparisons, the methodological structure described in chapter 4
is directly applicable. The principal problem-specific element needed is
the mechanism for building the initial preference-indifference relation over
the set of options. It is naturally possible to develop and use various
such relations, which may nonetheless be consistent with our set of basic
considerations. The extent of our development in this chapter is however
limited to illustrating how the basic mechanism introduced in section 4.2,
and extended throughout the previous sections, may be applicable to the MC
case.
Having placed this section in its proper perspective, the mathematical
problem formulation is presented in subsection 5.4.1, primarily to reintroduce
the necessary notation. The pairwise comparisons methodology is then pur-
sued, with section 5.4.2 defining an initial preference-indifference rela-
tion which integrates the relation of section 4.2 within a lexicographic
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model. The properties of the resulting relation are then discussed in
section 5.4.3, followed by their methodological implications, particularly
with regards to strategies for correcting inconsistencies. Concluding
remarks and a summary of this section are presented in subsection 5.4.4.
5.4.1 Multicriteria Discrete States Problem
In this section, the mathematical problem formulation is presented,
followed by a brief discussion of major solution approaches.
As stated in section 1.4, the multicriteria discrete states problem
is defined as follows. Given a Pareto-optimal or non-dominated set of n
options 0 = {Ol, 02, ... , On}
, 
the problem is to select a most preferred
option o'*O. Uncertainty is represented through a set of m mutually
exclusive, collectively exhaustive states of nature S ={S1' S2 ' "'... ' Sm
with known probabilities of occurrence P - {P1, P2,' "", Pm} , where PjEP
denotes the probability of occurrence of state SJES. It is again assumed
that the Pj's are independent of which option o*CO is selected.
The impact of each option is expressed by a vector of impacts along
p criteria C = {C1 , C2 , ... , C p, conditional upon the realization of a
state of nature. Let { 2 .. , } denote the conditionalstate of nature. Let - {xij,9xi,.. ii
kimpact of oi given the realization of SjES, where xij is the impact of oi
along criterion Ck should Sj occur. A given option ojEO is thus characterized
by the m-tuple X = {Xl' 2' "' Xi }.
The practical relevance of this formulation was discussed in Chapter 1.
The principal formal approach for dealing with this and other multi-
criteria evaluation problems under uncertainty is multiattribute utility
theory (MAUT), which satisfies the Expected Utility model discussed in
Chapter 3. Since MAUT relies on VN-M's axioms, the critical discussions
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of EUT in Chapter 3 is applicable here as well. In addition to those
axioms, MAUT makes further restrictive assumptions on the decision-maker's
preferences, in the form of different independence axioms, in order to
obtain operationally tractable functional forms. A review of this vast body
of literature is outside the scope of this chapter; for further details, see
Fishburn and Keeney (1974), Keeney and Raiffa (1976), Fishburn (1977),
Farquhar (1977) or Yilmaz (1978), among others. A critical review of MAUT
relevant to the premise of this thesis can be found in Schoemaker (1980).
Also based on EUT are extensions of stochastic dominance (described in
subsection 3.1.3) to the multivariate case, for which only few operationally
useful results exist (Fishburn, 1977: FishburnandVickson, 1978). A
Si~lfication of stochastic dominance relations, set in an interactive format,
was recently described by White and Sage (1981). However, relatively little
else outside the framework of MAUT is available for MC evaluation problems
under uncertainty.
The principal difference between this formulation and problem subclass
1 is of course that it is no longer possible to establish a complete
conditional order over the set 0 under each of the possible states of nature.
This is a result of the multiplicity of criteria along which this conditional
impact is expressed; of course, by collapsing these criteria into a single
index, the problem is recast as a single criterion problem to which the
ad hoc approaches discussed in subsection 4.2.1 are applicable. We proceed
hereafter to show the applicability of the decision aiding framework of
section 2.3 and the subsequent methodological development articulated in
the context of the single criterion case to the MC problem.
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5.4.2 Pairwise Comparisons: Defining An Initial Binary Relation
As stated in the introduction to this section, the same methodological
structure for pairwise comparisons developed in Chapter 4 is applicable
here. This subsection addresses the first component in that structure,
which consists of building an initial binary preference-indifference rela-
tion over the options set 0. In particular, its purpose is to show how
the measures and associated evaluation rationale developed for the single
criterion case, in section 4.2, can be used in the presence of multiple cri-
teria.
It should first be noted that we assume properties of the preference-
indifference relation over the options set 0 to be consistent with those
of partial semiorders, as postulated in section 3.3, and for the same
reasons advanced there. This relation therefore allows incomparability of
options and does not require transitivity of indifference.
Further assumptions specific to the relation developed herein are
next presented, along with the rationale underlying the binary decision
rule, followed by the mathematical description of its elements.
Comparison Rationale
The preference-indifference relation is predicated upon the existence
of a hierarchy over the set C of criteria. When comparing two options oi
and oj, it is assumed that oi cannot be preferred to oj unless it is either
better than or indifferent to oj on the "most important" criterion. We
thus assume the comparison to proceed lexicographically, whereby a given
tThe reader is referred to subsection 4.4.1 for an overview of the
methodological structure; see also Figure 4.12.
215
criterion comes into play only if indifference exists on the more important
criteria.t
The mechanism for comparing oi and oj thus starts with the most important
criterion. If preference of one option over another can be asserted with
respect to that criterion, then lower ranked criteria are not considered.
However, if indifference exists on the first criterion, then comparison
with respect to the second criterion becomes the basis of option-wise overall
comparison. Noting that the impact of an option along any criterion is not
known with certainty, the special feature of this model (vis-a-vis the
standard lexicographic decision model [Fishburn, 1979]) is to allow incom-
parability along a particular criterion, which is translated into option-wise
overall incomparability.
The choice situation faced in comparing two options along a particular
criterion can be seen to be analogous to the single criterion discrete
states problem (i.e., subclass 1) addressed in Chapter 4 and in the pre-
vious sections of this chapter. The measures and decision rules introduced
in section 4.2 (and extensions in Chapter 5) are thus applicable to it, as
described hereafter.
Mathematical Specification
The problem is to define an initial partial binary preference-
indifference relation, denoted by ( ) 1' i 1) , over the set 0. As before,
>1' denotes strict preference, whereas 1', denotes preferential indifference.
The lexicographic idea in decision models is described in a number of
references, including Fishburn's (1974) excellent review article offering
both pragmatic and mathematical perspectives on the subject. Early
advocates include Georgescu-Roegen (1954, 1968), Encarnaci6n (1964).
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Incomparability of options by (~1' "1) is denoted by I. Therefore, given
oi, OjEO, we describe here the mechanism used to establish which one of
the following holds: 1) [o il oj]; 2) [oj li oi]; 3) [oi ~ oj], or
4) [oi I oj].
Let r denote the lexicographic rank of a particular criterion, with
r = 1 for the most important criterion and r = p for the least important.
The preference-indifference relation over 0, based on the r-th ranked
criterion only, is denoted by (•1' ~1)' where, for a given oi,ojEO:
- [oi Oj i0 or  [o > oi indicates preference based on a comparison
between the respective impact of oi and oj along the r-th ranked criterion,
given that this impact is conditional upon the realization of one of a
set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of nature S.
In other words, it is a comparison between the respective marginal probabilty
mess functions of the impact of oi and oj along the r-th ranked criterion. +
In addition,[o i I o] indicates incomparability of oand oj by the
r
As we said earlier, ()r r), for r = 1, ..., p, can be constructed
usir.g the procedure of section 4.2, as shown in figure 4.3. The details
associated with the redefinition of the risk measures in that section are
relatively straightforward and are left to the end of this subsection,
following the remainder of the description of the mechanism for using
the r-th criterion relations (>', r') to establish the option-wise
r r
tif C is the r-th ranked criterion, then the marginal probability mass
function of oi's impact alongkthe r-th ranked criterion consists of a
probability P~ of obtaining x , for I = 1, ..., m. Note however that
the impacts of oi and o, are jointly conditioned upon the realization of
a state of nature S* S.
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overall relation ( I ) ) "
We first give a methematical definition of the preference-indifference
relation ( 1i 1 )'
Definition 5.1: The partial binary preference-indifference relation
(1 ' 1) is defined over the options set 0 (for the problem stated in
subsection 5.4.1) as follows:
1) oi >1 oj if and only if
3k E [1,...,p]I([oi '' oj] for all r=l,...,k-l) and [oi.•• .I])
2) oi "1 oj if and only if
{ [oi . o] for all r=,,...,p }
3) oi I oj otherwise.[
In other words, in order to establish (>1' %1) between two
options oi, ojEO, we start with the highest ranked criterion, i.e., r = 1.
By the 1st ranked criterion relation (>', ' ), one of the following holds:
1) [oi) oj]; 2) [oj ),oi]; 3) [oi '~ Oj] or 4) [oi I~ oj] .
.If [o i ) oj] is true, then [oi )1 oj],by the preference relation
>1 defined above over the set of options. Similarly, if [oj >1 oi]'
then [oj >1 oi]"
If [oi I1 oj], then [oi I oj], i.e., option-wise (or overall)
incomparability is declared between the two options, regardless of the
other criteria.
If [oi "' oj], then the next highest ranked criterion is considered;
i.e., we set r = 2.
Note that throughout this section the symbols denoting the criterion-
specific relations are primed, whereas the overall relations taking the
multiplicity of criteria into account are not.
Note that each option oicO in this problem consists of a multivariateiprobability mass function.
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Therefore, the second-ranked criterion relation (>, 2 2 ) is used
to compare oi and oj only if [oi #' oJ]. Clearly then, given that
[Oi oj],
*if [oi>1 oj], then [oi>l1 o] and vice-versa if [oj ) oi ]
*if [oi I2 oj], then [oi I o]
.if [o 2' oJ], then the next level is considered, i.e., we set
r = 3, and so on ... until one of the following is obtained: [oi > oj],
[oj >1 Oi [i oj], or [oi I oj].
One further comment concerns elicitation of the rank order over the
set of criteria. Two approaches come to mind:
1) a priori, before establishing ( 1 , "' ) over 0
2) progressively, whereby the decision maker first selects the
most important and all pairs are compared by the relation ()>' )
If there are any iption pairs (oi, oj)cO x 0 such that [o i  10 oj], then
the second most important criterion is selected and all eligible pairs
are compared by (W, 2).
Similarly, the next highest criterion is identified and all
eligible pairs compared, and so on, until either:
*all p criteria have been identified (i.e., we reach r = p)
or < p but no pairs (oi, oj) in 0 x 0 are such that [o i '  oj].
Comments on Establishing R-th Ranked Criterion Relation ()', -)
It was mentioned earlier that the mechanism of section 4.2 is applicable
here to obtain ()>r, r). The applicability is quite clear; let Ck be
the r-th ranked criterion. If Ck is the only criterion of interest in
the comparison, then the discrete states formulation (problem subclass 1)
is obtained.
We can thus compute the risk measures ckj and dkj, based on theij ii
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respective impact of oi and oj along Ck, using Equations 4.1 and 4.2.
The rules summarized in Figure 4.3 are then directly applicable. The only
preferential information needed from the decision-maker for a particular
-ksingle criterion relation consists of the two threshold values c and ,
as defined in section 4.2.
Having described the mechanism for comparing any two options in 0,
the properties of the resulting initial binary relation are discussed
in the next subsection.
5.4.3 Properties of Initial Relation (>• 1) and Correction Strategies
This subsection addresses the properties of the initial option-wise pre-
ference-indifference relation developed in the previous section, with parti-
cular emphasis on its consistency with the properties of partial semiorders.
To the extent that such consistency does not hold, and it is desired to
remove sources of inconsistencies, our methodological structure provides for
general corrective strategies (cf. section 4.4), with one requiring further
relation specific definitions, as discussed in subsection 6.4.2.
Properties
The properties of the option-wise relation (l' ~ ) integrating the
single criterion relation of section 4.2 within a lexicographic model,
clearly depends on the properties of the criterion-specific relations
(•r'Pr), 
r =, 
.,,p.
In particular, in section 4.2, it was determined that the properties
of the criterion based relations are generally unrestrictive (cf. subsec-
tNote that we have superscripted these measures by "k" so as to indicate
that they apply to impacts along Ck.
§Of course, different thresholds apply for each criterion.
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tion 4.2.4), and not necessarily consistent with partial semiorders. Such
inconsistencies in (>', r) for r w 1, ... , p, can obviously carry over to
the overall relation (>O-, " ) , along with other properties, as briefly dis-
cussed hereafter.
Completeness: (>i' Yi) is of course not complete as it allows incompara-
bility of options. It should be noted in this context that incomparability
effectively limits the applicability of the lexicographic assumption only
to those comparisons where a preferential statement is clear cut (cf. dis-
cussion in section 4.2 and 2.2 on incomparability). Conceivably, compensa-
tory action between criteria can then be exercised among options incompar-
able by the lexicographic relation.t
Reflexivity and Symmetry: Following standard usage, the preference rela-
tion 1 is irreflexive and asymmetric, while the indifference relation '1
is reflexive and symmetric.
Transitivity: Because the criterion-based relation (>r' "r) , r = 1, ... , pr r
are not necessarily transitive (neither for preference >.' nor for indif-
r.
ference Ir). the option-wise overall (> 1I) can easily be shown to inherit
this property.
Properties P3 and P4: Counterexamples are presented in subsection 4.2.4 to
show that the criterion-based relation (>', ') does not necessarily follow
properties P3 and P4 of semiorders (defined in section 3.3). It is again
trivial to establish that those properties do not hold for (>1' Vc1)'
Therefore, in general, (>-1 u1) is not necessarily consistent with the
tIn that sense, the underlying rationale has features of Luce's (1978) lexi-
cographic trade-off structures.
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p:roperties of partial semi-orders. As discussed extensively in section 4.3, a
particular relation (>)' ri) defined over a specific set of options may or
may not violate those properties. However, when they do occur, such viola-
tions are manifested through the presence of cycles in the graph G(>1, "1)
associated with that relation. Types of cycles and whether they are incon-
sistency cycles were described in section 4.3, and that discussion is of
course applicable to this case as well.
Furthermore, approaches for correcting inconsistencies, described in
section 4.4, are applicable here as well. However, the second corrective
strategy ("breaking weakest link") requires interpreting the "weakest link"
in the context of the relation (>1' ri ) specified in subsection 5.4.2.t
Correction Strategies
An interesting feature associated with this relation is that a parti-
cular link in G (>1' ~1) can be characterized by the lexicographic rank r
at which it was established. For example, preference between oi and o.
(E 0), denoted oi >1 o, is established at rank 3, when
[o 1 oj and [o ' o] and o[oi> i].
A special case is of course option-wise indifference, which can only be
established at rank p (where p is the number of criteria.)§
Subsequently, a given cycle in G(>, 1) may consist of links that
are either: 1) established at the same lexicographic rank, or 2) established
at different ranks. In the first case, the problem of identifying the
In the same way that it was interpreted in section 4.4 for the relation of
section 4.2, and in subsection 5.2.4, for the target-oriented relation
of subsection 5.2.2.
§By definition, [o i  0 oj] {[o I  '0 oj], r=l, ... , p) (cf. subsection 5.4.2).By deiniton, 1. r j
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weakest link becomes identical to the one addressed in subsection 4.4.2, in
conjunction with the (univariate) discrete states case, and the same
approach applies here. In the second case however, when the different links
forming the inconsistency cycles are established at different ranks, the
lexicographic feature of the model suggests a different interpretation.
In particular, links established at a "lower level" criterion (i.e.,
higher values of r) are considered prime candidates for "weakest link".t
The implication is thus that, in a given cycle with links established at
differing ranks, the end nodes of the link established last (i.e., at the
lowest rank) are declared incomparable, thus removing the inconsistency. In
the event that multiple pairs in the cycle qualify under the above rule,
then either: 1) all are declared incomparable, or 2) the same rules des-
cribed in subsection 4.4.2 can be used to select among Phose multiple pairs.
Of course, the other two correction strategies (of subsection 4.4.1
and 4.4.3) are applicable here as well, as they are general and require no
relation-specific definitions.
5.4.4 Concluding Remarks on Section 5.4
This section has described the sequential elimination structure and
associated decision rules for the multicriteria discrete states problem
In addition, it illustrated the use of the pairwise comparisons methodology
developed in the previous chapters to the MC case. In particular, it
described an example initial binary preference-indifference relation (over
the options set) that integrates the single criterion technique (of section
4.2) within a lexicographic comparison structure. Its properties were
tThe rationale is a direct result of our definition of (-, fl) in subsection
5.4.2, whereby lower rank preference indicates indifference up to that rank,
meaning that other option pairs along the same cycle exhibit more clear
cut dominance on the higher ranked criteria.
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discussed and implications for building the final binary preference-
indifference relation suggested.
In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on the lexicographic
assumption for the initial binary relation developed in this chapter. It
is clear that this assumption is quite strong and may be untenable in
some instances (see Fishburn, 1974; 1977 for a discussion). On the other
hand, it is not necessarily inappropriate in all situations for our
class of problems, especially when one considers the following:
a. In many instances in urban transportation evaluation (especially
in the context of developing countries), economic criteria (usually an
aggregate measure of users benefits) are still quite prominent, whereas
other environmental and social criteria are primarily handled on a
satisficing basis.
b. The sequential elimination phase can ensure the consideration
of these important factors by eliminating those unsatisfactory options
that do not meet some minimum levels.
c. The pairwise comparisons stage would then recognize the precedence
of economic criteria, and, if two options are preferentially indifferent
with respect to the highest ranked criterion, then the less important
criteria come into play again.
d. By allowing incomparability, the criterion-specific relations
as well as the option-wise overall preference-indifference relation
recognize the restrictiveness of a strictly lexicographic relation, and
allow for a full consideration of trade-offs, over a reduced number of
superior options, in the global comparison stage of the decision aiding
framework.
However, our methodology does not propose anything by way of
explicitly capturing preferences for trade-offs among criteria. Further-
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more, the lexicographic feature is not advocated as a normative principle
to follow. We merely presented an example binary preference-indifference
relation, which draws upon the basic methodological development of the
previous chapters, and incorparates a feature which is often observed in
practice and as such may be useful in the pairwise comparison stage of the
decision aiding framework.
It should be noted that generalization of the contents of this section
to the MC equivalent of problem subclass 2 is feasible. In particular, for
the pairwise comparisons stage, the only difference is at the level of
the criterion-specific preference-indifference relations, wheregy the con-
tinuous version of the comparison measures (of section 4.2), as described
in subsection 5.3.2, can be utilized. Beyond this minor modification, the
lexicographic aspect of the option-wise overall relation remains unchanged.
tIn this formulation, uncertainty as to the impact of each option o c 0 is
represented by p-variate probability density (or mass) functions of
(x , xi , ... , xl), where xk is the random variable denoting the impact of
oi on Ck'
§Note however that this formulation is not representative of actula appli-
cations due to its very definition and steep impact information requirements.
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5.5 Summary of Chapter 5
This chapter has consolidated the contribution of Chapter 4 by
extending themethodology in four directions:
1) Specification of alternative functional forms for the risk dimen-
sions used to build the initial preference indifference relation, in sec-
tion 5.1;
2) Integration, in section 5.2, of the well-known notion of target
within the methodology, as an elimination rule and as an alternative mech-
anism for defining the initial relation.
3) Generalization of the methodology, in section 5.3, to problem
subclass 2 where options are characterized by continuous probability
density functions over the impact domain.
4) Extension, in section 5.4, to problem subcalss 3, where the options'
impacts are expressed along a multiplicity of criteria and uncertainty is
represented via discrete states of nature.
In conjunction with the first point, an important result was estab-
lished concerning the occurrence of intransitivities in conjunction with
a strict concordance measure. In addition, problem situations where each
of the alternative specifications is appropriate were identified, and numer-
ical illustrations provided.
The second point extended the rationale of the decision rule of section
4.2 to problem situations where options are evaluated with respect to their
performance vis-a-vis a target level for the desired impacts. The proper-
ties of the so-defined binary relation were examined and some of their
implications for devising corrective strategies (as per section 4.1) dis-
cussed.
A family of decision rules compatible with the methodological struc-
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ture presented in Chapter 4 have thus been developed in the first two sec-
tions of this chapter. More important than the specific rules and measures
described is the fact that they underscore: 1) the importance of adapting
the methodology to the specifics of a given problem situation, and 2)
the flexibility of the decision aiding methodology developed in this thesis
in that regard.
The third extension presented in this chapter concerned the more general
problem formulation where options are represented as continuous probability
density functions. The applicability of the methodology to this subclass
of problems was shown to be possible, subject to respecifying the underlying
risk measures. It became apparent, however, that some loss of intuitive
appeal occurs as the discordance measure is redefined.
The fourth and last extension addressed the case where options are
exnlicitly evaluated with respect to their uncertain impact along a multi-
plicity of criteria. The same methodological structure for pairwise compari-
sons is applicable here as well, and the problem specific element needed
is the mechanism for building the initial preference-indifference relation
over the options set. An example binary preference-indifference relation
was defined, primarily to illustrate how the measures and associated
evaluation rationale developed for the single criterion case (in section
4.2) may be used in the presence of multiple criteria.
Further comments are presented in the next chapter summarizing the
thesis and its principal contributions, and suggesting directions for
further research.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
In this concluding chapter, a summary of the thesis, highlighting its
principal contribution, is presented in section 6.1. In addition, section
6.2 reviews the major concerns facing the application of the methodology by
an analyst interacting with a decision maker in an environment similar to
the one depicted in section 1.1. These concerns include the various
assumptions and possibilities open within the structure of the methodo-
logy, and aspects associated with the interaction process. Finally, direc-
tions for further research are outlined in section 6.3.
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6.1 Summary
This thesis was motivated by the need to explicitly consider uncertainty
in transportation planning decision models. While the field is currently
deficient in that respect, the restrictive assumptions and/or high input
requirements of existing formal methodologies make these generally inappro-
priate for the realities of urban transportation decision problems and their
complex environment. The objective pursued in this thesis was the develop-
ment of a decision aid, consisting of a family of decision rules embedded
within a coherent methodological structure, for a representative class of
problems (of the urban transport context), involving selection among a large
finite set of options whose impact is not known with certainty. This class
of problems was considered to arise within a prototypical decision environ-
ment consisting of an agency where an analyst is engaged in aiding a single
decision maker (or "group which speaks with one voice") in the decision
process.
A set of basic considerations underlying the methodological develop-
ment of the decision aid was derived from the characteristics of the decision
environment as well as behavioral aspects of individual decision making and
judgement, including relevant results from the behavioral science literature.
In addition to further defining the role of decision aiding, for our class
of problems, this set of considerations specified the special features that
the decision aiding methodology should possess, and as such constitutes an
important- output of this research. Based on those considerations, an overall
framework for decision aiding was developed, consisting~of three sequential
activities: elimination, pairwise comparisons and global comparison. The
second of those was the primary focus of the analytical development in
this thesis.
229
This set of considerations provided the basis upon which existing
normative decision models for choice under uncertainty were assessed, with
special emphasis on expected utility theory. The axiomatic foundation of
the latter theory was critically reviewed, especially the independence
axiom whose plausibility was questioned using a new argument relying on the
implications of that axiom on the risk dimensions underlying a choice situ-
ation. Less restrictive postulates, reflecting our basic considerations,
were proposed for the methodology developed in this thesis. In particular,
the preference-indifference relation over the set of options was postualted
to follow the properties of partial semi-orders, thus allowing incompara-
bility of options as well as intransitivity of the indifference relation.
This is a behaviorally justified departure from the usual assumption of
the existence of a complete order in decision models, and as such is an
integral part of the contribution of this research. It should be noted,
however, that partial semi-orders were not claimed as an absolute normative
representation of the preference-indifference relation, but as a model
possessing relatively rational properties for that relation within the con-
text of operationally forming that relation.
The main thrust of the methodological development in this thesis con-
sists of the pairwise comparisons procedure (within the overall decision
aiding framework), including its structure, as well as its specific elements.
The methodology revolves around the construction of a binary preference-in-
difference relation over the set of options, that is consistent with our
starting postualtes, and then using that relation to obtain a reduced sub-
set of superior options. The first component of the methodology consists
of a mechanism for comparing any two given options (yet allowing for
incomparability), thus defining an initial partial binary preference-indif-
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ference relation over the options set. Such a mechanism was introduced in
Chapter 4 for a widely occurring problem subclass where the respective payoff
of each element of a finite options set :is conditional on the realization
of one of a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states of
nature (with known probabilities of occurrence). This mechanism, consisting
of regret-based risk measures (sumarizing the implications of a binary
choice situation), and an associated decision rule, requires preferential
input from the decision maker in the form of a pair of threshold levels.
The properties of the resulting initial preference-indifference relation
were then shown to be quite unrestrictive and not necessarily in confor-
mance with the starting postulates (i.e., properties of partial semi-orders).
The detection of such inconsistencies within a given problem context
constitutes the second component of the pairwise comparisons methodology. This
thesis thus identified inconsistencies with the properties of partial semi-
orders as cycles in the graph theoretic representation of a given partial
preference-indifference relation, and presented rules for their detection.
The third component of the methodology then consists of approaches for
correcting those inconsistencies in the initial preference-indifference
relation. Three such approaches were described, and the implications of
each one examined. The remaining component of the methodology is to obtain
the reduced subset of superior options (in this case the kernel) using the
resulting "final" preference-indifference relation.
Variations on some of the specific elements of the core methodology
were then presented. In particular, alternative functional forms of the
risk measures sued to build the initial preference-indifference relation. In
addition, the commuonly used notion of target (or aspiration level) was inte-
grated within the methodlogy, as an elimination rule as well as an alter-
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native mechanism for defining the initial relation over the options set. A
family of decision rules, comprising both types of variations, were thus
defined for use, separately or jointly, within the above basic structure,
thus increasing the flexibility of the methodology and allowing the analyst
to fine tune its details to the specific decision problem situation. In
addition to analyzing mathematical properties (and their implications) of
the above variations, problem situations where each would be appropriate
were identified and illustrated via numerical examples.
Generalization of the methodology to the case where uncertainty in
the alternative options' impact is represented through probability density
(or mass) functions was presented, requiring respecification of the under-
lying risk measures (for building the initial preference-indifference rela-
tion), all else remaining unchanged. In addition, extension to a problem
subclass where options are explicitly evaluated with respect to their uncer-
tain impact along multiple cirtieria was presented. For this subclass, the
methodological structure is applicable as well, though its first component,
i.e., the mechanism for building the initial preference-indifference rela-
tion over the options set, needs to be defined. An example preference-
indifference relation was then presented, primarily to illustrate how the
basic mechanism introduced earlier may be applicable, under some circum-
stances, to the multicriteria case.
Therefore, in addition to its stated overall premise and motivation, the
principal contribution of this thesis consists of the development of a family
of decision rules and associated methodological structure, for use within a
decision aiding approach for a widely occurring (in the urban transportation
environment) class of decision problems uncer undertainty. The structure
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achieves consistency with specific postulates reflecting the set of basic
considerations, which define the features of the methodology, and as such
form an integral part of the contribution.
In addition to the above structure, the methodological contribution of
this thesis includes:
- the principal binary preference-indifference relation developed
(in section 4.2, with variations in section 5.1), based on a multidimen-
sional representation of the risk implications of a binary choice situation;
while the rationale is adapted from the ELECTRE technique (Roy, 1974;
Nijkamp and Van Delft, 1977) for multicriteria decision problems under cer-
tainty, the adaptation to single criterion decision problems under uncer-
tainty is new and particularly appropriate since the measures were derived
from risk considerations of concern in the application context, as discussed
i~ Chapter 4.
- the alternative assumptions as to the above measures and decision
rules, including the target-oriented versions, aimed at increasing the
operational flexibility of the approach.
- the "correction" strategies, in the third component of the above
methodological structure, aimed at "removing" inconsistencies with the
underlying postulates.
At a more theoretical or mathematical level, results that are worthy
of note include:
- identification and detection rule for inconsistencies with partial
semi-orders in the graph theoretic representation of a given partial
preference-indifference relation;
- derivation of several proofs concerning the properties of the
relations studied,
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Other secondary contributions are present at various points in the
thesis and are indicated in the chapters in which they occur. However, as
emphasized throughout, it is the totality of the approach that constitutes
the primary contribution of this thesis, rather than the sum of the "local"
contributions.
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6.2 Application Issues Facing Analyst
In this thesis, we have addressed the problem of an analyst, operating
in the problem environment of section 1.1, in aiding a decision maker through
the evaluation process. As stated in section 2.1, our basic premise has been
that it is possible for the analyst to structure the decision aiding acti-
vity and use analytical tools (decision aids) within this structure. Basic
considerations underlying the development of such decision aids were derived
in Chapter 2, as well as an overall framework for decision aiding. Within
this framework the focus of the subsequent methodological development was
on the pairwise comparisons stage.. However, consistently with the above men-
tioned basic considerations, which recognize the importance of context spe-
cifics, there is scope for interpretation and choice in the application of
the methodology, allowing i' to be fined tuned to the particular problem at
hand.
The analyst thus faces a number of issues, the resolution of which is
predicated upon a variety of factors, including: 1) the specific options un-
der consideration and their associated impact matrix, and 2) characteristics
of the decision maker, as well as many other circumstantial factors. A
full characterization of all possible situations, and mapping of these
situations into specific rigid procedural steps to be followed in a cook-
book fashion by the analyst is certainly outside the scope of this thesis'
contribution; furthermore, it is questionable that this degree of speci-
ficity is at all feasible for decision aiding tools in the complex urban
transportation environment (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2).
It is nonetheless possible to offer more or less specific "guidelines"
or suggestions to assist the analyst in performing his role. For instance,
most of the basic considerations of section 2.2 are also applicable to the
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general activity of decision aiding (notably propositions 2.2.3 to 2.2.8).
In addition, the identification of the principal choices available (to the
analyst) and the factors affecting their resolution can be of considerable
assistance. In the remainder of this section, we address a number of impor-
tatn concerns arising in conjunction with the application of the pairwise
comparisons methodology developed in Chapters 4 and 5. These concerns are
grouped in two categories: 1) "decision points" or assumptions relative
to the selection of a principal element within the methodology, and 2) those
related to the interaction between the decision maker and the analyst in
his use of the methodology.
Subsections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 respectively address each of the above cate-
gories.
6.2.1 Principal Methodological Choices
Two major methodological choices are of particular concern in this
subsection. The first is that of the specific risk measures and associated
decision rule underlying the mechanism for building the initial binary pre-
ference-indifference relation (i.e., in the first step of the methodological
structure of section 4.1). The second is that of a correction approach or
mix thereof, (in the third step of the methodological structure) for removing
inconsistency cycles from the graph theoretic representation of the initial
preference-indifference relation. These are discussed in turn hereafter.
Selection of Risk Measures
Within the family of measures introduced in section 4.2 and extended in
section 5.1 and 5.2, the choice as to which ones to use in building the
initial preference-indifference relation can be viewed as a two-stage one:
the first stage involves determination of whether or not to use the target-
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oriented measures (section 5.2), whereas the second stage determines the
functional forms for the concordance and discordance measures, conditional
upon the first decision.
As discussed in section 5.2, the (first stage) decision relative to
the use of the target-oriented approach (to build the initial binary pre-
ference-indifference relation ) hinges upon the validity of an assumption
on preferences over the payoff domain X, whereby all outcomes that achieve
or exceed the target level xt are considered to be preferentially equivalent.
This assumption might, for all practical purposes, be acceptable whenever
a target value xt can be identified in the problem context; for instance,
the options under consideration may have been designed to meet such a target
level (in the form of a service standard, for example). Another situation
where the use of the target would be quite appropriate is when impact infor-
mation, for each option, is available only relative to a particular level,
due to limitations of input data or impact prediction capabilities (or a
variety of other reasons, including time constraints).
However, outside of the above two situations, the measures introduced
in section 4.2 (or their variants in section 5.1) would be more appropriate
as explained in section 5.2.
The second stage decision concerns the specific functional forms of
the concordance and discordance measures respectively. While the basic
form was introduced in section 4.2, consistently with proposition 2.2.7
(as amply discussed in section 4.2 and 4.5), different variants were presented
tOf course, this discussion applies to the sue of the target oriented approach
for building the binary relation, and not to its use as the basis of an elimi-
nation rule.
§Note that this choice is open within the target-oriented approach as well.
Though the presentation in section 5.2 did not explicitly show the target
oriented parallels to the variants of section 5.1, these parallels are quite
straightforward, and will thus be assumed available to the analyst.
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in section 5.1. The different variants (and basic form) are listed in
Figure 6.1 along with the associated notation to facilitate the reader's
ability to follow this discussion.
This discussion in section 5.1 addressed the properties of those
measures, and indicated problem situations (accompanied by simple numerical
illustrations) where each would be appropriate. We will not duplicate that
discussion here, but briefly highlight the principal concerns underlying
each alternative form, and factors affecting their relative adequacy for a
particular decision situation. Those factors can be grouped in the two
types mentioned in this section's introduction; 1) those related to the
options and 2) those related to the decision maker's preferences, and more
importantly, the interaction between the two, as seen hereafter.
Concerning the choice of a functional form for the concordance measure,
both "strict" measures (c+j and c'j) are intended for situations where a
stricter basis for preference is deemed necessary, relative to the "basic"
form (cij). As discussed in section 5.1, they allow a sharper line for
differentiating between preference and indifference. Such refinement in
the representation of the decision maker's preferences may be needed when
the options exhibit substantial "overlap", i.e., when the probability of
receiving identical payoffs from two given options is relatively high.
Furthermore, when this overlap varies across options (given that it is sub-
This probability, in the discrete states formulation is given by Pk
kiSkEEij
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Figure 6.1: Summary of Alternative Risk Measures
cij
+
CijciJI
ij
dicij
m
dij
dr
ij
M basic form of concordance measure
M strict concordance measure
M normalized strict concordance measure
a basic form of discordance measure
likelihood compensated discordance measure
W conditional weighted discordance measure
W marginal weighted discordance measure
a relative discordance measure
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stantial overall), ct or the normalized strict measure is particularly
appropriate (cf. example 5.1, in section 5.1).t
The choice of discordance measure is also predicated upon the above
two groups of factors. In particular, the factors related to the options'
impact distributions consist primarily of the variation of impact within
options, the variation across options, as well as the resulting regret or
loss profile (i.e., distribution of the impact difference, for any given
option pair). Perhaps the single most important factor is whether or not
"catastrophic" losses are present. As discussed in section 5.2, such
situations clearly require the use of the "basic" form (dij). When loss
profiles are less drastic, yet exhibit substantial variation (within given
option pairs), with some states having very low probability of occurrence,
the likelihood compensated form (dIj) may be used (as illustrated in
example 5.2). Furthermore, when more than just the "worst" state needs to
be taken into account, the "weighted" variants (dc or dm ) would be appro-ii ij
priate. In addition, as illustrated in example 5.4, when the range of pay-
offs of the different options is quite wide (i.e., order[s] or magnitude),
the relative discordance measure (drj) may be appropriate, as it divides
the absolute potential loss by the corresponding realized outcome.
While the above are mere qualitative considerations in the selection
among alternative functional forms for risk measures, it is not possible
A particularly interesting case where either version of the "strict"
measure may be appropriate is in the context of the multicriteria extension
presented in section 5.4. Within the lexicographic structure, stricter
preference may be required on the higher ranked criteria before accepting
option-wise preference.
Note that this discussion on the appropriate discordance measure is not
applicable to problem subclass 2 (defined in section 1.4), since, as
explained in section 5.3, the same range of choices (as in "discrete
states" problems) is not available to the analyst.
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at this point to specify more definitive, "hard" and content free proce-
dures. Furthermore, the very nature of the general context of the decision
problems of interest (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) precludes such
specification, and dictates the need to allow the analyst (and decision maker)
to exercise a fair amount of judgement in applying the decision aiding
methodology. It is conceivable however that the accumulation of experience
through repeated use of the methodology for a specific type of problem may
produce more definite recommendations. It is however, felt that the basic
forms of both concordance and discordance measures are generally the most
appropriate and plausible for urban transportation applications. However,
when some of the above mentioned special situations arise, the flexibility
exists to accomodate them. Of course, the variants presented in section 5.1
and reviewed here have by no means exhausted all special situations nor all
possible variants, as it is equally possible for the analyst to generate
other variants if deemed necessary.
Selection of Correction Approaches
Three approaches were described in section 4.4 for affectingadjustments
in an initial unrestrictive partial binary preference- indifference rela-
tion (containing inconsistency cycles which violate the properties of partial
semi-orders) towards a final relation free of inconsistency cycles. These
approaches were comparatively assessed in section 4.4 and the differences
in the respective preferential implications highlighted. As a reminder, these
approaches are:
1. preferential indifference among cycle elements,
2. breaking "weakest link", and
3. mutual incomparability among cycle elements.
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As discussed in section 4.4, whereas the first makes a relatively strong
preferential assumption (by interpreting the precence of a cycle as an
indication of preferential indifference), which may be highly questionable
in many situations, the second and third approaches utilize the non-completeness
of the relation by declaring incomparbility between two or more cycle ele-
ments. For instance, the second approach seeks in interpretation within a
specific relation of the "weakest link" of a cycle, and subsequently "breaks"
the cycle by declaring the endpoints of that link incomparable, as described
in subsection 4.4.2. The third approach is more "passive" as it "refuses"
to accept any of the inconsistently connected elements by declaring all
cycle elements mutually incomparable.
It was further mentioned in section 4.4 that an analyst could utilize
more than one approach in a particular problem. We elaborate hereafter on
the analyst's possibilities, identify principal factors that s/he should
consider, and accordingly suggest strategies which s/he may follow in
certain situations.
The first decision of course concerns whether to adopt one correction
approach throughout, and apply it to all cycles, or to employ different
approaches for different cycles. This decision is to be taken by the analyst
and decision maker being counseled; it is preferable to proceed situation-
ally, by waiting to face a specific cycle configuration in the graph of the
actual initial relation.
The factors that affect the analyst's choices at that point are:
1. number of inconsistency cycles, both in absolute and relative to
the size of the problem;
2. size of each inconsistency cycle, i.e., the number of elements
connected by it;
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3. decision maker's preferences;
4. circumstantial characteristics of the interaction process including
time constraints, decision maker's availability and others.
For instance, in the presence of only a few inconsistency cycles, within
a problem with a relatively large number of options, the third approach would
probably be recommended. It is clear that such an approach cannot mis-
represent the decision maker's preferences, and can be executed without the
decision maker's input. However, as explained in section 4.4, the price
exacted for this value-neutrality could be a significant reduction in the
decidability of the overall problem as in the case where a large number of
options are connected by inconsistency cycles.
Similarly, a small-sized inconsistency cycle is better suited for reso-
lution by the third approach than by any of the other two. Largert cycles
are more appropriately treated by thn second approach, which only "des-
troyp" a small number of links. Thus, for a problem with a large number
of cycles, small cycles could be treated by the third approach, with larger
ones to be resolved by the second approach.
The application of the second approach may further entail another deci-
sion for the analyst to take, as described in subsection 4.4.2. In parti-
cular, it was stated in-that subsection that when the efficient set of
option pairs (corresponding to end nodes of the links along a given cycle) is
large, selection of the "weakest link" may proceed either situationally (by
having the decision maker directly identify that link), or according to a
set rule (specified in that subsection). It was clear that the situational
approach is preferable from the standpoint of representing the decision
tAs an arbitrary rule of thumb, consider "large" cycles as those with 5 or
more nodes.
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maker's preferences, though it is more demanding on the decision maker's
time. Therefore, in the presence of a large number of inconsistency cycles
which cannot be resolved by the bi-criterion rule (cf. subsection 4.4.2), the
analyst has to consider the constraints on the time available for the de-
cision aiding activity in determining whether to seek the decision maker's
input or to resort to the alternative assumption.
As stated earlier, the first approach is the most questionable theo-
retically. It may however be used if its underlying assumption conforms to
the decision maker's preferences. There is, however, no way of determining
in any conclusive fashion whether or not this is the case. Therefore, if
informal interaction with the decision maker reveals the acceptablity of
this assumption, then it may be used. It is however, recommended that its
applicability be limited to small sized cycles.
In summary, a number of factors enter the determination of which correc-
tion approach to apply to a particular cycle. In general, it is preferable
to limit the use of the first appraoch to smaller cycles, if at all. The
third approach, on the other hand, is the least risky one, and is recom-
mended for situations where its implementation would not lead to a drastic
loss of decidability of the overall problem (such as in the presence of a
small number of cycles in a problem with a large number of options). How-
ever, in cases where a substantial number of cycles are present, it is
recommnended that the second approach be used for large cycles, while the
third one would resolve the small cycles (unless an unduly large number of
those exist). In using the second approach, time constraints and the decision
maker's availability are important factors in determining the identification
rule (of the weakest link) to be followed.
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It is clear that these are merely guidelines and suggestions that are
meant to complement rather than supplement the analyst's judgement in
conducting the decision aiding activity.
6.2.2 Interaction Between Analyst and Decision Maker
This subsection addresses a number of important concerns faced by the
analyst with regard to the interaction with the decision maker in the use
of the methodology developed in Chapters 4 and 5. In particular, the
methodological development in Chapter 4 assumed the existence of decision
maker supplied threshold values c and d, as input to the mechanism for
building the initial relation (1' 1)" No further specification of the
process by which those two values can be otained has been presented. As
discussed in the introduction to this section, the nature and the mechanics
of the interaction are better handled on a context specific basis, thus
adapting to a number of factors, including:
- the specific set of options under consideration;
- characteristics of the decision maker, such as his familiarity with
the decision problem at hand, his knowledge of the specific options at
hand, his prior experience (if any) with the methodology, among others;
- time and other resource constraints;
- the specific problem under consideration; in particular, whether any
of the preferential inputs of the evaluation are known a priori (in the
form of legislated constraints, prior decision, etc.).
Again the final adaptation is the prerogative of the analyst. Figure
6.2 depicts a possible sequence of steps adapted from ELECTRE (Roy, 1971;
Nijkamp and Van Delft, 1977) that can be followed by the analyst in conducting
the pE.irwise comparisons stage of the decision aiding framework. This se-
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quence reflects proposition 2.2.5 (progressive difficulty in preference
elicitation), by letting the decision maker start at a high concordance
threshold and low discordance threshold (reflecting a fairly "confident"
statement on behalf of the decision makert) and then progressively
decreasing ; and/or increasing d (reflecting less confident preferential
statements). At every step (i.e., new threshold values pair), inconsis-
tencies are identified and removed, and only the kernel is retained for
the next step (cf. Chapter 4 for the methodological details.)
Another important associated concern is that of what information
to display to the decision maker in the above process. Of course, propo-
sition 2.2.7 is applicable here, in addition to having been already invoked
in communicating the implications of a binary choice situation via the two
intuitively understandable risk measures, which also serve as a medium for
eliciting preferential information. Thus, the analyst should present the
decision maker with all the concordance (cij's) and discordance (dij's)
measures for all the comparisons that would be affected by the requested
threshold values. However, in most realistic problems, the number of the
(cij, dij) pairs under consideration is likely to be too large for useful
(numerical) display, thus the need to summarize this information. Histo-
grams (for cij and dij separately and also possibly jointly) may be parti-
cularly appropriate for this task.
Note in addition that the discordance information should be presented
along with the value of dmax (see Equation 4.2)S in order to "anchor" the
tRemember that cij - 1 and dij W 0 imply complete dominance of oj by oi
Or, if a variant of this measure is used, the corresponding quarterly
in the denominator should be displayed.
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Figure 6.2: Possible Interaction Sequence
tIn addition, the impact information may also be presented along with
those options, as well as the list of eliminated options.
1. Analyst displays cj 's and dij's to decision maker (DM)
2. DM supplies threshold values (c, d).
3. "Processing: with appropriate computational support, analyst
obuilds initial relation
*identifies and corrects inconsistencies (may
decide to seek DM input)
4. Analyst prespnts DM with reduced subset of options resulting
from (c, d)
5. If DM is satisfied (i.e., reduced subset of sufficiently small), thus
pairwise comparisons state is terminated.
Otherwise, c 's and di's, for reduced subset of options, are
redisplayed.
6. If DM is not willing to further lower c and/or raise d, then pair-
wise comparisons stage is terminated.
Otherwise, DM lowers c and/or raises d, and process goes back
to step 3.
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values of dij (which are all in the interval [0,1]). In some cases (de-
pending on the decision maker), it may be preferable to display the dis-
cordance measures directly as differences in impact, prior to normalization.
The chief reason is that it may be easier to elict the threshold value d,
reflecting the maximum tolerable regret, directly in the units in which
the impact information is expressed.
Of course, the interaction pattern presented in this subsection is
highly schematic. It does however give a flavor of how the methodology
developed in this thesis might be used in the overall decision aiding
process.
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6.3 Directions for Further Research
There are three major directions along which further research related
to this thesis can proceed:
- research on issues immediately related to the contents of this
thesis.
- research towards major extensions of the methodology presented
herein.
- research in pursuit of the same general aim guiding this thesis;
this aim, stated in Chapter 1, consists of developing an integrated
structured analytical apparatus for transportation evaluation and decision-
making, that would be cognizant of the complexity of the decision problems,
and operation in terms of being compatible with the realities of the
decision environment.
Along each of the above directions, a number of issues and topics
can benefit from further research, as discussed hereafter.
Immediate Issues
The principal issue arising in conjunction with this thesis is of a
general nature as it concerns the evaluation of decision aids. In other
words, it is legitimate to wonder whether a decision aid improves the
"quality" of decision; however, the answer to that question is a dilemma,
and remains as yet unresolved, as noted by Einhorn and Hogarth (1981).
The latter also note the lack of validity of one-shot case studies as a
basis of evaluation of a decision aid, especially when variations across
decision-makers and their environments preclude any such generalization.
Nevertheless, it is felt that applications to real problems will yield
further insights into the usefulness of a decision aid, and may result
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in better guidelines for its use.
At a more methodological level, specific points (related to the
development presented in Chapter 4) which may benefit from further
research include the possibility of formalizing the analyst's allocation
of analysis resources to specific inconsistency cycles (in the graph of
the initial partial binary preference-indifference relation) and
subsequent matching of correction strategies. This may be accomplished by
some form of prioritization scheme by which different inconsistency cycles
would acquite different degrees of "urgency" (depending on their size,
type and relation to other components of the graph).
Another specific research issue, primarily of a decision theoretic
nature, is the characterization and identification of cycles that violate
the properties of partial interval orders (a more general fort of semi-
orders proposed by Fishburn, 1973); the latter may be considered as an
alternative assumption to partial semi-orders for representing the
preference-indifference relation over the options set.
Major Extensions of the Methodology
In Chapter 5, we showed the applicability of the methodological
structure to multicriteria decision problems under uncertainty, subject
to the definition of an acceptable mechanism for building the initial
binary preference-indifference relation. Such a mechanism was developed,
also in Chapter 5, for a special case where a lexicographic assumption
(based on a hierarchical rank ordering of the criteria) may be acceptable.
The limitations of such an assumption were however recognized and discussed
in that chapter. Thus the need remains for a more general mechanism for
that extremely important formulation, which would nonetheless retain the
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consideration is a major area for future development, which contributes
towards the general aim guiding this thesis.
In a previous review (Mahmassani, 1980b), fundamental difficulties
and "paradoxes" associated with aggregation of multiple actors preferences
were highlighted. Furthermore, the dynamics of multiple actor decision-
making processes, which involve bargaining and negotiation, clearly
challenge the realism of formal normative decision models, especially in
the urban transportation context where no explicit, systematic and mutually
agreed upon rules govern the interaction process. However, in the decision
environment depicted in section 1.1, it is possible to take institutional
preferences into account in the decision aid via a number of mechanisms.
For instance, a proposed approach with the following features seems
worthy of further development:
a. analyst (using decision aid in interaction with single decision-
maker) attempts to describe (or predict) the acceptability to all other
actors of any option under consideration);
b. "acceptability" can be expressed in a number of ways. The
following operational definition is proposed: "probability of accepting
a particular option." This definition suggests the use of probabilistic
discrete choice models to obtain that measure as a function of option
attrbitues and a given actor's characteristics (along the lines of
McFadden, 1977).
It is clear that the considerable experience accumulated in discrete
choice modeling in the area of travel demand analysis renders the
development of descriptive institutional preference models an accessible
objective.
Another extremely important and continuing area of research, which
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behavioral features of the basic considerations (cf. Chapter 2). In
particular, first steps taken in this direction during the course of
this research have suggested that such a relation should ideally allow
for lexicography over subsets of criteria (instead of over individual
criteria, as in the model presented in section 5.4). Furthermore, the
rationale of Luce's (1978) lexicographic trade-off model, was considered
particularly appealing for such a relation, whereby compensatory action
(between different criteria) previals when preference by a lexicographic
semi-order cannot be established. This last feature could be instilled
in the extension described in section 5.4, by viewing the compensatory
aspect as a means of reducing incomparability in the lexicographic model
presented. However, the mechanism for capturing compensatory action in a
manner that is consistent with our basic considerations was not specified,
and as such remains a major area for further research.
Towards General Aim
In the description of the prototypical decision environment in section
1.1, it was stated that the final outcome of the decision process was
predicated upon the interaction of a number of actors, with varying
perceptions and (usually conflicting) objectives. It was further stated
that the inter-actor interaction process had different methodological
requirements than the intra-actor (i.e. single decision-maker interacting
with analyst) process. However, despite its clear and acknowledged impor-
tance, taking multiple actors into account within systematic evaluation metho-
dology has been relatively absent from the repertoire of transportation eva-
luation methods, as suggested by the review in section 1.3. Such explicit
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is essential to the use of systematic decision aids, such as the one
developed in this thesis, concerns problem formulation and the generation
of the needed input information. Though the formulation(s) pursued in
this thesis is realistic and representative of current modeling
capabilities, and in some cases of current practice, our review in
section 1.2 (of approaches for dealing with different types of uncertainty
in transportation planning) revealed that considerable research
opportunities exist in:
- recognizing sources and types of uncertainty in specific decision
situations involving different transportation systems and problems. The
categorization presented in section 1.2 is a first step in that direction.
- empirically analyzing those uncertainties, and analytically
representing them in the prediction methodology.
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APPENDIX A
SEQUENTIAL ELIMINATION STRUCTURE AND DECISION RULES
This appendix specifies the details of the elimination stage of the
decision-aiding framework presented in section 2.3. The rationable behind
that stage was discussed in that section as well. It was further mentioned
that it would proceed in an Elimination-by-Aspects, or EBA-like fashion,
combining lexicographic features with conjunctive rules, based on
proposition 2.2.6. Section A.2 describes the sequential elimination
structure, followed in A.3 by the types of measures and associated
elimination rules. The specification of these details is pursued in the
context of problem subclass 3 (where impacts of options are expressed along
multiple criteria and uncertainty represented via discrete states of
nature)t which is first stated in A.1.
The reasons for discussing elimination within this subclass were
articulated in section 2.3. Note however that it is applicable to the
other subclasses as well.
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A.1. Problem Formulation
Given a Pareto-optimal or non-dominated set of n options 0 - {ol,
0o2, .. , n)}, the problem is to select a most preferred option o* c 0.
Uncertainty is represented through a set of m mutally exclusive, collec-
tively exhaustive states of nature S {(S1, S2 , ..., Sm) with known proba-
bilities of occurrence P w {(P, P 2' "0'' Pm ), where P. E P denotes the
probability of occurrence of state Sj c S. It is again assumed that the
P 's are independent of which option o* 0 is selected.
The impact of each option is expressed by a vector of impacts along
p criteria C = {C1 , C2 , *... Cp), conditional upon the realization of a
state of nature. Let X {x 2 ..., x denote the conditional
ij i i ij ., ij
kimpact of oi given the realization of S E S, where xij is the impact of o.
along criterion Ck should Sj occur. A given option oj E 0 is thus charac-
terized by the m-tuple X i {Xil' Xi2' "9" Xim }
The elimination stage of the decision aid seeks to reduce the size
of the options set 0 by eliminating some of its elements from further con-
sideration based on preferential information which operates at the indi-
vidual option level, as described hereafter.
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A.2 Sequential Elimination Structure
Tversky's (1972) EBA model described individual choice behavior as
a sequential elimination activity, whereby an "aspect" (of the options being
evaluated) is selected, and all options unsatisfactory on that aspect are
eliminated.t This is followed by the selection of another aspect which
itself becomes the basis of further elimination, etc. ... until all options
but one are eliminated. To the extent that Tversky's model was concerned
with describing observed choices (or revealed preferences), aspects selection
was postulated as a stochastic phenomenon with the probability of selecting
a given aspect proportional to its respective importance.
The use of elimination in our normative decision-aiding framework
exhibits two important differences with respect to the above descriptive
model:
1. the elimination phase is not generally intended to reach one single
final solution, but merely to reduce the size of the set of options with
a minimal amount of cognitive strain.
2. aspects selection is not purely endogenous to the decision-maker,
but affected by analyst interaction.
It follows from those points that the order in which aspects are
considered is not really an issue (in terms of the outcome of the elimination
phase), since an option that is not satisfactory on any of the considered
aspects is ultimately eliminated.& Thus all aspects that the decision-
This model is considered byFishburn (1974) as a special case of a more
general class of lexicographic models.
§As such, it is patterned after mental operations and activities that the
individual decision-maker is likely to feel comfortable with, especially
at the beginning of the evaluation process, as empirical evidence cited
in subsection 2.2.6. seems to indicate.
Order is however a factor in Tversky's model when additional aspects are
considered until a single option remains.
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maker can form with confidence are considered. In that sense, the sequential
elimination process ends by the inability to further form meaningful aspects,
rather than by a rule based on the number of the remaining options. In that
sense, the stopping rule is left up to the analyst in a particular problem
setting rather than being a constraint of the methodology.
The resulting general structure of the elimination phase is as follows:
a. An "aspect" (broadly defined) is formed as a result of analyst/
decision-maker interaction.
b. Each option o•LO is screened individually to determine whether
or not it is satisfactory with respect to that aspect.
c. If oi is not satisfactory on given aspect, then it is eliminated
from further consideration. Otherwise, it remains eligible for further
reduction.
d. After rema.ning options are determined, a "new" aspect is
formed, also as a result of interaction with the decision-maker. Steps
(b) to (d) are thus repeated until no further aspects can be formed.
Note that we explicitly stipulated that "aspects" are broadly
defined. Typically, they would consist of conjunctive rules (or set
thereof) operating on deterministic or probabilistic measures computed
from the m-tuples i ; VoleO. This problem is addressed in the next
subsection.
tThe question naturally arises as to what if all but one option are indeed
eliminated before exhausting relevant aspects. The answer, pragmatically,
is that the remaining option is thus the desired solution. However, in
most problem situations where this decision aid is needed, such simplified
strategies would not be sufficient to reach the desired solution.
lAgain, we maintain the assumption that no unique single solution will
emerge by this process.
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A.3 Elimination Measures and Decision Rules
This subsection addresses the problem of forming aspects for use in the
above sequential elimination structure. While many such aspects are straight-
forward, either because they correspond to current practice, or are extremely
intuitive, the analyst can additionally suggest some less obvious measures
judiciously selected for the problem context so as to capture some of its
otherwise non-apparent interactions. This is particularly true for the
multi-criteria (MC) problem, where the analyst may perceive "aspects" that
the decision-maker should consider but may not have otherwise noticed in the
initial impact information (i e., the problem as defined in section A.1).t
As "aspect" is thus defined as a condition (or set thereof) that each
option should meet in order not to be eliminated. The underlying decision
rules therefore are conjunctive rules, which can operate on different types
of information, including both deterministic and probabilstic information.
Deterministic Information
The simplest of course consists of a minimum acceptable score along
any criterion, which may be state-specific or valid across all states of
nature. Thus, if x denotes this minimum level for criterion C kC themin k
decision rule is simply:
k kif xl >min V Sj S, then reject oi, for all oi  O0.j1 2 in can be defined
More generally, a vector Xmi n  [xi n , min ,  can be defined
such that
if Xij < Xmin , V Sj e S, then reject oi, for all oi E O.
Within the above structure, such levels can be set either separately
or jointly in any combination.
tThe reader is reminded of the description of the decision problem
environment given in section 1.1, whereby the analyst and decision-
maker are within the same agency and thus share an amount of context-
specific knowledge.
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Probabilistic Information
a. Marginal Probabilities
In this case, we are interested in controlling for the marginal
probability of scoring below some critical level, x r, for some CkEC.cr k
Whereas xin is an absolute minimum level to be achieved with certainty,
Xcr translates a situation where an inevitable finite probability exists
k
of an undesirable (i.e., below x ) outcome. A typical example is controlling
cr
for the probability of "ruin" (defined with respect to xk on Ck) being
cr k
below a given level. Mathematically,
k k k
if p(xij < x cr) <max , then reject o , for all o e 0,
where p(xi.< x r) jx.<x
ij cr
k k
and x is the maximum acceptable probability of scoring below x .
max cr
Auseful way of framing that same rule is in terms of a target level,
in the same sense as in subsection 5.2.1. In this case, we would be
interested in the probability of exceeding that target being greater than
a minimum value. While being mathematically equivalent, these two
interpretations may have important operational distinctions. For instance,
when dealing with a design service level that the contemplated facility should
offer, framing in terms of the probability of achieving that target level
is more appropriate (see section 5.2). Subsection 2.2.7 gives further
explanation as to the importance of these distinctions.
It can be seen that the elimination rule presented in subsection 5.2.1.
based on a two-dimensional target-oriented risk measure is an extension of
the above rule, which is directly applicable here. The redefinition of the
risk measures' functional form (specific in section 5.2.1.) is straightforward
for the MC problem, and will thus not be presented here.
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b. Joint Probabilities
More generally, one can control for the joint probability of scoring
below a vector of critical levels defined over any subset of criteria, i.e.,
k k
if p(x < xc, k = 1, ...,p) > Pin then reject oi, for all ocO,i crmi' in
where p(x < k = 1,
kl Xij<xcr
and Pmin is the minimum acceptable probability of obtaining a vector
of scores below the critical vector.
Similarly, one could consider (both marginal and joint) probabilities
of x .being within pre-specified intervalst instead of simply exceeding a
lower bound. The range of possible specifications is obviously quite wide.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the elimination phase is
particularly well suited for handling non-quantitative critera, such as
aesthetics, community disruption, etc. Aspects could then be defined
based on categorical information (e.g., high, low, etc.).
To conclude this section, it should be noted that while the ideas
underlying the elimination phase are to a large extent obvious, it is
recognized as a plausible step which should be performed as part of the
decision aiding framework. As discussed in Chapter 1, current practice
in transportation planning includes many examples of the use of satisficing
service standards, as in the case of statewide programming. We thus try
to take advantage of an approach that decision-makers feel comfortable
with to reduce the size of the problem.
A recent example from the Cairo, Egypt setting includes the development
of a "political desirability index" and its use in conjunction with a
tOdom et al. (1979) use this formulation in a multiobjective subset
selection problem under uncertainty.
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cut-off rule to eliminate options that are not institutionally acceptable
(Mahmassani and Gakenheimer, 1981b).
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APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS
USED IN DECISION THEORY
This appendix presents a number of fundamental mathematical concepts
and definitions frequently used in decision theory, and at various
instances throughout this thesis. The material presented herein draws
heavily on Fishburn (1973a) and White (1976); those texts should be
consulted for additional information and more advanced material.
Binary Relatiozs
A binary relation R, defined over a set X consists of a particular
property which exists between two elements .x, y E X. The notation
[Ix) R y] means as "x has the relation R to y." For example, if X is the
set of legislators the relation "is more powerful than" is a binary
relation, whereby [x R y] means that congressman x is more powerful than
congressman y. The notation (x,y) c R is sometimes used to denote
[x R y]. Thus a binary relation R on a set X is a subset of ordered
pairs in the product X x X.
If R is a binary relation on X, and x,y C X, then exactly one of
the following holds: 1) [x R y] and [y R x]; 2) [x R y] and not [y R x];
3) not Ix R y] and [y R xJ or 3) not Ix R y] and not [y R x].
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Properties of Binary Relations
The following are a few properties that binary relations may possess
that are of interest in decision theory:
1. Reflexivity: R is reflexive when [x R x] is a true assertion.
2. Irreflexivity: R is irreflexive when [x R x] cannot be a true
assertion.
3. Symetry: R is symmetric when [x R y] 4*[y R x].
4. Asymmetry: R is asymmetric when [x R y] = not [y R x].
5. Antisymmetry: R is antisynmetric when {[x R y] and [y R x]}) x-y
(the "equal" sign indicates that x and y are identical).
6. Transitivity: R is transitive when {[x R y] and [y R z]} * x R y
7. Completeness: R is complete when [x R y] or [y R x], V x,y c X.
This property is also referred as connectedness or comparability.
Special Binary Relations
Some binary relations possessing compatible combinations of the
above properties are frequently encountered in decision theory and have
therefore been given special names. A number of these are defined
hereafter.
1. Equivalence Relations: An equivalence relation E defined as
a set X is a binary relation on X which has the following properties:
- reflexivity
- symmetry
- transitivity
Order Relations: An order relation usually refers to a
transitive binary relation. Order relations are usually classified in
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two categories:
- asymmetric orders; these are necessarily irreflexive, and
include preference relations.
- reflexive orders; these are not asymmetric, and include
indifference relations.
Letting P denote an asymmetric order relation, the following are
common special cases of asymnetric orders:
a. strict partial order: P is irreflexive and transitive
b. weak order: P is asymmetric and negatively transitive
c. linear order: P is irreflexive, transitive and complete. The
prime example of a linear order is the relation > on the set of real
numbers.
Reflexive orders are usually discussed in conjunction with
preference-or-indifference relations, consisting of the union of a
preference relation P (usually an asymmetric order) and an indifference
relation I (which is usually reflexive). The resulting preference-or-
indifference relation R is defined as [x R y] if and only if [x P y] or
[x I y]. Common types of reflexive orders include the following
combinations of properties:
a. preorder: R is reflexive and transitive
b. weak order: R is transitive and complete
c. partial order: R is reflexive transitive and antisymmetric
d. complete (or total) order: R is transitive, complete and
antisymmetric.
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A frequently encountered example of a complete order is <, defined
over the set of real numbers.
The above were only basic mathematical definitions.
